'Beirut spring' to Assad's end? By Austin Bay January 20, 2006 The Washington Times Original Source: http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20060119-085301-5529r By Austin Bay Published January 20, 2006 Two events sparked Lebanon's 2005 Beirut spring, that street revolution of protests and pro-democracy demonstrations that ultimately forced Syria to end its two-decade-long military occupation of Lebanon.     The first revolutionary fire-starter was Iraq's historic January 2005 election. The Iraqis trekked to the polls, despite terrorists' threats, encouraging democrats throughout the Middle East, but particularly in Lebanon.     Murder, however, provided the ultimate spur. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was a Lebanese nationalist with the guts to challenge Syria's vicious and corrupt Assad regime. The Valentine's Day 2005 assassination of Hariri pushed hundreds of thousands of Lebanese into the streets.     Lebanese of all political and religious stripes suspected the orders to kill Hariri came from Syria. The assassination clearly was an act of terror designed to thwart Lebanese nationalist and democratic aspirations -- and continue Syrian control.     Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America, the assassination might have achieved those goals. There were no other choices. New Iraq, however, has created new political and democratic options.     Instead of cowing the population, the assassination energized Lebanon's opposition. Lebanese aggressiveness, backed by explicit Western support, forced Syria to pull out. Media coverage of Lebanese protests put Syria under intense pressure. The U.S. Army on Syria's border, and an Iraqi government angry at Syrian support of Iraqi terrorists, certainly encouraged Syrian caution.     After Syria's withdrawal, key questions remained about Hariri's murder. The biggest ones centered on Syrian dictator Bashar Assad. Did Mr. Assad give the orders to kill Hariri?     The United Nations ordered an investigation of Hariri's assassination. German jurist Detlev Mehlis pursued leads with a fierceness that surprised the Syrian government and impressed critics who thought the U.N. investigation would be a feel good gesture with little substance. Mr. Mehlis finessed Syrian attempts to obstruct his investigation and ultimately produced evidence of Syrian involvement in the crime.     The legal pursuit of Mr. Assad continues. Last week, Belgium's Serge Brammertz officially replaced Mr. Mehlis. Mr. Brammertz has been an International Criminal Court prosecutor. He is tasked with continuing to probe Hariri's killing as well as terrorist bombings in Lebanon since October 2004. Mr. Brammertz also has spine: He called Mr. Assad as a witness.     Mr. Assad can ignore Mr. Brammertz -- the prosecutor has no means of enforcement other than political pressure. Political pressure, however, is building. Former Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam is talking. Mr. Khaddam -- a 74-year-old politician who once worked for Bashar Assad's father, Hafez al-Assad -- resigned as vice president in June 2005 and went into exile. (Hafez al-Assad died in 2000.)     Mr. Khaddam recently told the German magazine Der Spiegel that the attack on Hariri was... one that could only have been set into motion by the highest-ranking members of the power structure in Lebanon and Syria.     I am convinced, Mr. Khaddam added, that the order [to kill Hariri] came from Assad.     Mr. Khaddam is no democratic dream. He's a Syrian Ba'athist and a Hafez al-Assad Old Guard loyalist. He helped orchestrate Syria's occupation of Lebanon. He understands the world has changed, however, and has begun organizing a government in exile. He claims he supports political and economic liberalization. He told an Arab interviewer Syria must change from within. ... If the main vector for change is external, then the interests of the country are harmed. However, he knows international political support for regime change is essential.     Mr. Khaddam isn't clean. He's a conniver. But he may be a transitional leader acceptable to Syria's security services, and one certainly preferable to the chaos of a civil war.     Unlike rogue Iran, Syria lacks oil cash. It's an economic basket case and vulnerable to economic pressure. Unlike North Korea, it cannot seal itself in a Stalinist shell. TV satellite dishes dot too many Syrian roofs. Mr. Assad can kick journalists out of Damascus, but Syria's borders are permeable.     On its own, an international judicial inquiry won't topple Mr. Assad. However, the Syrian military, pressured by U.N. investigators, squeezed by economic sanctions and goaded by a government in exile, just might.          Austin Bay is a nationally syndicated columnist.