THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (MONUC): A CASE FOR PEACKEEPING REFORM Testimony of Dr. Nile Gardiner1 Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy The Heritage Foundation2 March 1, 2005 House Committee on International Relations: Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Members of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations. Thank you for holding today's hearing on an extremely important issue: widespread abuses carried out by United Nations personnel against refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and implications for U.N. peacekeeping reform. This hearing will undoubtedly shine a huge spotlight on a major scandal in the heart of Africa, which has until now received relatively little attention from Congress and the world's media. In the Congo, acts of great evil and barbarism have been perpetrated by United Nations peacekeepers and civilian personnel entrusted with protecting some of the weakest and most vulnerable women and children in the world. Congress has a vital role to play in helping ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. It is my hope also that this hearing will help prevent abuses on this scale from ever occurring again in current and future U.N. peacekeeping operations. Personnel from the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo stand accused of at least 150 major human rights violations.3 This is almost certainly just the tip of the iceberg, and the scale of the problem is likely to be far greater. The author is grateful to Joseph Loconte, William E. Simon Fellow in Religion and a Free Society, at the Heritage Foundation, for his advice and suggestions. Heritage Foundation foreign policy intern Nicole Collins assisted with research for this testimony. The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization operating under Section 501(C)(3). It is privately supported, and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees. 2 1 1 The crimes involve rape and forced prostitution of women and young girls across the country, including inside a refugee camp in the town of Bunia, in northeastern Congo. The alleged perpetrators include U.N. military and civilian personnel from Nepal, Morocco, Tunisia, Uruguay, South Africa, Pakistan, and France. The victims are defenseless refugees, many of them children, who have already been brutalized and terrorized by years of war and who looked to the U.N. for safety and protection. The U.S. Congress should act to ensure that the U.N. personnel involved are brought to justice and that such barbaric abuses are never repeated. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has acknowledged that "acts of gross misconduct have taken place."4 A draft United Nations report has described sexual exploitation by U.N. personnel in the Congo as "significant, widespread and ongoing."5 In the words of William Lacy Swing, Annan's special representative to the Congo, "We are shocked by it, we're outraged, we're sickened by it. Peacekeepers who have been sworn to assist those in need, particularly those who have been victims of sexual violence, instead have caused grievous harm."6 This scandal raises serious questions about U.N. oversight of its peacekeeping operations and the culture of secrecy and lack of accountability that pervade the U.N. system. The fact that abuses of this scale are taking place under U.N. supervision is astonishing, and it is inconceivable that officials in New York were unaware of the magnitude of the problem at an early stage. There are major doubts surrounding the effectiveness and scope of the U.N.'s own internal investigation into the Congo scandal, conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, headed by Under Secretary General Dileep Nair.7 A confidential U.N. report obtained by The Washington Post revealed that "U.N. peacekeepers threatened U.N. investigators investigating allegations of sexual misconduct in Congo and sought to bribe witnesses to change incriminating testimony."8 According to the Post, 3 For background, see Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, "Sex and the U.N.: When Peacekeepers Become Predators," The Independent, January 11, 2005; Jonathan Clayton and James Bone, "Sex Scandal in Congo Threatens to Engulf U.N.'s Peacekeepers," The Times, December 23, 2004; and Marc Lacey, "In Congo War, Even Peacekeepers Add to Horror," The New York Times, December 18, 2004. "Annan Vows to End Sex Abuse Committed by U.N. Mission Staff in DR of Congo," U.N. News Center, November 19, 2004. Colum Lynch, "U.N. Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo; Peacekeepers Accused in Draft Report," The Washington Post, December 16, 2004. 6 7 5 4 "U.N. Outraged by Sex Abuse," CNN.com, January 10, 2005. Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, January 5, 2005, at http://www.monuc.org/downloads/0520055E.pdf Colum Lynch, "U.N. Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo; Peacekeepers Accused in Draft Report," The Washington Post, December 16, 2004. 8 2 the report also cites instances where peacekeepers from Morocco, Pakistan, and possibly Tunisia "were reported to have paid, or attempted to pay witnesses to change their testimony." The Congo abuse scandal is the latest in a string of scandals that have hit U.N. peacekeeping operations across the world. Indeed, it appears that U.N. peacekeeping missions frequently create a predatory sexual culture, with refugees the victims of U.N. staff who demand sexual favors in exchange for food, and U.N. troops who rape women at gunpoint. Allegations of sexual abuse or misconduct by U.N. personnel stretch back at least a decade, to operations in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. Despite previous U.N. investigations, and Kofi Annan's declaration of a policy of "zero tolerance" toward such conduct, little appears to have changed in the field.9 The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) Established in 1999, MONUC is currently authorized by Security Council Resolution 1493. It is the world's second biggest U.N. peacekeeping mission, with a total of 13,950 uniformed personnel, including 13,206 troops, 569 military observers and 175 civilian police. In addition, there are 735 international civilian personnel and 1,140 local civilian staff. 47 U.N. member states have contributed military personnel, and 20 countries have contributed civilian police personnel toward MONUC.10 The MONUC Force Commander is Major-General Samaila Iliya of Nigeria. The biggest peacekeeping contingents (based on September 2004 figures) are from Uruguay, (1,778 soldiers), Pakistan (1,700), South Africa (1,387), Bangladesh (1,304), India (1,302), Nepal (1,225), and Morocco (801).11 There are no U.S. personnel serving as peacekeepers or military observers with MONUC. U.S. Funding of MONUC An issue of great concern to Congress should be the scale of U.S. funding for the Congo operation. U.N. peacekeeping operations paid for with U.S. public funds should be accountable to American taxpayers, who expect U.N. officials and peacekeepers to conduct themselves with honor and integrity. For further background, see Joseph Loconte, "The U.N. Sex Scandal," The Weekly Standard, January 3/10, 2005; Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, "Sex and Death in the Heart of Africa," The Independent, May 25, 2004; and Michael J. Jordan, "Sex Charges Haunt U.N. Forces," The Christian Science Monitor, November 26, 2004. 10 9 MONUC, "Facts and Figures", January 31, 2005, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html MONUC, "Military Contributions," September 12, 2004, at http://www.monuc.org/ContribMilit.aspx?lang=en. 11 3 The United States and is the biggest financial contributor to MONUC, providing about a third of its operating budget of $746 million. The U.S. contribution to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Congo has been substantial. If 2005 figures are included, the U.S. will have contributed roughly three quarters of a billion dollars ($759 million) toward MONUC since 2000, according to State Department figures. The U.S. is expected to contribute $249 million toward MONUC in FY 2005, and $207 million in FY 2006.12 U.S. Funding for Worldwide UN Peacekeeping Activities The United States is the world's biggest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations, contributing 27 percent of the total worldwide U.N. peacekeeping budget. The U.S. is expected to contribute over $1 billion toward U.N. peacekeeping activities across the world in FY 2006. Over the past decade the United States has made a huge contribution toward U.N. peacekeeping operations. Since 2001, including 2005 figures, the United States will have contributed $3.59 billion toward U.N. international peacekeeping operations.13 According to the General Accountability Office (GAO), the United States gave the U.N. $3.45 billion in direct contributions to conduct peacekeeping operations between 1996 and 2001.14 This figure is dwarfed by the estimated $24.2 billion in indirect contributions made by the US to help support 33 U.N. peacekeeping operations in 28 countries during that five-year period. 15 There are currently 428 U.S. personnel serving in U.N. peacekeeping operations across the world, in the Middle East, Kosovo, Georgia, East Timor, Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Haiti. They are overwhelmingly civilian police, including 309 serving with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). There are only 6 American troops under U.N. command (three in Haiti and three in Liberia).16 12 See U.S. Department of State, "Account Tables," at http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2003/7809.htm; U.S. Department of State, "The Budget in Brief: Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request," February 7, 2004, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/41676.pdf; and U.S. Department of State, "UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)," April 12, 2001, at http://www.state.gov/p/io/fs/2001/2512.htm. Based on State Department figures. 13 14 UN Peacekeeping: Estimated US Contributions, Fiscal Years 1996-2001, General Accountability Office (GAO), February 2002, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02294.pdf 15 Ibid. The GAO defines indirect contributions as "US programs and activities that are located in the same area as an ongoing UN peacekeeping operation, have objectives that help the peacekeeping operation achieve its mandated objectives, and are not an official part of the UN operation." UN figures. See also Marjorie Ann Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress", Congressional Research Service, January 11, 2005, at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB90103.pdf 16 4 Questions for Congress There are many key questions that arise from the scandal and which merit congressional scrutiny: · Why has the U.N. failed to effectively prevent abuse by its personnel given its tarnished record in previous peacekeeping operations? Why did the U.N. take six months to release its own internal report on the Congo abuse scandal? To what extent were the U.N. Secretary-General and other senior U.N. officials aware of the abuses by U.N. personnel in the Congo before media reports began to surface? Can the U.N. be relied upon to objectively conduct its own investigations into allegations against its peacekeepers and civilian staff? How can U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel accused of human rights abuses be prosecuted for their crimes? What measures can be implemented to ensure that future U.N. peacekeeping operations are transparent, accountable, and run in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? What mechanisms should be put in place to ensure external oversight of U.N. operations? What impact should the Congo scandal have on future U.S. contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping budget? · · · · · · Key Recommendations for Congress and the United States Government · The United States should call for a Security Council-backed fully independent investigation into the MONUC abuse scandal, to cover all areas of the MONUC operation. In addition there should be independent investigations launched into allegations of abuse by U.N. personnel in other U.N. peacekeeping operations, including Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Burundi. The United States Government should pressure U.N. member states to prosecute their nationals accused of human rights violations while serving as U.N. peacekeepers. The U.N. should lift diplomatic immunity for its own staff accused of criminal acts in the Congo, opening the way for prosecution. · · 5 · The Security Council should exclude countries whose peacekeepers have a history of human rights violations from future operations. The U.N. should publicly name and shame those countries whose peacekeepers have carried out abuses in the Congo. The U.N. should make publicly available all internal reports relating to the Congo scandal, and outline the exact steps it plans to take to prevent the sexual exploitation of refugees in both existing and future U.N. peacekeeping operations. Fully independent commissions of inquiry should handle all future investigations into human rights abuses by U.N. personnel. An external oversight body, completely independent of the U.N. bureaucracy and staffed by non-U.N. officials, but backed by a Security Council mandate, should be established to act as a watchdog over U.N. operations, including humanitarian programs and peacekeeping operations. The United States should also set up its own U.N. oversight unit, answerable to Congress, specifically charged with monitoring the use of American contributions to United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. This could be funded by diverting part of the annual U.S. assessed contribution for the United Nations. Congress should withhold a percentage of the U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations unless U.N. personnel responsible for criminal activity are brought to justice. Serious consideration should be given to the establishment of an elite training academy for U.N. peacekeeping commanders, backed by the Security Council. · · · · · · Conclusion The Congo episode has further undermined the credibility of the United Nations and raises serious questions regarding the effectiveness of the U.N.'s leadership and the U.N.'s Office of Internal Oversight Services. The U.N. has consistently failed to publicize, prevent and punish the criminal behavior of its own personnel in trouble spots across the world. The sexual abuse scandal in the Congo makes a mockery of the U.N.'s professed commitment to uphold basic human rights. U.N. peacekeepers and the civilian personnel who work with them should be symbols of the international community's commitment to protecting the weak and innocent in times of war. The exploitation of some of the most vulnerable people in the world--refugees in a war-ravaged country--is a shameful episode, a betrayal of trust, that will haunt the United Nations for years to come. 6 Appendix 1 MONUC Military Contributions As of 09/12/2004 Country Algeria Bangladesh Belgium Benin Bolivia Bosnia Burkina Faso Cameroon Canada Chile China Czech Republic Denmark Egypt France Ghana India Indonesia Ireland Jordan Kenya Malawi Malaysia Mali Marocco Mongolia Mozambique Nepal Niger Nigeria Pakistan Paraguay Peru Poland Romania Russia Senegal Serbia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Tunisia UK Ukraine Uruguay Zambia Pays Algerie Bangladesh Belgique Bénin Bolivie Bosnie Burkina Faso Cameroun Canada Chili Chine République Tchèque Danmark Égypte France Ghana Inde Indonésie Irelande Jordanie Kenya Malawi Malaysie Mali Maroc Mongolie Mozambique Népal Niger Nigeria Pakistan Paraguay Péru Pologne Romanie Russie Sénégal Serbie Afrique du Sud Espagne Sri Lanka Suède Suisse Tunisie Angleterre Ukraine Uruguay Zambie Milobs 11 23 5 13 7 5 12 5 8 0 12 3 2 28 5 21 46 13 3 30 37 21 20 23 2 2 2 21 18 37 38 18 5 3 27 27 20 0 13 2 2 6 3 32 5 16 49 24 725 Contingent 0 1304 0 0 202 0 0 0 0 0 218 0 0 0 3 460 1302 175 0 0 6 0 0 0 801 0 0 1225 0 0 1701 0 0 0 0 0 459 6 1387 0 0 0 0 464 0 0 1778 0 11491 Totals 11 1327 5 13 209 5 12 5 8 0 230 3 2 28 8 481 1348 188 3 30 43 21 20 23 803 2 2 1246 18 37 1739 18 5 3 27 27 479 6 1400 2 2 6 3 496 5 16 1827 24 12216 Source: MONUC Website, at http://www.monuc.org/ContribMilit.aspx?lang=en 7 Appendix 2 MONUC's Mandate & Resolutions MONUC's mandate is defined by the Security Council's resolutions. The current mandate is mostly provided by Resolution 1493, dated 28 July 2003, whereby the Security Council, acting under the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized the increase of MONUC's military strength to 10,800. According to this resolution the Security Council: - Requests MONUC, which convenes the International Committee in support of the Transition, to coordinate all the activities of the United Nations system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to facilitate coordination with other national and international participants in support of the transition; - Encourages MONUC, in coordination with other United Nations agencies, donors and non-governmental organizations, to provide assistance during the transition period for the reform of security forces, the re-establishment of a State based on the rule of law and the preparation and holding of elections throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; - Authorizes MONUC to assist the Government of National Unity and Transition in disarming and demobilizing those Congolese combatants who may voluntarily decide to enter the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), pending the establishment of a national DDR program in coordination with the United Nations Development Program and other concerned agencies; - Authorizes MONUC to take the necessary measures, in the areas of deployment of its armed units, to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment; to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, in particular those engaged in missions of observation, verification and DDRRR; to protect civilians and humanitarian workers under imminent threat of physical violence; and to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided; *In order to fulfill its mandate, the Security Council authorizes MONUC to use all means in Ituri district, and as deemed necessary and within the limits of its capacities, in the Kivu's. This is the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Source: MONUC Website, at http://www.monuc.org/MandateEn.aspx 8 Appendix 3 Top Contributors to UN Worldwide Peacekeeping Missions Country 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15 16. 17. 18. 19. 20 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. Pakistan Bangladesh India Nepal Ethiopia Ghana Jordan Nigeria Uruguay South Africa Morocco Kenya Senegal Brazil Ukraine China Argentina Namibia Sri Lanka Poland France Chile Tunisia Ireland Niger Philippines United Kingdom United States Austria Benin Russia Togo Canada Sweden Germany Turkey Spain Romania Bolivia Peru Personnel 8,183 7,942 5,154 3,453 3,428 3,335 2,929 2,884 2,497 2,317 1,704 1,675 1,575 1,367 1,204 1,038 1,006 886 778 724 606 582 523 476 468 455 431 428 417 411 363 323 314 303 296 293 260 239 231 226 Source: Ranking of Military and Civilian Police Contributions to UN Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Website, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2005/January2005_2.pdf 9 Appendix 4 Worldwide UN Peacekeeping Missions Mission UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) MONUC (UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) UNOCI (UN Operation in Cote D'Ivoire) ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi) UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone) UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) UNMISET (UN Mission of Support for East Timor) MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) UNMOGIP (UN Observer Group in India and Pakistan) UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) Personnel 15,775 13,950 7,392 6,224 5,460 4,167 3,546 3,364 1,994 1,023 959 619 229 152 133 44 19 Total 65,050 Source: UN Missions Summary of Military and Civilian Police, United Nations Peacekeeping Website, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2005/January2005_4.pdf 10