Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan I. Introduction 1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, respect for the ceasefire and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations in the Sudan. The report provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since my previous report to the Council, dated 20 August 2007 (S/2007/500), as well as an update on the activities of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and recommendation for extension of the Mission’s mandate, which expires on 31 October 2007. II. Implementation of the major elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2. The parties did not make significant progress during the period under review on the major outstanding issues of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, namely, the status of Abyei, demarcation of the 1956 border between northern and southern Sudan, completion of the security arrangements and preparations for elections. Legislation required for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement also did not make progress, as the National Assembly remained in recess for the holy month of Ramadan. At the same time, the security situation remained calm, but volatile. While a stand-off between the parties’ armed forces at Muglad, Southern Kordofan, on 7 September was resolved peacefully, there has been increasing tension around the unresolved 1956 border. 3. The relationship between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has been further strained by the slow progress on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. During my visit to the Sudan from 3 to 6 September 2007, I appealed to both parties to resolve their differences on key outstanding issues, and stressed that the United Nations stood ready to assist them in this regard. However, as indicated later in the present report, on 11 October SPLM suspended its participation in the Government of National Unity, saying that its return would be conditional on progress on a list of issues of concern related to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At the time of reporting, the parties were engaged in direct political consultations at the highest level in an effort to resolve the impasse; however, a final outcome was still pending. Security 4. While the overall security situation in the UNMIS area of operations remained generally calm and no major incidents were reported, there were signs of instability. In southern Sudan, scattered incidents of inter-ethnic violence were reported in Eastern Equatoria and Warrab States, as well as in Jonglei, where clashes in August between Murle and Nuer fighters reportedly left over 80 dead. Most incidents were linked to cattle rustling, private feuds and/or undisciplined acts by disgruntled soldiers. 5. On 7 September, former Popular Defence Forces of the Misseriya tribe who have aligned with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) were besieged by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the town of Muglad, in Southern Kordofan. Escalating tensions were defused by the rapid intervention of the Ceasefire Political Commission, which issued a decision on 8 September giving the SPLA-aligned elements in Muglad seven days to withdraw to the south, and stipulating that they should move without their weapons, in civilian clothes, and only after obtaining prior permission from the SAF and SPLA. The same decision applied to another SPLA-aligned group of former members of the Popular Defence Forces in Abo Matarik (Southern Darfur). In order to enable monitoring and verification of the decision, the parties agreed to temporarily lift the restrictions on the freedom of movement UNMIS in sector VI, Abyei. However, the seven-day timeline given by the Ceasefire Political Commission was not met by the SPLA, which has officially advised the Ceasefire Political Commission that movement of these elements will not be possible until January 2008, owing to logistical constraints and the rainy season. 6. There was no significant further progress in the redeployment of the parties’ armed forces since my 20 August report. According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, SAF was required to complete redeployment of its forces north of the 1 January 1956 boundary by 9 July 2007. This process has yet to be completed. As at 15 October, 79.8 per cent of a total of over 46,000 SAF troops had been redeployed, of which 11.7 per cent were “voluntarily demobilized” soldiers who were still considered by SPLA to be active SAF forces. Under the terms of a July ruling by the Ceasefire Political Commission, SAF agreed to complete terminal payments to the “voluntarily demobilized” troops by the end of 2007, after which SPLA would accept them as redeployed. SAF acknowledges that approximately 3,600 SAF troops remain in southern Sudan, but claim that these forces are required to protect the oilfields, pending the full deployment of joint/integrated units. Meanwhile, 7.7 per cent of some 59,000 SPLA troops have been redeployed south of the approximate 1956 boundary. According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, SPLA redeployment is to be completed within six months of the full formation of the joint/integrated units, which has not yet been achieved. SPLA columns have temporarily halted redeployment to facilitate proper monitoring and verification, since many troops had moved without prior notification. Meanwhile, SAF has indicated its objection to the redeployment of SPLA troops to assembly areas that it believes are north of the 1956 boundary. These issues have been referred to the Ceasefire Political Commission for its consideration. 7. The Joint Military Teams have verified that the mobilized strength of the joint/integrated units rose slightly, to 81 per cent, of the envisaged establishment of 39,000 joint/integrated unit troops. On 11 September, the SPLA and SAF agreed to hand over security of the Petrodar oil installation at Adar, Upper Nile, to the local joint/integrated unit, monitored by UNMIS. However, in general, the formation, training and deployment of the joint/integrated units remain well behind schedule. Joint command and control is largely ineffective, with the SAF and SPLA components of the joint/integrated units reporting to their respective headquarters rather than through the joint/integrated unit chain of command. 8. Both parties have made progress in incorporating other armed groups aligned to them into their formal ranks. While the SPLA has declared that all aligned other armed groups have been fully integrated, the collaborative committee of the other armed groups is currently assessing SAF claims that no SAF-aligned other armed groups remain in southern Sudan. Political 9. As noted above, during the reporting period, tensions increased in the political relationship between NCP and SPLM. While both parties continued to assert their commitment to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, differences over implementation issues intensified, and trust between them became ever more fragile. 10. During my visit to the Sudan from 3 to 6 September, I held a series of meetings in Khartoum and travelled to Juba in southern Sudan, as well as to Darfur. In my meetings with President Omar Al-Bashir and the First Vice-President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, they both stressed their commitment to the full and timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including the holding of free and fair national elections. However, both parties also expressed concern about different aspects of the peace process. Senior officials of NCP emphasized the need for donors to fulfil their pledges of financial support to the peace process and for SPLM to play its full role as a partner in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. For its part, SPLM expressed the view that NCP was delaying implementation in key areas, namely the redeployment of forces, the resolution of the Abyei issue, the demarcation of the 1956 border and transparency in the sharing of oil revenues. I urged both parties to continue to work hard on outstanding issues of divergence, and to show the flexibility necessary to keep the implementation of the peace process on track. 11. Consultations between the parties on these issues continued during much of the reporting period, with the question of Abyei remaining high on the agenda. While NCP and SPLM held a number of joint high-level political meetings on the issue, little tangible progress was made, and the boundaries of the proposed Abyei interim civil administration are still undecided. The parties have established a 14member team to consider the northern borders of Abyei, using reference documents from 1974 and soliciting the views of the local communities. 12. Meanwhile, the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee responsible for demarcation of the 1956 boundary between northern and southern Sudan briefed the Presidency on its work in September. The Presidency instructed the security agencies in all border states to provide their full support to the Committee’s work. The Border Committee began planning for an international workshop on the demarcation process, with United Nations and donor support. Its final report is now expected in early 2008. 13. In the course of September and October, SPLM raised increasingly forceful objections to the slow pace of progress on a number of issues, in particular redeployment, oil revenue-sharing and preparations for the census and elections. On 10 September, the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, opened the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly with a speech in which he warned of the risk of a return to conflict if progress on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was not made. On 15 September, the Government of Southern Sudan invited the Abyei Boundary Commission to brief a wide range of southern Sudanese officials on the methodology of the Commission’s original report, whose findings NCP had rejected in March 2006. On 27 September, the Government of Southern Sudan made public its own map of the territory of southern Sudan, based on the recommendations of an international consultant and including a provisional rendition of the 1956 boundary. These moves were criticized by NCP officials as unilateral. 14. Preparations for the national census, which is formally scheduled to take place from 4 to 16 February 2008, continued but attracted controversy. Census mapping, undertaken with the support of UNMIS and United Nations partners, reached 66 per cent coverage in southern Sudan and was expected to be completed by the end of November. However, insecurity and floods impeded the mapping process, and funding remained a major constraint. Delayed disbursement of the Government of National Unity commitment of $30 million for the period from June to September led to the deferment of activities, jeopardizing overall preparations. Differences over the census questionnaire resurfaced, with the parties divided over whether to include questions on ethnicity and religion. 15. The continued deadlock on these issues contributed to a general deterioration in relations between the parties, which was compounded by localized tensions after the police raided SPLM offices in Khartoum in mid-September, as part of a city-wide search for illegal weapons. SPLM reacted angrily, and tensions were defused only after senior NCP officials apologized for the incident. 16. On 11 October, following a week-long meeting of its Interim Political Bureau, SPLM announced that it had recalled its ministers, state ministers and presidential advisers from the Government of National Unity. Explaining the decision, SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum cited the lack of progress on the issues of Abyei, border demarcation, redeployment, transparency of oil revenues and preparations for the census and elections, and indicated that the ministers would resume participation in the Government of National Unity only after these issues had been resolved. SPLM also stated that NCP had encroached upon the constitutionally mandated powers of First Vice-President Salva Kiir Mayardit, failing to consult on key decisions and withholding approval of a recommended reshuffle of SPLM ministers. 17. Reacting to the SPLM move, NCP stated to the press that the suspension was unjustified, since joint mechanisms already existed to tackle the outstanding issues on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. NCP released several documents stating that SPLM and Government of Southern Sudan had also violated and delayed implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including by exceeding the mandated powers of the Government of Southern Sudan and by delaying its redeployment of forces. 18. On a positive note, the parties rapidly convened high-level political talks to address the crisis. At the time of reporting, the NCP and SPLM delegations remained engaged in intensive consultations, while the United Nations has offered its support if required. 19. Meanwhile, the National Assembly extended its summer recess until 22 October, to accommodate the holy month of Ramadan and the Eid al-Fitr holiday. A heavy legislative agenda is pending, much of it essential to preparing for national elections in 2009. While the National Constitutional Review Commission continued its consultations on a draft elections bill, differences reportedly remain over the form of the electoral system and the number of seats in the National Assembly and the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. Depending on the electoral system, seats may be associated with subnational electoral circumscriptions whose boundaries are yet to be established. 20. During the reporting period, other commissions on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement continued work to reach agreement on plans for future activity. The Commission for the Protection of the Rights of non-Muslims in the National Capital met on 30 August and approved workplans for subcommittees, including on religious education. The National Civil Service Commission convened for the first time on 22 August and is establishing mechanisms to implement the CPA provision that 20 to 30 per cent of civil service posts should be allocated to southerners. 21. The Government of Southern Sudan continued to reorganize its institutions and strengthen its capacity. The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly reconvened for its fourth session on 10 September with a heavy legislative agenda, focused on the establishment of the rule of law and corrections. With the support of UNMIS and United Nations agencies, line ministries worked to develop their three-year budget plans, intended to ensure transparency and accountability of fiscal expenditure. The Third Interim National Council of SPLM met on 18 and 19 August and reviewed progress in the SPLM transformation from a liberation movement to a political party. 22. Several state legislatures made significant efforts to address issues of corruption and hold officials to account. Notably, Upper Nile State witnessed good cooperation between the NCP-led state government and the SPLM-dominated state assembly. In Central and Eastern Equatoria States, new payam (district) administrative units were created in an effort to improve grass-roots inclusion and service delivery. However, the pace of integration of the wartime SPLA administration into the new civil service remained slow. In addition, many local administrators are still not receiving regular salaries. 23. In Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, the incoming Governors took steps to establish their administrations. On the whole, the handover of power from NCP to SPLM in Blue Nile and from SPLM to NCP in Southern Kordofan was implemented peacefully. While the Nuba Mountains part of Southern Kordofan remained generally stable, insecurity in the western part of the state, which borders Southern Darfur, gave rise to concern. In Blue Nile State, on 23 September, Governor Malik Agar (SPLM) formally established the “Al Tadamon” locality designed by his NCP predecessor. The proposal had earlier met with strong opposition from the SPLM, which saw it as politically motivated. The new administrations in both States are now faced with taking forward implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as meeting the population’s expectation of peace dividends in the form of stability, basic social services and economic development. 24. The parties continued to cooperate in sharing oil revenues during the reporting period. In September, the joint Government of National Unity-Government of Southern Sudan technical committee for oil revenue-sharing produced its most recent report on 2007 transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan and to the state level, including detailed calculations based on the production of oil from each commercial block. According to the report, the Government of Southern Sudan’s share of oil revenues for the period from January to August 2007 totalled $810 million, resulting in actual transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan (after administrative and tax deductions) of $778 million. In the same period, transfers were made to the Sudan’s oil-producing states, which according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are entitled to a 2 per cent share in the proceeds of locally produced oil. Actual transfers to the state level for the period from January to August 2007 were reported as totalling $52.55 million, of which $24.7 million went to Unity State, $10 million to Upper Nile State and $17.8 million to Southern Kordofan State. Nonetheless, members of SPLM continued to complain about lack of transparency in monitoring and calculating the oil revenues. III. Implementation of other peace processes in Sudan 25. Full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remains at the core of sustainable peace in the Sudan. Lack of progress on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement could therefore have a negative impact on other peace efforts in the country, including the situation in Darfur and eastern Sudan. 26. In Darfur, the security situation has continued to deteriorate, with heavy fighting between Government forces and rebel factions, but also clashes between rebel groups and inter-tribal violence, as well as ongoing banditry. The insecurity has exacerbated an already serious humanitarian situation and further hampered the work of humanitarian agencies. 27. In a very worrying development, unidentified armed elements launched a massive attack on the Southern Darfur group site in Haskanita of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) on 29 and 30 September. Ten AMIS personnel were killed and eight wounded while one is still missing. The attackers also looted 16 vehicles and a significant amount of weapons and ammunition. 28. On the political front in Darfur, preparations continued for peace talks scheduled to start in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 27 October. The United Nations and the African Union held consultations with regional partners (Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) on 10 October on the key issues of participation and representation in the talks, and it was agreed that they should begin with a commitment by all parties to a cessation of hostilities, followed by a session on security arrangements. Meanwhile, SPLM hosted a meeting of nonsignatory movements from 15 to 20 October to help prepare them for the upcoming negotiations, and rebel movements were scheduled to meet in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for pre-talks on 21 October. 29. In the meantime, UNMIS continued to provide assistance to AMIS under the support packages, while the two organizations are intensifying preparations for the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). 30. After months of stagnation, the pace of implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement accelerated during the reporting period, following the return of the leaders of the Eastern Front to Khartoum on 27 August. Three Eastern Front representatives were sworn into their new positions in the Government of National Unity on 28 August, and a further eight will take their seats in the National Assembly when it reconvenes on 22 October. Eastern Front representatives also took up positions in the governments of the three eastern states, including the Deputy Governorships of Gadarif and Kassala. The allocation of development funds for eastern Sudan promised under the agreement is on hold, pending Eastern Front decisions on its priorities for spending. A high joint committee headed by Vice President Ali Osman Taha continues to monitor implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, including on plans for the incorporation of former Eastern Front fighters into SAF and the national police force. Concern remains, however, about the extent of grass-roots support for the Agreement. 31. Talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda are currently in recess to enable both parties to consult their respective stakeholders. In reaction to the movement of LRA fighters to the Garamba Park area in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in recent months, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced on 9 September an agreement to flush out the LRA from the area unless peace was reached within 90 days. This announcement prompted LRA to threaten attacks in northern Uganda. My Special Envoy for the LRA-Affected Areas, Joaquim Chissano, continues to work closely with mediators of the Government of Southern Sudan and with regional Governments to help keep the Government of Uganda-LRA peace process on track. In a positive development, an LRA delegation travelled to Kampala on 4 October, the first visit to the Ugandan capital by LRA representatives since the group’s insurgency began in 1987. IV. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan Political support and reconciliation 32. Full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement continues to require focused political support at the highest level. This was especially evident during the recent crisis in the Government of National Unity. During my visit to the Sudan, and in contacts with both parties in recent weeks, my Acting Special Representative and I have urged the parties to keep implementation of the Agreement on track, and stressed that the United Nations stands ready to offer additional assistance in resolving difficult issues. 33. UNMIS continued to engage local politicians and others to promote the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and defuse tensions that may arise. The “transitional areas” of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile present particular challenges, given the differences between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement parties and the lack of progress towards a solution. The Mission worked to engage the new governors in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, encouraging cooperation. Meanwhile, as the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee worked to complete its report on the critical 1956 boundary, United Nations border demarcation experts travelled to the Sudan to provide advice and agree on plans for further technical assistance to the Commission. 34. As tribal clashes claimed more lives in southern Sudan, UNMIS provided logistical support to the efforts of the Government of Southern Sudan to disarm and curb inter-ethnic violence in Warrab, Lakes and Jonglei States. The Southern Sudan Security Committee has since formulated a regional strategy for arms control and civilian protection. UNMIS is monitoring the situation closely and has established a policy advisory group on conflict and reconciliation to provide a coherent response to difficult situations in all sectors. Military deployment and activities 35. As at 20 October, 97 per cent of the mandated military personnel (9,402 of a total of 9,706) were deployed in the UNMIS mission area, including 584 military observers, 282 staff officers and 8,536 troops. 36. The military component continued to facilitate implementation of the security protocol through the ceasefire structures at sector and force headquarters levels. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander, continued to meet fortnightly, passing the milestone of its 60th meeting on 28 August. The regular convening of this body as a forum for dialogue and confidence-building between the parties’ armed forces continued to contribute greatly to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee addressed a number of key issues, including the redeployment of forces, verification of joint/integrated units and incorporation of other armed groups into SAF and SPLA. 37. Monitoring and verification activities were limited not only by the adverse road conditions during the rainy season, but also by the restrictions imposed by both parties in sector 6 (Abyei). It is hoped that the decision of the Ceasefire Political Commission to lift these restrictions for a period of one month to enable monitoring of the movement of SPLA “Debab Forces” south of the 1956 boundary will have a positive impact. 38. The military component of UNMIS also undertook humanitarian activities in support of local communities, including the improvement of schools; the provision of medical evacuation and care for civilians; the construction and grading of roads; the clearance of unexploded ordnance; and the care and treatment of livestock, which are vital for the local economy. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 39. The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council convened for the third time on 22 August, leading to provisional approval of a national strategic plan for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the Sudan. However, the plan has not yet received final approval, and disagreements between the parties remain on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in the transitional areas and on the categories, criteria for eligibility and estimated numbers of the beneficiaries of the programme. The exclusion of the United Nations and donors in the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council continued to hamper dialogue on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy and to cause substantial delays in critical decision-making on the programme in both northern and southern Sudan. 40. In a welcome demonstration of commitment to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the Government of Southern Sudan funded the registration of some 25,000 candidates identified by SPLA for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in 2007. UNMIS provided technical and logistical support to the southern Sudan institutions involved. In addition, 227 children associated with SAF, SPLA and other armed groups have been registered in Blue Nile State. The progress of the registration effort helped re-energize the planning process in southern Sudan. However, the total number of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration candidates and target size for the SPLA has yet to be agreed by the leadership of the Government of Southern Sudan. The rightsizing of the army remains an issue of political choice. Electoral assistance 41. UNMIS continued to engage with international partners on planning for electoral assistance, tracking preparations for the census and monitoring the progress of the draft elections law. Following on lessons learned from the pilot census, a national grassroots advocacy and information campaign has been proposed to create greater awareness of the rationale for the census and attendant methodologies, particularly among internally displaced communities. The Government of National Unity undertook to release all outstanding funds for the conduct of the census by the end of October. 42. Drafting of the elections law has reached an advanced stage, and should be ready for submission to Parliament when it reconvenes on 22 October. Meanwhile UNMIS continued its efforts to establish its electoral capacity. A Chief Electoral Officer and Chief of Operations have been recruited, while other technical posts for both southern Sudan and UNMIS headquarters in Khartoum are being filled. A joint mission by the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services is planned immediately after the promulgation of the electoral law, aimed at providing a system-wide response to the operational, funding and capacity-building needs associated with its implementation, including the establishment of an electoral management body, the registration of voters and polling. Police 43. During the reporting period, UNMIS conducted a strategic evaluation of its development work to date with the Southern Sudan Police Service. The evaluation identified key achievements, including close rapport with stakeholders at strategic and functional levels; significant progress in registration of Police Service personnel; introduction of community policing; release of illegal detainees; and development of standardized police training. Some 17 per cent of registered Police Service personnel have received basic training to date, in addition to the specialized training of four formed police units, which is a major step towards the target of the Police Service to take responsibility for law and order duties by December 2008. Upcoming priority areas include the expansion of training programmes, issuance of police identity cards and development of the command, control and communication channels of the Police Service. 44. Following the success of the community policing initiative at Al Baraka internally displaced persons camp in Khartoum, joint community policing initiatives were established at Al Salaam and Wad Al Bashier camps in Omdurman locality and Dar Al Salam Camp in Jabal Auliya. UNMIS conducted training workshops in Al Salaam and Wad Al Bashier camps for 125 personnel. Community policing is also gathering momentum in southern Sudan with the formation of 3 new police-community relations committees in the Wau and Juba areas, bringing the number of committees to 11. 45. As at end September 2007, the United Nations police had provided training to 753 local police personnel. For the second phase of its training programme, 39 courses, including 3 basic training programmes, have been planned. In a special drive, the United Nations police delivered training in gender, child and vulnerable persons protection and also trained “peer educators” in HIV/AIDS awareness. The United Nations police also provided specialized forensics, ballistics, crime investigation training to police of the Government of Southern Sudan in Khartoum, and airport security. In a welcome development, the United Nations police were invited to conduct a training needs analysis in Northern and Blue Nile States. As at 9 October, the United Nations police had deployed 657 police advisers from 43 countries, representing 95 per cent of its authorized strength. 46. The UNMIS police priorities for the coming months include the commencement of basic police training, utilizing Southern Sudan Police Service trainers as well as training of 120 formed police unit personnel in the three southern sectors; the commencement of 24 hour a day/7 days a week patrols of Southern Sudan Police Service formed police units; an increase in the number of night collocation sites; an increase in the issuance of identity cards to the Southern Sudan Police Service; the introduction of command, control and communications reporting channels for the Southern Sudan Police Service; the initiation of the set-up of a police computer lab in Juba; the establishment of gender and vulnerable persons desks in each sector and the streamlining of collocation at the state headquarters of the Southern Sudan Police Service. Identifying and encouraging donors to fund basic requirements of the Southern Sudan Police Service and infrastructure development remain a priority for UNMIS police. Human rights 47. UNMIS continued to provide technical support to the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan to enhance their human rights capacity, including workshops on human rights for Southern Sudan Police Service police officers and law enforcement policymakers. UNMIS also published seven promotional booklets on international human rights treaties for distribution to governmental institutions and civil society organizations in various parts of the country. The Mission organized workshops for Government officials, parliamentarians and civil society on the principles of fair trial, the reform of national legal provisions related to sexual offences, the process for ratification of the Convention against Torture and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 48. The Mission continued to monitor human rights violations in the Sudan, and received reports of increasing restrictions on journalists. The parties need to ensure that freedoms of expression and association are fully guaranteed by the authorities. Likewise, political parties should be allowed to operate without restriction and harassment. I would also urge the Sudan to ratify the Convention against Torture, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which it signed earlier this year. Finally, it would be essential for both parties to complete the legislative process for the establishment of both the National Human Rights Commission and the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, in compliance with the Paris Principles. Rule of law 49. As part of its support to the development of the Sudan prisons system, UNMIS launched a programme to mentor and train prison officers in southern Sudan. Seconded prisons officers are being deployed in several states in the south, where they will be co-located with and mentor southern Sudan prison officers. In Khartoum, UNMIS trained trainers in facilitation skills for prison officers, and provided comprehensive briefing on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to senior prison officials. On 23 September, a Prisons Development Committee was established, composed of the Director-General of the National Prisons Service, nine senior prison officers, UNMIS and UNDP. The Committee will monitor implementation of corrections reform activities contained in the May 2007 memorandum of understanding between the Government, UNMIS and UNDP. 50. In southern Sudan, the development of the rule of law continues to be impeded by uncertainty about “applicable law”, exacerbated by delays in passing new legislation. The lack of uniformity in the application of legislation has impacted on foreign investment and economic development. Poor infrastructure, compounded by floods in many areas has inhibited the administration of, and access to, justice. The judiciary is establishing special customary Courts headed by trained judges from the Government of Southern Sudan judiciary to address the matter of the large number of persons in pre-trial detention due to tribal conflicts. Public information 51. UNMIS radio (Miraya FM) expanded its network in southern Sudan during the reporting period. Repeater stations were set up in Torit, Yambio and Maridi in August and September. Preparations are ongoing to mount additional repeater stations in Aweil, Bentiu, Yei and Bor, and to increase the coverage area of the Malakal and Wau stations. Miraya FM is on schedule to cover all main population centres of southern Sudan by the end of 2007. Short wave services for rural areas have been contracted and testing of frequencies is ongoing. 52. Miraya FM is currently broadcasting a comprehensive series of specially produced explanatory programmes on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and is preparing a special census programme in cooperation with the United Nations Population Fund and the southern Sudan authorities. Miraya FM also continues to support AMIS with weekly programmes and radio messages broadcasted on Darfur State radio stations. 53. During the reporting period, UNMIS delivered one-day train-the-trainer workshops on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to state officials, members of parliament, village chiefs and elders, national non-governmental organizations and students. In southern Sudan, an average of seven workshops dealing with the census, the role of UNMIS, and local reconciliation initiatives are conducted each month. In cooperation with universities in Khartoum, UNMIS has started to hold similar workshops for students in northern Sudan. Humanitarian assistance 54. Humanitarian operations in August and September focused on providing an effective response to the serious floods that have affected an estimated 200,000 people in southern Sudan. The most critical areas are in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Northern Bahr el Ghazal States, with floods now spreading into Warrab, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria. Serious crop damage has occurred in most of the flood-affected locations and the World Food Programme continues to provide food assistance. 55. The Common Humanitarian Fund delivered $5.7 million and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund contributed $7.8 million for the flood response in advance of the 28 August “flash appeal” for $20.2 million to address outstanding needs. Despite donor requests for an appeal, no bilateral contributions have yet been received. Among the most immediate needs are support for health, food insecurity, water and sanitation activities to mitigate water and vector-borne diseases. The latter is critical since less than 40 per cent of the population has access to safe drinking water or sanitation and less than a third of the population has access to adequate health services. The United Nations country team is now seeking additional support from the Common Humanitarian Fund to address the outstanding needs not met in the flash appeal. 56. Floods have significantly impeded humanitarian access, as many roads have been washed away and airstrips waterlogged. However, emergency infrastructure projects have enabled 100 per cent of food aid to be distributed by road in 2007, in comparison to 20 per cent in 2005. Protection of civilians 57. UNMIS continued to monitor issues of civilian security in the context of tribal clashes in southern Sudan and to promote a timely response by authorities and redress for the victims. Inter-ethnic fighting continued to cause localized displacement in rural areas. The capacity of the authorities to respond to incidents has improved, particularly in securing affected areas. However, UNMIS continued to receive reports of harassment, rape and extrajudicial killings by some SPLA soldiers. The continued presence of SAF and other armed elements in the oil areas has further heightened tensions among populations, underscoring the need for a rapid deployment of joint/integrated units in this region. Returns 58. The 2006 period for returns reached its conclusion with the arrival of torrential rains and severe flooding across much of the Nile Basin. Return operations continued for as long as possible, with movement to 9 out of 10 States in southern Sudan and two of the three transitional areas. A pilot air transport programme was established to assist internally displaced persons travelling to more distant destinations in southern Sudan. The total number of internally displaced persons who returned home during 2007 reached 44,610, representing 70 per cent of the United Nations target for the year. Meanwhile, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assisted some 66,000 refugees to return home by air and road from five neighbouring countries. Further movements have been postponed until the dry season. Plans to resume return operations in the last quarter of the year remain uncertain owing to a lack of adequate funding. Mine action 59. With the onset of the rainy season, UNMIS mine action teams focused on training, recruitment of deminers and prioritization of routes and areas to be cleared in the dry season. UNMIS and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided mine risk education to 166,992 people living in or intending to return to mine-affected areas. To date, UNMIS mine action teams have cleared 1,032 of the 2,366 at-risk areas, and opened 21,133 kilometres of roads. 60. The United Nations Mine Action Office also continued to support the development of national institutional and operational mine action capacity in the Sudan. In August, the Government approved its first national strategic framework for victim assistance, establishing guidelines for activities to support survivors of mine and explosive remnants of war and their families for the next five years. United Nations agencies helped to organize Sudan’s second national victim assistance workshop, in collaboration with the National Mine Action Centre and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission. The Commission now has a functioning head office in Juba and three operational field offices in Yei, Malakal and Wau. Economic recovery and reconstruction 61. The Government, the United Nations and the World Bank continued to prepare for the next meeting of the Sudan Consortium, which is scheduled for the first quarter of 2008. Following the recommendations from the March 2007 Sudan Consortium, the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan are reviewing the Joint Assessment Mission and evaluating external aid flows. Results of the review will be consolidated in a joint exercise and integrated into the Government of National Unity and Government of Southern Sudan strategic plan to form a shared road map for implementation of the Joint Assessment Mission for the remainder of the interim period 2008-2011. The Government of Southern Sudan continues to follow up on the proposal for the establishment of second windows to the multi-donor trust fund. 62. During the reporting period, the Government of Southern Sudan completed its rolling three-year budget sector plans. The United Nations and partners have been actively involved in the planning process and efforts are under way to ensure alignment between Government plans and the United Nations plans and programmes. Gender 63. UNMIS technical advice to the Ministry of Justice through the Unit for Combating Violence against Women in Darfur resulted in a declaration on measures for the elimination of violence against women by the Government on 18 August 2007. In the south, UNMIS continued to build the capacity of Government counterparts on gender equality by advocating for increased participation of women in correction services and the establishment of gender and children’s desks in police stations to deal with crimes against women and children. In Darfur, the gender office continued to advocate for the inclusion of women representatives in all consultative meetings. HIV/AIDS 64. UNMIS expanded its HIV/AIDS capacity-building and sensitization campaigns, reaching a total of 2,317 peacekeepers and community members by the end of September. This included the graduation of 128 personnel from UNMIS and AMIS as peer educators and a further 256 as regional-level peer leaders. UNMIS expanded its outreach campaigns to support HIV/AIDS capacity-building in civil society and the Government of National Unity, and made plans to support the HIV/AIDS prevalence survey of the Government of National Unity. Conduct and discipline 65. Overall, the reporting period saw a reduction in cases of misconduct within the Mission. Only 13 allegations of minor misconduct were reported and are being handled by Mission management. No allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were reported during the period. UNMIS continued to focus on the prevention of misconduct, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse, providing training on United Nations standards of conduct for 568 incoming UNMIS personnel and launching five training modules for specific target groups. The Mission’s outreach programme was strengthened by the appointment by the Government of Southern Sudan of a representative to the Mission’s task force on sexual exploitation and abuse. Civilian staffing 66. There are currently 851 international civilian staff (out of a total of 1,118 posts), while the number of national civilian staff stands at 2,555 (out of a total of 3,217 posts). The Mission also employed 143 international United Nations Volunteers and 43 national United Nations Volunteers. 67. Since my previous report, I have appointed as my new Special Representative for the Sudan Ashraf Jehangir Qazi of Pakistan. Mr. Qazi, who until now served as my Special Representative for Iraq, is expected to take up his new duties in the Sudan on 24 October. Until his arrival, Taye-Brook Zerihoun will continue to serve as my Acting Special Representative. Meanwhile, Ameerah Haq of Bangladesh arrived in Khartoum on 15 September to become my Deputy Special Representative for the Sudan and the United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in the Sudan. V. Financial aspects 68. The General Assembly, by its resolution 61/289, appropriated for the maintenance of UNMIS for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, an amount of $846.3 million, equivalent to $70.5 million per month. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIS beyond 31 October 2007, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2008 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly. 69. As an exceptional measure outlined in my letter dated 2 October 2007 to the President of the General Assembly (A/62/379), substantial support to AMIS under the heavy support package provisions is being financed through the temporary use of UNMIS resources pending review by the General Assembly of the proposed 2007/08 budget for UNAMID. Upon approval by the Assembly of the budget for UNAMID, expenditures incurred by UNMIS in support of AMIS will be reimbursed by UNAMID. 70. As at 31 July 2007, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMIS amounted to $249.5 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,799.3 million. Reimbursement of troop-contributing Governments for troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 31 August 2007 and 30 June 2007, respectively. VI. Observations and recommendations 71. The events of recent months are a sobering reminder of the fragility of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation process. In the past two years, NCP and SPLM have cautiously developed political and institutional structures to take forward their complex agreement on power-sharing, wealth-sharing and mutual security, and self-determination. However, their partnership has been weakened by mutual mistrust, differing interpretations of the Agreement, and the slow progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Strengthening the NCP-SPLM partnership is crucial for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which remains central to peace and stability in the Sudan. I commend the parties for their continued efforts to overcome their differences and defuse potential crises through dialogue, including the prompt action taken by the Ceasefire Political Commission to address the situation in Muglad in September and the high-level political discussions to address the crisis in the Government of National Unity in October. 72. Nevertheless, these remain difficult times for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Failure by the parties to provide the political will necessary to resolve their differences and make concrete progress on the outstanding issues without further delay could undermine the integrity of this crucial, hard-won agreement. The unresolved status of Abyei, the lack of demarcation of the 1956 border, and the incomplete redeployment of SAF and SPLA forces form a dangerous constellation of deadlocked issues which is likely to further test the resilience of the NCP-SPLM partnership. Both parties have understandable concerns and interests, closely linked to the cultural and political demands of communities as well as to the strategic value of oilfields concentrated in the 1956 border area. I urge both parties to intensify their efforts to tackle these issues peacefully and expeditiously. 73. In particular, I call upon the parties to resolve the boundary and Abyei issues promptly and within the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. SAF and SPLA should complete their respective redeployments with full transparency and on the basis of a mutually agreed arrangement for maintaining security of the oilfields. I call upon both sides to set and adhere to realistic timelines for the final demarcation of all relevant boundaries, and in the meantime to refrain from unilateral actions which may escalate tensions in the boundary area. I remind the parties that the United Nations stands ready to offer technical, monitoring or other support as they may require and request. 74. In the past six months, UNMIS has carried out a comprehensive strategic assessment and structural review, and has initiated with the parties a high-level consultation mechanism through which to discuss strategic priorities. Both these initiatives reinforce the view that the needs of the next 18 months to 2 years will differ from those of 2005, and that the Mission must adapt accordingly. I will report on progress and findings in this regard in my next report to the Security Council. 75. The six-year interim period has now entered its second phase, during which the focus of the peace process will become increasingly political, while the security environment may be increasingly tenuous. Moreover, should the parties make progress on key issues of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the next few months, as they have pledged to do, they may wish to call upon UNMIS for additional or more focused monitoring and support. I therefore recommend that the Security Council consider extending the mandate of UNMIS for a further period of 12 months, until 31 October 2008, and that in advance of that date the Council consider a more general review of the mandate of the Mission. 76. As the process of redeployment is completed, the military focus will shift to those areas where both parties’ armed forces continue to have a presence; primarily the area around the 1956 boundary. The two parties have an interest in ensuring transparent monitoring of this area and in making use of the ceasefire joint monitoring mechanisms, which have proved effective in maintaining stability and building confidence. I encourage both parties to make full use of the United Nations military observers and the Joint Military Teams, and to guarantee their full freedom of movement. 77. In line with the schedule on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the parties, with United Nations support, should increase their efforts to prepare for the census and elections. At the same time, as the Government of Southern Sudan consolidates itself, UNMIS and relevant United Nations agencies will provide support to the fledgling civilian administration. Development and reconstruction in southern Sudan and the transitional areas, particularly the delivery of basic services, are of critical importance in creating visible peace dividends for the war-affected population. I hope that the opening of the second window of the multi-donor trust fund and the support of donors will assist in this process through the prioritization of social service deliveries and early recovery activities. 78. I commend the progress made by the Government of Southern Sudan in the establishment of institutions, particularly at the central, state and county levels, and their increasing focus on decentralization. UNMIS will continue to work closely with the Government in the strengthening of commissions and institutions to ensure that the Government of Southern Sudan is able to take the lead in the recovery and development process. 79. Continued delays in the nationally led disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process are a cause for concern. The national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration institutions, cooperating with international partners, have made considerable efforts to develop a joint strategy and operational planning. However, both parties remain fundamentally reluctant to reduce active forces during the interim period, as was envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. International stakeholders, including the United Nations, should make a realistic assessment of the prospects for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the medium term and focus their resources accordingly, in consultation with the parties themselves. 80. The security situation is likely to remain volatile in the coming months. In addition to the challenges of the security arrangements for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, inter-communal tensions in southern Sudan and the transitional areas continue to pose localized threats, and may even increase in the run-up to 2009 elections. More seriously, the UNMIS area of operations is vulnerable to possible spillover of the conflict in Darfur. The September attacks on Wad Banda in Northern Kordofan and the presence of SPLA-aligned forces at Abu Matarig in Southern Darfur are a reminder that the peace process in Darfur is also critical to the stability of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As UNAMID deploys, the two operations will cooperate closely. Every effort must be made to ensure that the Missions are adequately resourced to face common challenges. 81. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in full and without delay, is central to a peaceful, stable and prosperous Sudan. While the conflict in Darfur has undoubtedly had consequences for the rest of the country, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remains critical to long-lasting peace throughout the Sudan. I urge the parties to implement all provisions of the Agreement in the same spirit as it was negotiated. Some key issues of the Agreement will clearly require political courage and leadership on both sides. Postponing and delaying implementation will only serve to undermine the very purpose of the Agreement, the creation of a peaceful and united Sudan. 82. In conclusion, I wish to extend my gratitude to all United Nations personnel working in the Sudan, as well as the efforts of the African Union and the support provided by Member States, including donors and troop-contributing countries, for their determined efforts to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and to end the conflict in Darfur. Annex Military and police component as at 20 October 2007 Military component Civilian police Observers Staff officers Troops Military subtotal Country Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Argentina — — — — — — — — 11 — Australia 6 — 7 2 — — 13 2 8 2 Bangladesh 20 — 32 — 1 512 4 1 564 4 32 — Belgium 5 — — — — — 5 — — — Benin 7 — — — — — 7 — — — Bolivia 16 — 1 — — — 17 — — — Bosnia and Herzegovina — — — — — — — — 2 — Botswana 5 — — — — — 5 — — — Brazil 24 — — — — — 24 — 2 — Burkina Faso 6 — — — — — 6 — — — Cambodia 10 — 1 — 135 — 146 — — — Canada 21 2 6 2 — — 27 4 2 — China 14 — 11 — 425 10 450 10 8 — Croatia — — 7 — — — 7 — — — Denmark 10 — 5 — — — 15 — 1 — Ecuador 15 — — — — — 15 — — — Egypt 18 — 20 — 781 15 819 15 7 — El Salvador 5 — — — — — 5 — 3 2 Fiji 7 — — — — — 7 — 1 — Finland — — 1 — — — 1 — 2 — France — — 1 — — — 1 — — — Gabon 8 — — — — — 8 — — — Gambia — — 1 — — — 1 — 18 1 Germany 31 — 5 — — — 36 — 5 — Ghana — — 3 — — — 3 — 38 2 Greece 2 — 2 — — — 4 — — — Guatemala 8 — 1 — — — 9 — — — Guinea 4 — — — — — 4 — — — India 20 — 28 — 2 574 5 2 622 5 13 2 Indonesia 10 — — — — — 10 — 6 — Italy — — 1 — — — 1 — — — Jamaica — — — — — — — — 3 3 Jordan 7 — 10 — — — 17 — 12 2 Kyrgyzstan 8 — — — — — 8 — 2 — Malawi 6 — 2 — — — 8 — — — Malaysia 8 — 4 — — — 12 — 11 — Mali 10 — — — — — 10 — — — Moldova 2 — — — — — 2 — — — Mongolia 2 — — — — — 2 — — — Mozambique 3 — — — — — 3 — — — Namibia 7 2 — — — — 7 2 1 — Nepal 8 — 8 — — — 16 — 56 1 Netherlands 7 — 5 — — — 12 — 15 1 New Zealand 2 — 1 — — — 3 — — — Niger — — 1 — — — 1 — — — Nigeria 11 1 9 1 — — 20 2 48 3 Norway 13 2 6 2 — — 19 4 6 — Pakistan 20 — 28 — 1 532 7 1 580 7 37 2 Paraguay 10 — — — — — 10 — — — Peru 17 — — — — — 17 — — — Philippines 13 — — — — — 13 — 52 2 Poland 2 — — — — — 2 — — — Republic of Kenya 7 — 11 — 775 45 793 45 18 2 Republic of Korea 7 — 1 — — — 8 — — — Romania 12 — — — — — 12 — — — Russian Federation 14 — 2 — 120 — 136 — 10 — Rwanda 15 — 9 — 253 — 277 — 25 — Samoa — — — — — — — — 13 — Senegal — — 5 — — — 5 — — — South Africa — — 3 1 — — 3 1 — — Sri Lanka 3 — — — — — 3 — 24 — Sweden 3 — 3 — — — 6 — 10 1 Thailand 12 — 2 — — — 14 — — — Turkey — — 4 — — — 4 — 17 — Uganda 9 2 — — — — 9 2 9 3 Ukraine 6 — — — — — 6 — 16 — United Kingdom — — 3 — — — 3 — 1 — United Republic of Tanzania 15 — 6 — — — 21 — — — United States of America — — — — — — — — 12 1 Uruguay — — — — — — — — 2 — Yemen 16 — 4 — — — 20 — 3 — Zambia 12 2 11 — 326 17 349 19 15 3 Zimbabwe 12 2 3 — — — 15 2 23 9 Total per gender 571 13 274 8 8 434 103 9 278 124 600 41 Total 584 282 8 536 9 402 641   sss1 \* MERGEFORMAT S/2007/624 sss1 \* MERGEFORMAT S/2007/624 FooterJN \* MERGEFORMAT 07-55192 \* MERGEFORMAT 20 \* MERGEFORMAT 21 FooterJN \* MERGEFORMAT 07-55192 United Nations S/2007/624 Security Council Distr.: General 23 October 2007 Original: English jobn \* MERGEFORMAT 07-55192 (E) 231007 Barcode \* MERGEFORMAT *0755192*