The Price of “Peace” 

By David White
December 13, 2005
The American Enterprise Online
Original Source: http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.18902/article_detail.asp

 “Hopelessness is worse than homelessness,” cried Dr. Abdalla Adam, the director of relief and development for the Darfur Peace and Development Organization, “and the people of Darfur are both.”
 
When he spoke those words in the nation’s capital a few short weeks ago, it was evident that desperation had reached a new height in Darfur. Because even though Dr. Adam was joined by four other experts whose policy prescriptions differed, they were equally demoralized by recent events in the region—and agreed the situation was dire.  
 
These days, such sentiments are commonplace. In a New Republic article just last week, Eric Reeves, a veteran observer of the crisis, wrote, “If we really believe that something should be done to save Darfur, then we have to do it now. Soon, it will be too late to do anything at all.” In writing those words, he joined the ranks of those who now believe that after three years of turmoil, the genocide is finally nearing an end. The reason? There is no one left to kill.
 
Although many claim otherwise, it would be deceitful to declare that the world has ignored the terrible tragedy in Northern Africa. After all, the United Nations Security Council has passed five resolutions in less than two years—imposing sanctions, sending inspectors, and creating a peacekeeping mission—and twice each week, the U.N. System in Sudan issues an up-to-date report on the situation in Darfur.  
 
Moreover, the United States has been a team player. No longer willing to act unilaterally, the U.S. has taken part in multiparty, multinational negotiations, given sanctions, inspectors, and the peacekeepers a chance to work, and exhibited the diplomatic patience of a saint. Not once has the U.S. threatened to use force, let alone promised “serious consequences.” 
 
Yet all the world has to show for this dedication to “peace” is the murder of nearly 500,000 innocent civilians, and the terror, rape, and displacement of 2.5 million others. Good thing we know that “war is not the answer.”   
 
Despite these illustrations of the horrors that often come with “peace,” opponents of the Iraq war who scream about its “costs” are finding greater sympathy—and more support—than ever before. Most of the media has been a willing pawn in this game, providing blanket coverage to Cindy Sheehan’s Thanksgiving camp and Representative Jack Murtha’s call for an immediate withdrawal, all while ignoring Senator Joe Lieberman’s declaration that “our troops must stay” and refusing to mention the probable consequences of an early withdrawal.  
 
What is most shocking, however, is the lack of attention paid to the default argument of those who continue to claim that the President “misled” the nation into war: the absurd notion that inaction would have carried no price. 
 
Aside from the most obvious comparisons to Darfur—resolution upon resolution, ineffective inspections, and endless sanctions—Saddam Hussein’s Iraq demonstrated the utter impotence of the U.N. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, as many as 100,000 Shiites in Southern Iraq were killed in their spontaneous uprising against Saddam’s government. And in Northern Iraq, millions of Kurds were displaced by Saddam's attempts to crush their similarly timed revolt. This all came in addition to the Anfal campaign of the late-1980s, which slaughtered nearly 200,000 innocent Kurds, including many who were killed by Saddam’s chemical weapons. 
 
In the 12 years between the end of the first Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.N. was certain that Saddam was seeking to conceal his weapons activities, yet was entirely unable to confirm whether or not he even possessed any weapons. And under the U.N.-imposed sanctions regime, Saddam—and many of his apologists—blamed the suffering of innocent Iraqis on the economic sanctions, even though the real reason for their distress was his manipulation of the oil-for-food program.
 
And in the months after September 11, despite the belief—shared by the Russians, French, Germans, and every other intelligence agency in the world—that Saddam possessed deadly weapons, the U.N. refused to authorize military action. 
 
With this reality, “utter impotence” seems too kind a description. Yet words can go no further.
 
Today, nearly three years after the invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration has been forced to continue defending its rationale for war. On the same day that five of the nation’s foremost experts gathered to discuss the ongoing genocide in Darfur, Vice President Cheney was deployed, yet again, to make their case. 
 
As he concluded his remarks, he stated, “The United States…is making the world a better place by defending the innocent, confronting the violent, and bringing freedom to the oppressed. We understand the continuing dangers to civilization, and we have the resources, the strength, and the moral courage to overcome those dangers and lay the foundations for a better world.”   
 
If only the U.N.—not to mention the “enlightened” liberals at home and abroad—could make such claims. Perhaps then the world would make good on its perpetual pledges to right the gravest wrongs. 
 
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the member states of the U.N. General Assembly gathered to unanimously pass the Genocide Convention. “Never again” became the rallying cry. But then came Cambodia. Then Iraq. Then Rwanda. Then Bosnia. Then Kosovo. And now, Darfur.
 
In each case, nothing done by the U.N. saved a single life. Only the U.S.—and NATO—was able to make a difference. Yet time and again, the U.S. stands as the object of disdain, and the world has turned to the U.N. for temporal salvation. One wonders if they will ever learn.
 
 
David White is assistant editor of The American Enterprise.