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Ilocro¡¡¡uü l'Ipegcraaurqnb
Poccuücroü Oogepaquu npu Opranusaquu O6reguner*u'D(
Harn¡r)

Permanent Repreaentative bf the Rusaian Federatlon to the ünlted.Nations

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136 East 67th Street /Yerv York, NY ¡10065

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Excellency,

¡

i-l**York, March
j

I ,zoto

i.
:

U/ith reference to your letter dated 5 Febrqary 20IA I have the honour
to enclose hel'awith the non-paper containing o *ù,o,orry of Russian position
'l

on thc koy issrres of the $ecurity Çouncil reforml. We are confident thât, you

will

take the¡n duty into

account,

I

AIIow me to

assure

you of our ft¡ll coiperation and construetive

l'

engâgement in the collective endeavour aimcd åt seeking a solution to the

Sacurity Council reform that oan garner the rþidest possible support by
Membor States.

Please accept, Excellenoy,
consideration.

the

asslÂrançes

of my highcst

i Vitaly Churkin ^
H.E. Mr. i Reiresentativo of the Islamic Republic of Af$ränistan Pennanent to the United Nations (Chair of the Intergovarnmçntal negotiations on the Seourity.Couricil refonn)

ZahirTanin,

Copy: - H.E. Dr. Á.li A.Treki President of the 64rh Session ofthe ,UN Gene¡al Assembly

,

- AII Fermanent Representativçs to thc Unitod Nations, New Vork

Non-Pao.cr

I

POSÍTION OT THE NUSSIAN FDDERÀTION ON COUNCIL RtrF'ORM

irsn uN sDcURITY

INTRODUCTION
Unfortunately, tho four rounds ot'intorgovemntentll neßotiations on the UN

refoln that lrave talcen ploce failed tolsignificantly narrow the gap of clifforenóes bctween the Member Statcs on thi five key issues of thc Socurity Council reform, So fär none of üre existing þodets of rctbr:ning the
Security Council
Corrncil eljoys prevailing support in t'he United Nations. trn suoh citcumstfilces ws

sce t10 other altemative but

to

cont¡lrrrû tltoughorrt

þc

cr¡rlent UN Ggnoral

Ässembly Session the metículous work within üo i intergovorn¡nental talks
launched in Fcbruary 2009.

This wor.k shouffi unfold in a calm, trans¡:arerrt and inclusive âtrtlosphere l'ree ftom apy artificial deadti¡res. It should be aimed A tìnrting a cotnprornise possiblc * enjoyirrg æ rvide support of Mernber States of the bfganization as

At thc
lecl on

Membsrs, .signitìcantly broader tharr two thirds of votes of the celierat Assontbly cuffent stage it would be countcrprtcluctiv, ,[o pt.*aturoly limit the

negotiations, trgenda down to one or two ruodcls only. iThe discussion should be

all options availablc in the

talks'

I

Any attempt to

prÇ$s tluough any scheme,

wltioh cloes not eqioy widest
I

.possible supporr þreferably consensus), by pul;ting ít'to voto rvould inevitably pelarizo thc General Assenrbly. Evon if one of.tho modéls gains the necessary 2/3
rurajorityo as rcquired

by tlte Charter, the Council wduld hardly become ntoro

authoritative in thc eyes of the "objccting rninority", ámong wltich thele rvoulcl
havc becn infJuenrial states.

CATEGORIPS

OT'MIMBERSIIIP

: )

I¡r a s,i:tuation when positions of tho two main grolìps of states
I
I

- thosc who

support the idea of the UN Seourrty Çouncil's expansioh in both categories and
thoss who do not

-

remain polar, one can advancc in thelnegotiating process otrly

by searohing for a cornproürÍso. Irr these cirçumstances þe bolev-e i-lp-g¡siblc to
look oloqcrjrt the''l$gliU_t"gSlellg$*q[9

d thgEitions,
i
I

So tlu we only h¿ve somc general undcrstanclirig of what the "intcri¡n
modcl" Ís,

If Membcr States opt for lhis partioula,r variant of the Security Couucil

enlargement, tfiey would have to agree on its modalities.

sIT,ß,,

OF AN ENLARGtrD SECURITY COUNqIL

Russia believos

ít

iirlportant

to ntaintain compact composition of
ohaf

I

thc

Securily Couneil to providc im adoquatc and f'ast rcactioil to ¡rew

lcnges. For

this reason we advocate tha idea that thç nurnber of inembcrs
I

in an cnlarged
".

Securiry Council should not exceecl a rcason¿ble levol of iow twenties.
-J.-*.-"--*-.,i
I

--

\ryORI{ING METHCIDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Working methods of thc Seourity Çouncil havc to üc improvecl, It shor¡ld be

l"

done in â transparent way based on the opinions of the inembcr states. I-lowovcr.
j
i

tJro

prcrogative in this process shor¡lcl belong to the Secür'ity Council itself. Thus.

Russia belicvcs it_would hc appropli&tç to wÍthdraw tho_Êgg$U_Courcilworking

'"f*gg"Tjf:@ -"b.,.'r r. Ñ;l'iiil,**- "r tt- il*n, of thc Counoil reform after the Member
^ Statcs come

course

the

intergovernnrental talks to a package rurangcment oo thç Council reform issue,

Both tho Sccurity Council working rncthocls and thc i.u*unt Securþ Council
Pennanont Mêrnbers' vcto right.issuo shoul<l not bo umor.{g the topics subjecf to thc
I

Security Cowrcil roview proccss.

RtrLÄTI ONSTilP BtrTWEDN THD SECURITY' C O UNCIL AF¡D THn GENERAL ÄSSEMBLY I
1

Russia snppôrts nrasonable and rcal'istic pt:oposal.siairnet{ at íncreasing tho
.É.'+--._\

aurirority an,{gf{eglivcngg e;[Jþg-Q9¡gq!ê9g-01¡fbly. We' suppose that any rcfonn innovations should bo basecl oû striçT observanoo of the diltribution of prerogativos
.t

betwèèn thç United Nations principal bodic.s.as enshrinoclin the UN Charter'
I

of the main bodies of

**-::**

the Organ i zati on tg*ü9*advantage-o

ih-s roilËonrE-ii¡.tne

prerôgâtivos

of the UN Sccurity Corncil, The UN Chahcr defines tho Security

Council and General Assornbly as the two ¡nain boclies ofjtho Organization.

QUESTIÖN O:tf TIIE VETO

possible norv Per:nanenl Members

of Sccurity Council, if
I

ancl when thc LIN

Mcrnber St¿tes agrc: on the Sccurity Council expanbion in both categorios. Therefbrc, a detailed discussion of thc veto can bogin at a latcr stage 0f
negotiations, âftet'a new compositiou of tùe Sccrrrity Couircil is dofined.

Arry changes of the status quo concerning the p{erogatives of the plesent
pennanent Mcmbers of thc Seculity Counoil including ttio vcto riglrt oan tur¡r into an insurmounrablo obstacle on thc way of putting

trirrejUN Charter amendntonts
i

through the national ratificatiorr.lrroccdures, inclucting in þe nS countries.

TOT/IL P.

OO4