United Nations

Security Council

Distr.: General 3 1 August 2006 Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council
At the 5500th meeting of the Security Council, held on 31 July 2006, in connection with the item on non-proliferation, the Council adopted resolution 1696 (2006). In paragraph 7 of the resolution, the Security Council requested by 3 1 August a report from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) primarily on whether the Islamic Republic of Iran had established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with the provisions of the resolution, to the Board and in parallel to the Council for its consideration. Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received today from IAEA (see annex).

Annex Letter dated 31 August 2006 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council
I enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1696 (2006), which I have submitted today to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its enclosure to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(Signed)Mohamed ElBaradei

Enclosure Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2006/38). since that date.

1. On 8 June 2006, the Director Oencral reported on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards This report covers developments

2. On 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1696 (2006), which, inter alia,

called upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the Board of aovernors in its resolution GOV/2006/14,which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to nsolve outstanding questions;
'

demanded, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessihg activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency; underlined the necessity of the Agency continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues . relating to Iran's nuclear programme; called upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations; and requested by 31 August a report from the Director General primarily on whether Iran hss established full and sustained suspension of dl activitiw mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the B o d of Govcmors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration. 3. This report is being submitted to the Board and in parallel t the Security Council. o

A. Suspension of.EnrichmentRelated Activities
4. ln~l continued me testing O ~ P - 1 has ccntrii~~gesthe P U O ~POOI &~hmmt Plant (PPBP). since in 6 June 2006, centrifuges in the single w h i n e tegt' stand and in the 10-machine and 20-machine c a s h have beta run mostly under vacuum, but with the feeding of UF6 into single machines of the 20-machine cascade for short periods of time. Between 6 and 8 June 2006, the 164-machine cascade 6 a was also tested with m , Further testing of the 161-machine cascade with UF6 w s carried out betwcen 23 June and 8 July 2006. During these tests, a total of approximately 6 kg of UP6 was fed into the machines and enriched to various levels of U-235. The feeding of UF6 into the 164-machine cascade was resumed on 24 August 2006.
1)

5. h June 2006, bn stated that it had achieved enrichment levels of 5% U-235 in a test run in the i 164-machine cascade.. lrak provided measurement mdts fiom the on-line mass spectrometer to substantiate this statement.. The Agency collected environmental samples, the results of which arc still pending. Iran has n n e the Agency access'to operating records concMning product and tail assays f sd which the Agency requires to complete its auditing activities. However, on 30 August 2006, Iran provided the Agency with some information about product assays, which the Agmcy is currently assessing.

6. The installation of a second 164-machine cascade is proceeding. Iran has infonned the Agency that it expects to be able to nm the cascade under vacuum in September 2006. In August 2006, the Agency installed additional camesgs to monitor this cascade. The Agency has also proposed .the implementation of remote monitoring to compensate for the fact that measures normally used for verification at operational enrichment 'facilities (e.g. limited frequency unannounced access) are not femible at PPEP. However, Iran contirmes to M i n e to discuss the implementation of remote monitoring at PFEP.
7. On 26 July 2006, deign infinmation verification (DIV) was carried out at the Fucl'Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, whwe construction w s ongoing. In Inthe a course of the inspectors*visit to Iran between 11 and 16 August 2006, I declined to provide the Agency with access to carry out DIV.at & FEP, stating that the frequency bf D V acti&ties was, i its view, too high and that the Agency had I n h performed 3 DTVs t m in 2003.3 DIVs in 2004,15 DIVs in 2005 and 12 DWs as of August 2006. Iran also expressed concern about the frequency of DIV at PFEP, the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)add the Iran Nuel& Rcaearch Reactor (IR-40). The Agency explained that-DIV was an ongoing and continuing process,, and that it is canied out during all construction, commissioning, operation and subsequent phases of a facility to establish the safeguards measures to be implemented and to e n m that there are no yndeclared design features which would permit the diversion of nuclear material. Between December 2003 and February 2006, the Agency, with the consent of Iran, also took Y advantage of D V activities to monitor Iran's suspension ofjcnrichment activities. The Agency explained that DIV also enables the Director General tq fulfil the reporting requiremaits set by the Between 26 and 30 August 2006, Iran allowld the Board of aovemors mid the Sed@.Cou~cil, Agency access to cany out DTV ~tPEP and at the other facilitiesmentioned above.

B, Suspension of tReprocessingActivities
8. The Agency has bean monitoring the use .of hot cells at the Tehrad Research Reactor and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility, and the constnrcdon of hot cells at the IR-40, through inspections, DIV and satellite imagery. Then are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities in Iran.

C. Heavy Water Research Reactor
9. On 12 Julyand 30 August 2006, the Agency carried out DN at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. Cmtmction of the facility is continuing.

D. Outstanding Issues
10. As indicated i ihe Director General's report of April 2006 (0OV/2006/27; para 6), on n 27 April 2006, the Agency received h m Iran a letter in wMch it was stated that "Iran is fully prepared to continue granting the Agency's inspection in lbocotdance with the Comprehensive Safeguards I in provided that the Iran's nucicar dbssicr will remait4 in M , the hmework of the Agency and under its safeguards, tho Islamic Republic of Iran is p r e p d to m l v e the remaining outstanding issuw reflected in [the Director O e n d ' s ] report CSOV/2006/15 of 27 February 2006, in accordance with the international laws and norms. In this regard, Iran will provide a time table within next three weeks." No such timetable has as yet been received.

D.1. Enrichment Programme
D.1.1. Contamination
11. There has been no h t h e r progress on the nsolution of the contamhflon issue (60V/2006/27, paras 8-9). As mentioned in the Director General's last report (OOV/2006/38, para. 4), givm the diRculty of establishing a definitive conclusion in connection with this long outstanding issue, a full .understandingof the scope and chronology of Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme, as well as full implementation of the Additional Protocol, are necessaxy for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. These are also essential for clarification of the source of the uranium particle contamination found at the technical university, as discussed in paragraph 24 below.

D.1.2. Acquisition of P-1and P-2Centrifuge Technology
12. The Agency has continued its investigation of the outstanding questions related to Iran's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes (QOV/2006/27, paras 10-14). However, Iran has not made any new idonnation available to the Agency. 13. As indicated in the Dircctor General's last report, following public statements made by high level M a n officials that Iran was conducting research on new types of centrifuges, the A p c y wrote to Iran on 24 April 2006 seeking clarification of the scope and content of such research (GOV/2006/38, para 6). On 16 June 2006, the Agency received h m Iran a letter stating, inter alia, that Iran was studying different types of centrifuge machines, and that this was "an ongoing and progressing R&D activity without usjng nuclear materials."

D.2. Uranium Metal
14. The Agency is carrying out investigations on Uormation and documentation which may have been provided to ltan by foreign intermediaries (OOV/2006/27, paras 15-16; GOV/2006/38, para. 7). To understand the full scope of the offers made by the intermediaries to Iran, it is still necessary for the Agency to have a copy of the 15-page docurneat describing Ule procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the casting and machining of mricbed and depleted u a i m metal into rnu hemispheres (first mentioned in GOVrZ005f87, para. 6). Iran continued to decline the Agency's request to have a copy of the document, but had agreed to allow the Agency to review the document, to take notes fiom it and to keep it under seal in h In the course of a visit to Iran .

in mid-August 2006, Agency inspectors continued their exadnation of the document. However, Iran informed the inspectors that t4e taking of notes would not be permitted, and the notw wbich had been taken thus far by the inspectors during that visit had to be destroyed. The document remains under seal .inIran.

D3 Plutonium Experiments ..
15. The Agency has cmtinued to seek clarification from Iran about its plutonium ecpmtion experiments (OOV/2006/38, paras 8-9). Since the Director Ocnd's last report, the Ageslcy has been able to evaluate thc'expIan8tions provided by Iranin June and examine the copy of the notebook kept by the resmher responsible for the plutonium experiments, and has concluded that they did not provide sufficient clarification of the outstanding issues. In an effort to acquire M e r information about the irradiation parameters, the Agency also m t on 11 July 2006, with a reactor operator and the e, researcher, who also did'not provide the data necessary to clarify the issues, Iraa bas stated that no other relevant Wonnation is available.
16. In a letter dated 10 August 2006, the Agency Informed Jran that, given the information received Erom I a to date, the Agency would nbt be able to resolve the outstanding inconsistencies unless rn additional idonnation w m made available by Iran.

17. The depleted uranium targets which had been inadiatcd in the course of the plutonium experiments are stored in containers 1ocatedW the Karaj Waste Storage Facility (GOVt2005167, para 24). On 8 August 2005, the Agmcy.took environmental samples Erom one of those contaiaers. The results from their analysis, nceotly frnafized by the Agency, indicate the presence of high enriched uranium particles. On 15 ~ u g u k 2006, ~ran'was requested provide information about the source of the contamination and the past use of the containers.

tP

E Other Implementation Issues .
' I

E1 Uranium Conversion ..
18. Since the Dimtor Otncral's last report t tbs Board, the Agency has completed its assessment of o the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV) of nuclear material at UCF carried out between 20 and 24 May 2006 (00~/20()6/38, para. 11). The Agency concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran w s consistent with.the rwufts of the PN,witbin the measurement uncertainties a normally associated with 'similar size conversion plants,
19. In April 2006, the m'avement of a 48X UF6 cylinder1by the operator into and out of one of the withdrawal stations without @or notification .to the.Agency resulted in a loss of continuity of knbwlcdge of nuclear materid in the process.'H6wever, i light of the results of the PW, Agency n the will continue to follbw up on this question as a routine part of its verification of the c o ~ e s and s completenessof Iran's declarations.

20. On 27 June 2006, Iran provided the Agency with the anticipated operational programme for UCF, iwluding details bf the new conversion campaign involving approximately 160 tonne of uranium ore Junk 2006 and is expected to be completed by January 2007. As of concentrate which was bcguxi on $6 ' 25 August 2006, approximately 26 tonnes of uranium in the fbrm.ofU& had 'been produced during this campaign. Al UFs produced at UCF remains under Agency containment and surveillance. Ln a l

' A standard 48X cylinder is capable of containing up to 9.5 tonnu of m6.

letter dated 18 July 2006, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to build a UCF a "standbyn t process line for converting ammonium uranyl carbonate to UG.

E.2. Other Matters
21. On 8 July 2006, D N was carried out at the he1 Mmufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan. Iran informed the inspectors that full commissioning of the FMP is scheduled for 2007. The civil engineering construction of the facility is appmximately 80% completed and equipment is being installed.
22. Thwe are no new developments to w o r t with respect to the other implementation issues referred to in the previous report (OV/2006/38, para 14; GOV/2006/27, paras 19 and 20).

23. Between the end of July 2006 and 29 August 2006, Iran declined to provide onc-year multiple entry visas to designated Agency inspectors as agreed to by Iran in the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. On 30 August 2006, Iran provided such visas for two inspectors, end on 31 August 2006 informed the Agency that Ufollowingthe normal administration process the multiple one year visa for remaining designated inspectors will be issued by 10 September 2006".

F Transparency Measures .
24. Analysis of the environmmtal samples taken from equipment at a technical univenity in January 2006, referred to in paragraph' 25 of GOV/2006/27, showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium. This equipment had been shown to the Agency in connection with its investigation into efforts made by the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) acquiro dual use material to and equipment (GOV/2006/27, paras 24-25).

25. Iraa has not yet responded to the Agency's requests for clarification concerning, and access to carry out environmental sampling of, other equipment and materials related to the PHRC. Nor has Iran provided 'the Agency with access to interview the other former Head of the PHRC.As noted h GOVt2006t38, paragraph 17, the clarification and access sought by the Agency have caktn on added importance in light of the results of the environmental sampling referred to in the previous paragraph. 26. Tbe Agency has continued to follow up on infonmtion concerning studies related to the so-caJIed Green Salt Project, to high explosives testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (CiOV/2006/27, paras 27-29). However, Iran has not cxpmsed any readiness to discuss these topics siirce the issuance of the Director General's report in Febnuvy 2006 (GOV/2006/15, paras 38-39),

r

G. Summary
27, Iran has been providing the Agency with access to nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required reports. Although Iran has provided .the ~ g & with some information concerning product assays at PFEP, Iran continues to decline Agency access .to certain operating records at PFEP.

I

!

1
I

28. Iran has not addressed the Iong outstanding verification issues or provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated with some of its activities. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities; nor haa Iran acted in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.

29. The Agency will continue to pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear activities. However, the Agency remains unable to make .furtherprogressin its efforts to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations with a view to confuming the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, The Director General will c o n t h e to report as appropriate.