lslamic Republic of PermonentMission the UnitedNotions to IRAN Please check against delivery Statementby AmbassadorMohammad Khazaee Permanent Representative the lslamic Republicof lran of before the UnitedNationsDisarmament Commission 7 April 2008 In the Name of God, the Compassrbnaf e, the Merciful Mr. Chairman, At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your electionto presideover this important sessionof the Disarmament Commission. The completion two substantive of agendaitems requires lot of work and effort a duringthe comingweeks.You may rest assuredof my delegation's support for your efforts to ensure that the Commission wouid have a successful session. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the statement made by the distinguishedrepresentative lndonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned of Movement. Mr. Ghairman, Agenda item dealing with the issue of nuclear disarmamentand nonproliferationis of great relevanceto internationalsecurity.The greatest threat to internationaland regional security and stability arises from the continued existence of nuclear weapons. At the time of the conclusionof the NPT it was promisedthat nuclearthreat, particutarly against non-nuclear countrieswould be removed in all its aspects includingthroughthe total etimination nuclear of weapons. Not only this threat has persisted until now; but also we are witnessing that the commitment of some nuclear-weaponStates to move in the directionof nuclear disarmamenthas been languished. Still some 27,OAA nuclearweaponscontinueto exist. The NPT is an agreementbased on a basic bargain.Accordingto the two components of this bargain, non-nuclear-weapon States pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange of a commitment from nucleir-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmamentnegotiations aimed at total efimination of their nuclear arsenals.The 2008 session of the DisarmamentCommission begins'at a time when, on the one hand, it has been widely recognizedthat non-proliferationobligations are being successfully implemented except in cases of transfer of nuclear weapon technology by certain nuclear-weapons States to non-partiesto the NPT, and on the other hand, today's situation of 622Tntrd New Ave, York, 10017 (21 NV Tel: 2)687-202A (21 BOL70B6 iran@un.int Fax: 2) email: ) nuclear disarmament processseems frustrating and threatening nonto nuclear-weapons Statesdue to the unfulfilled disarmament undertakings and a growing threat by certain nuclear-weapon States against non-nuclearweaponStates. Againstthis backdrop, delegation the lslamicRepublic lran, the of of alongwith the ovenryhelming majority memberstates,maintains position of its that nucleardisarmament remainsthe most important priorityin the field of disarmament. Mr. Chairman, ln the recentyears,there has beena seriesof developments has that givenrise to the pervasive concern that somenuclear-weapon Stateshave no genuine and intention accomplishing disarmament of the NPT will of part the bargain.To depict the scale of this crisis, I draw your attention some to worrying trends and related developments place in the context of taking ArticleVl of the NPT. A dangerous trendhas beeninitiated certainnuclear-weapon by States to reinterpret their unequivocal undertakings nucleardisarmament. to They cunningly assertthatthe fulfillment theirdisarmament of obligations subject is to the emergence an international of securityenvironment the definition of which is only known to them. In fact, they are setting a precondition for compliance with theirobligations they are the oneswho will decidehow, and when and underwhat circumstances precondition met. The speeches this is by the representative the UnitedStatesand the Secretary Defence the of of of UnitedKingdom maderespectively the 20OT at session the FirstCommittee of and the 5tnFebruary meetingof this year'sConference Disarmament on are the mostrecentexamples this regard. so saying, in By theynot onlyfloutwhat they have solemnlyagreed to, but also set a counterproductive model for others,a modelthat is not in the interest the integrity the NPT. of of I do not intend to rehearsethe provisionsof the NPT and the agreements 1995and 2000Review of Conferences let me stresson a few but pointsin this regard.First,ArticleVl is clearaboutthe nuclear disarmament obligation. conditionality. No Furthermore, 1995all nuclear-weapon in States acknowledged factthat "nuclear the disarmament substantially is facilitated by easingof international tensionand the strengthening trust betweenStates of whichhaveprevailed following end of the coldwar."lt was in linewith this the recognized that in 2000,they agreedto a blueprint fact knownas 13 practical steps for the implementation ArticleVl of the NPT with no conditionality. of That is why the caseagainstreinterpretation the ArticlelV is ovenruhelming. of We must ensurethat withinthis Commission the familyof NPT,thereis and no placefor sucharbitrary irresponsible and interpretation. Mr. Chairman, 'lt is unfortunateto see that the same States are engaged in destabilizing the international security environmenteither by building or advocatinga "missile shield" in Eastern Europe based on declaratory assessments hypothetical non-existing of and threats. Besides, some nuclear-weapon states instead of fulfilling their obligations requiredby ArticleVl of the NPT and the agreements as of the 2000 ReviewConference, have chosento build new nuclelr weaponsand modernize their nuclearweaponssystems. This is a very dangerous trend. For instance, U.S. administratioh, an extensive the in and multi-billion dollar program, seeking buifda new generation nuclear is to of warheads and new nuclear weapons facilities. This case alongwith the other anti-nuclear-disarmament policies and actionsconstitute intentional an noncornpliance the contextof ArticleVl of in the NPT and the agreements 2AOA of NPT ReviewConference. casesof The U'S' noncompfiance with the Treaty's disarmament obligationsillustrate vividlythe challenges facingthe NPT. We shoulddiscussand address such preparatory casesin the upcoming committeeof the Npr. Mr, Chairman, In 2000 NPT Review conference, nuclear-weapon states undertook diminish roleof nuclear to the weapons theirsecurity in policies as a step towardsnucleardisarmament. is truly regrettable some nuclearlt that weapon States are acting in contravention tnis obligation.They of have adopted policies that haveled to the augmentation theirreliance nucfear of on weapons rather than diminishment. recent years, this trend has In been accelerated and has led to the prevalence the role of nuclearweaponsin of international security. Clearly, international the community must withstand this tempting dangerous but trend. ln the wake of the year 2000,the U.S included its mifitary in doctrine the notion of using nuclearweaponsin combat againstspecifictirgets. ln 2006, the United Kingdom has decided to procu-re new generation a of nuclear-armed Trident submarines,and to extend the life of the related nuclear missiles welf into the next century. And recenly, France has announcedthe additionof a new nuclear-armed ballisticmissile-carrying submarine its nucleararsenals. to The Frenchpresident quotedas saying is "Frenchnuclear forcesare a key elementin Europe's security." appears lt that this countryin defianceof its international obligations seekingio find and is define new roles and missionsfor its nuclearforces in orderIo justify the continuedretention them in the post-cold of war era. ln so doing,if,"y have even resortedto irresponsible methodssuch as manipulation intettigence oi and fear to promoteprograms that their peoplewouldotheruvise support. not They will soon realizethat their nuclearweaponshave essentially lost any conceivable rationalebecausethe conditions today'sworld have become of so different fromcoldwar conditions. Such developments persist, if will undermine normsand principles of nucleardisarmament down by the Final Document tne SSOd-t, laid of the NPT and its 1995and 2000 ReviewConferences. Thesenormsand principles have been established a result of a long and painstaking as multilateral processWe hope that the outcomeof our deliberations this Commission in will contribute uphording to thesenormsand principles. -r- Nuclear-weapon Statesneedto take effective measures confidence for building implementing their commitment nuclear by fully to disarmament. ln the coming days the sincerityand seriousness nuclear-weapon of States abouttheircommitment the objective nuclear to of disarmament be tested will in thissession the Commission. of Mr. Chairman, Non-proliferation peaceful and uses of nuclear energy,as recognized by the NPT, are of high importance. Theseissuesshouldbe considered on their own meritwith due attention the rightsand obligations member to of states under relevantprovisions the NPT. Unfortunately, of non-proliferation has beenmanipulated a few countries a pretext advance by as to theirnarrow national interests and to deprivedeveloping countries theirrightsto nuclear of technology peacefulpurposes, for The Commission needsto leflect on non proliferation all its aspectsand recommend in certainmeasures ensurethe to criticalbalancebetween non-proliferation obligations the rightto nuclear and technology peaceful for purposes. My delegation acknowledgesthe merit of a concise draft for successfully concluding work on the agendaitem 1. The paperprovided our by the Chairman the Working of Groupone contains elements a consensus of document.However,there is still room for refinement and improvement in orderto strikea properbalance. Mr. Chairman, On the second agendaitem, namelythe "practical confidence-building measures the fieldof conventional in weapons" wouldliketo brieflyelaborate I mainprinciples which,in ourview,suchpractical on CBMscanwork: - CBMs are workable and can contributeto strengtheningpeace, securityand stability when two sidesof an agreement implement them reciprocally. theyare not oneway roads. So - CBMSare merely"voluntary measures", therefore, and they can by no meansbe converted legally to binding obfigations. - CBMs in the field of conventional weaponsat the international level have been manifestedin the form of "UN registerof Conventional Arms"-However, shouldnot lose sightof the fact that the Register we itself was established the basis of GA Resolution on 46/36 L which provided for "further developmentand on transparencymeasures related weapons massdestruction-" to of - lt is a recognized fact that transparency thousands conventional in of weaponsis not comparable with the transparency existence nonin or existence onesinglenuclear of warhead. Mr. Chairman, I wish to conclude reaffirming beliefthat we shouldmakeevery by our effort in the spirit of cooperation and good-willwith the view to making progressin the important task before us. The successful conclusion this of meeting will positivelycontributeto the standing of this body within the disarmament machinery. r-