Testimony of John R. Bolton at the House hearing on The Future of the United Nations under Ban Ki-Moon

February 13, 2007
Original Source: http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/bol021307.htm


Chairman Lantos and members of the Committee.  I wish to thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to address “The Future of the United Nations Under Ban Ki-Moon.”  Since this is my first appearance before the Committee under its new leadership, I want to congratulate both Chairman Lantos and Representative Ros-Lehtinen for assuming their new positions.
 
            The United States strongly supported Ban Ki-moon’s candidacy to become Secretary General, based on his record over the years, including the fact that he was well known to many of his from his service at the Republic of Korea’s Embassy here in Washington during President George H.W. Bush’s Administration.  During that period many of us worked with him, especially on the ROK’s efforts to become a member of the United Nations, which it achieved, along with the DPRK, in September, 1991.
 
            He faces an unquestionably difficult task, on many substantive policy fronts, but I will focus here today, as the Committee has requested, on the perennial subject of UN reform.  Over the past two years, and especially since the September, 2005 Summit, there has been a substantial effort at reforming the United Nations.  Unfortunately, even the concept of reform has meant many different things to different governments, and, as a result, the effort has been diffuse, often at cross-purposes with itself, and largely unsuccessful.  The UN, of course, is a complex system, with many specialized agencies, so for today’s purposes, I will concentrate on the main UN Organization in New York, although much of what we discus will have implications for the system as a whole. 
 
I take “reform” at the UN to mean making it more effective, more efficient, more responsive and more transparent, both in its governance structures, its Secretariat, and its far-flung field operations.  There is serious room for improvement in all of these areas.  Unfortunately, the UN has still not recovered from the negative impacts of the Oil for Food scandal, widespread procurement fraud, sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers, in large measure because necessary reforms have not been adopted.
 
The view that enormous reform is needed is obviously not mine alone.  When Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who chaired the Independent Inquiry Committee (“IIC”) investigating the Oil for Food Scandal, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2005, he described his findings and recommendation in stark terms.  He referred to “deep-seated systemic problems in UN administration” and  “the importance of maintaining high ethical standards has been lost.”  These observations have not changed.  Asked during the SFRC hearing if there was a “culture of corruption” at the UN, Volcker said there was not, although there was corruption, but he said he was most concerned by the “culture of inaction” he found.  That telling phrase  --  “culture of inaction”  --  unfortunately describes much not only about the lack of success in the reform effort, but about the UN organization as a whole.
 
            The response must be as substantial as the problem.  In September, 2005, addressing the general Assembly, Secretary of State Rice called for a “revolution” of reform, an apt description of what was than  --  and still is  --  needed.  In presenting his report to the General Assembly on March 7, 2006, on UN procedures and systems, as required by the September Summit, former Secretary General Kofi Annan called for “a radical overhaul of the entire Secretariat,” and a “thorough strategic refit,” as foreshadowed in his earlier report “In Larger Freedom.”  So strongly did we all feel about the need for reform that a unanimous General Assembly, with the full support of Secretary General Annan, in December, 2005, imposed a six-month commitment cap on the Secretariat’s spending power, in a concerted effort to move reform along.  
 
            Unfortunately, today, after almost two years of effort, there is precious little to show.  On key aspects of management reform, progress has been minimal.  The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly shredded Secretary General Annan’s systems reforms by a vote of 108-50-3.  Almost all of the world’s industrial democracies voted to support Annan’s proposals, but we were defeated by an over-two-to-one majority.  A similar vote was held shortly thereafter in the General Assembly plenary, leaving the Secretary General’s proposals, which we thought in most cases were only first steps, for dead.  Significantly, the fifty countries supporting reform in the Fifth Committee contribute approximately 90 percent of the assessed contributions to the UN, whereas the over-100 opponents together contribute only 10 percent.  
 
On the mandate review, also ordered by the September, 2005 Summit, the Secretariat identified some 9,000 separate and distinct mandates that had been created for the Secretariat over the years, and a working group established by the general assembly set out to review them, looking for obsolete mandates to be terminated, redundant mandates to be consolidated, and inefficient or in effective mandates to be reformed or eliminated.  Faced with intense opposition by the Group of Seventy-Seven (“G-77”) and the Non-Aligned Movement (“NAM”), the process stalled out.  As of today, no mandates have been eliminated, no mandates have been consolidated, and no mandates have been reformed.  Intense opposition from the G-77 came in part from our efforts to eliminate such deadwood as the Division of Palestinian Rights, two General Assembly committees on Palestine that serve no discernable purpose other than harassment of Israel and its friends, and to look seriously at the continuing utility of UNRWA (“UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees”) in its current configuration.  Thus, in all but formal interment, the mandate review effort is dead.
 
            Some argue that substantial reforms have taken place, but the record is spotty.  The UN’s new ethics office is desirable but long overdue.  Frankly, the most important advance for ethics at the UN in recent times was Secretary General Ban’s personal and honorable decision to make his own financial disclosures public at the very start of his tenure, thus lifting a cloud that had hovered over the SG’s office in recent years.  
 
Other recent changes also appear to have limited utility.  New whistle-blower protection regulations, for example, have been criticized by the UN staff union for failing to protect the very people they are designed to encourage to come forward with problems they have encountered.  The staff union ordered an extensive study of the regulations by Sir Geoffrey Robertson, an international human rights lawyer, which describes the inadequacies of the UN’s procedures concerning the processing of conduct and performance charges against UN personnel.  
 
            Changes in UN audit procedures and safeguards are a far cry from what Chairman Volcker’s IIC recommended.  For example, instead of truly effective and independent internal and external audit mechanisms, little has been changed internally, and only an external audit advisory committee has been established, with no real authority.  The risk of substantial procurement fraud thus continues, as ongoing investigations and indictments by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and others continue to remind us of the scope of the problem.
 
            The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (“OIOS”) remains a frail imitation of a real “Inspector General,” with true independence and clout within the Secretariat.  It is now almost exactly fifteen years since then-Under Secretary General Dick Thornburgh proposed a real IG for the UN, and it is still not a reality.
 
            The new Peace Building Commission (“PBC”), now over a year old, has barely gotten itself organized, and has little to show for its work.  In the meantime, in the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (“DPKO”), UN peacekeeping operations have continued to grow, increasing the strain on management and staff there, and increasing the likelihood of catastrophic failure due to inadequate oversight and problem-solving capability.
 
            The new UN Human Rights Council (“HRC”), replacing the discredited Human Rights Commission is no better than its predecessor, serving largely as a vehicle for anti-Israel resolutions rather than an unbiased source of pressure on the world’s worst human rights abusers.  The United States correctly decided last year not to seek election to the new HRC, and we should follow that path, and not seek election this year either.  If anything, we should move to defund the HRC to express our displeasure.  I know that the United States vote against the resolution was controversial with many Members of the Committee, but even strong Administration critics supported our position, and, if I may say so modestly, even patted my ego, such as the Sunday, February 26, in the New York Times, entitled “The Shame of the United Nations,” which said:  “When it comes to reforming the disgraceful United Nations Human Rights Commission, America’s Ambassador, John Bolton, is right;  Secretary General Kofi Annan is wrong;  and leading international human rights groups have unwisely put their preference for multilateral consensus ahead of their duty to fight for the strongest possible human rights protection.  A once-promising reform proposal has been so watered down that it has become an ugly sham, offering cover to an unacceptable status quo.  It should be renegotiated or rejected.”  Many editorials since the HRC has actually come into operation echo these words.
 
            What conclusions emerge?  I think that the only sensible conclusion, based not just on the last two years, but on efforts on UN reform that in my own case go back to 1989, the start of the Bush 41 Administration, is that we need a fundamentally new approach.  Efforts at incremental or marginal reforms are simply insufficient to keep ahead of the problems we encounter.  Failure to reform leaves us with fewer choices in our foreign policy, because the UN is not seen as effective or capable of handling challenges we might otherwise wish to assign it.  Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has already proposed some modest management reforms, particularly to deal with the overload facing the critically important DPKO, where large equities are at stake for the United States.  Nonetheless, in just over a month in office, he has already run into enormous resistance from the G-77.  This does not bode well for the future, although I believe the United States should continue to support and encourage the Secretary General to make the necessary hard decisions now, early in his tenure, before the tidal-force inertia of Turtle Bay overcomes him.
 
Accordingly, I believe that our only real chance for sustained and lasting reform is to move the UN system away from a system of assessed contributions toward a system of voluntary contributions.  I recall for you testimony I gave before this Committee just over a year ago on that subject:
 
I also note, as this Committee has observed, that there are differences in performance based on the way different entities were funded.  UN agencies are primarily funded through assessed contributions, while funds and programs are typically funded through voluntary contributions.  Catherine Bertini, former UN Secretary General for Management, and former head of the World Food Program (WFP), noted that ‘Voluntary funding creates an entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN.  At WFP, every staff member knows that we have to be as efficient, accountable, transparent and results-oriented as is possible.  If we are not, donor governments can take their funding elsewhere in a very competitive world among UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral governments.’”
 
We will now have a case study at WFP, UNICEF and the UN Development Program in what the Wall Street Journal has called the emerging “cash for Kim” scandal, to see if these voluntarily funded programs can respond quickly.  Will they follow the UN’s “circle the wagons” mentality when the Oil for Food scandal broke, or will they, as Secretary General Ban indicated, open themselves to truly independent external audits so that the full story can emerge?  
 
            A system of voluntary contributions will  allow UN members to judge the effectiveness of the various parts of the UN system, and demand results.  Non-responsive programs and funds can be defunded, effective agencies and personnel can be rewarded and augmented, and, most importantly, the crippling mentality of “entitlement” that pervades the main UN organization will be stripped away.
 
            Some argue that voluntary funding will lead to uncertainty in the income flows to the UN system.  I would have to say, based on the performance we have seen, some measure of uncertainty would be a good thing, not a negative.  Those agencies that currently rely on voluntary funding have certainly adapted to the uncertainty, and there is no inherent reason why other units of the UN system could not adapt as well.  In some cases, a “replenishment” mechanism, similar to that used for the international financial institutions, might be appropriate, so that UN member governments could agree for a period of, say, three years, what their respective funding levels would be.  They key is that whatever amounts are pledged would be voluntary, and if performance has been inadequate or other priorities have arisen, adjustments could be voluntarily made at the next replenishment negotiation.  
 
            Other opponents of voluntary funding argue that such an approach would create a “UN a la carte,” with member governments only funding programs they deem desirable.  I consider this a plus as well.  Why shouldn’t member governments pay for what they want, and get what they pay for?
 
            Finally, some argue that voluntary funding puts too much power in the hands of the United States and a few other major contributors such as Japan, recalling instances of withholding or threatened withholding of America’s assessed contributions and the attendant ill-will allegedly caused thereby.  I think the historical record is to the contrary.  Each of the key examples of American withholding has had visible and positive effects on international organizations subjected to them.  The massive Congressional withholdings of the mid-1980’s and the mid-1990’s resulted in substantial changes in the UN system, and smaller statutory withholdings have signaled powerful U.S. opposition to certain selected programs.  Ronald Reagan’s decision to withdraw from UNESCO, and the consequent elimination of America’s twenty-five percent assessment enormously changed that organization.  The threat by the Bush 41 Administration in 1989 and 1990 to defund any UN agency that admitted the PLO as a member state unquestionably stopped the PLO campaign in its tracks, and prevented its exploitation of specialized agencies like the World Health Organization for political purposes.  Most recently, the prospect of massive defunding of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the “OPCW,” established by the Chemical Weapons Convention), helped in our campaign to replace the ineffective Director General and replace him with sound leadership.  These all demonstrate the power of our financial contribution to international organizations, which we should not hesitate to use.
 
            I have no illusion that moving from assessed to voluntary contributions will be an enormously difficult struggle, requiring a real change in the culture in New York.  But only a change of this magnitude can replace the “culture of inaction” with a culture fully deserving our support.
 
            Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to try to answer any questions the Committee may have.