United Nations s/2006/1024 Distr.: General 23 December 2006 Original: English Security Council Letter dated 23 December 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council Upon instructions from my Government and with regard to the discussions in the Security Council at its meeting of 23 December, I have the honour to state the points contained in the annex to the present letter. ' I should be grateful if you would have the, present letter and its annex, including the footnotes t o the said annex, circulated as a document of the Security Council. (Signed)M. Javad Zarif Annex to the letter dated 23 December 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council The adoption of Security Council~Resolution 1737 (marks a sad day for the nonproliferation regime. Only a few days ago, the Prime Minister of the Israeli regime boasted about his regime's nuclear weapons.; But instead of even raising an eyebrow let alone addressing that serious threat to international peace and security and the non-proliferation regime, the Security Council imposed sanctions on a member of the NPT that. unlike Israel: - - - - has placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards,3 ' fully implemented the Additional Protocol for over two. years4 and stated its readiness to resume its implementation? allowed over 2000 person days of lAEA scrutiny of all its related and even nc unrelated - facilities: resulting in re ated statements by the ~ ~ e on the ~ absence of any evidence of diversion,'?= voluntarily suspended its lawful enrichment activities for over two years, verified by the IAEA,~in order to build confidence and provide ample opportunity to find a mutually acceptable solution - if that ever were the intention of its negotiating partners, presented various far-reaching proposals to ensure permanent non-diversion, and has consistently called for time-bound and unconditional negotiations to find mutually acceptable solution; a call that was repeated yesterday by Iranian Foreign Minister. ? NPT, has never attacked or thratened to use force against any member of the United Nations, has categorically rejected development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on ideological and strategic grounds,' was repared to provide guarantees that it would never withdraw fiom the - The same Governmentsi which have pushed the Council to take groundless punhive measures against Iran's peacefil nuclear progranft'have systematically prevented it fiom taking any action.to nudge the Israeli regime towards submitting itself to the .' Religious Fatwa by the Leader o f the Islamic Republic reflected in Kayhan, 6 November 2004. Also see the Iranian Reply of August 22,2006 to the 5+1 Package, S/20061806,P 2 and 12. . See the Iranian Reply o f August 22,2006 to the 5+1 Package, Sl20061806,P. 14. See, inter alla, ~OV12006/64@m 20. 'IAEA- ~0~/2006115,#ara %ti1 6 February 2006, implemented the Additional Protocol as if it 30: were in force, including by providing, in a timely manner, the requisite declarations and access to locations." See the Iranian Reply o f August 22,2006 to the S t 1 Package, S/2006/806,,P. 13. See, inter alkr, IAEA GOV/2006/15, paragraph 30, IAEA - GOVf2004/83, paragraph 6, IAEA GOVI2005l67, paragraph 56 and IAEA GOV/OR.I I 19' Issued: April 2005, paragraph 103.. See, inler aha, IAEA GOV/2003/75,paragraph 52 and lAEA GOVM006115, paragraph 53 See, inler alia, Statement of the IAEA's Director General at the Board of Governors on March 8, 2004, IAEA - GOV/2004/11, paragraphs 72-73, IAEA GOVD004134, paragraphs 40 and 43, ,.IAEA GOV12004/60 paragraphs 55 and 60, , IAEA GOV/2005/67 paragraphs 53 and 55, IAEA OOV/2005/87paragraph 17. - ' - - - - - - - rules governing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. By so doing, they have provided it with wide latitude and even encouragement to indulge freely in the clandestine development and unlawful possession of nuclear weapons and even public boasting about it with impunity. As 1 pointed out in my letter of 20 December 2006; it is ugdisputable that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Israeli regime with an unparalleled record of noncompliance with Security Council resolutions if that was the criteria for adoption of the resolution against Iran and a long and dark catalogue of crimes and atrocities such as occypation; aggression, militarism, state-terrorism, crimes against humanity and apartheid1', poses a uniquely grave threat to regional and international peace and security. -- - The reversal of the hypocritical policy of "strategic ambiguity" by the Israeli regime has removed any excuse if there ever wen any - for continued inaction by the Council in the face of this actual threat to international peace and security. - The reaction of the Security .Council to the Israeli regime's unlawfbl possession of nuclear weapons will show,whether the Council is acting - as it is obliged to under Article 24 of the Charter - on behalf of the members of ,fie international community who have made their views abundantly clear on this issukl';.or whether it is merely a "tool in the too~box"'~ a few of its permanent members who'only misuse it to fix of their foreign policy problems and to serve their short-sighted perceived interests. In such a situation, it is not at all surprising that a nation is punished for exercising its inalienable rights, primarily at the behest of a dangerous regime with aggression and war crimes as its signature brand of behavior, which was apparently rewarded for having clandestinely developed and unlawfully possessed nuclear weapons. . D e anyone expect this to enhance the credibility of the Council or sbengthen the os authority of the NPT? Put into perspective, the resolution can only remind the Iranian people of the historic injustices the Security Council has done to them in the past six decades. It is reminiscent of the attempt made in the Council to punish the Iranian people for their nationalization of their oil ind~stry~described a threat to as It is also a reminder of the Council's indifferend in the face of a military coup, organized by two permanent members, which restored the dictatorship. It refreshes the memory of the time when the Council did not consider the massive invasion of Iran by the former Iraqi regime as a threat to international peace and stcrlrity, and refused to even call on the invading army to withdraw from Iranian territory. It brings back the horrors of the long years when the Council turned a blind eye to the extensive and brutal use of 9S/2006/1008,A/611650 'O , .' F m e r US President Cre in his recent opinion @ece in the LA Times dated Deecmba 8, 2006 atr states: "The book describes the abominable oppression and persecution in the &pied Palestinian t r i o i s . l many ways, this is more oppressive than what blacks lived under in South Affica during crtrc..n ~piwthe1d." l3 '' U S Department of State: hup:lhrsinfo.~~~te.g0vlmdArehive/2O06/Mm/Ob846555html SP23581Rev. I Final Document ofNAM Summit September 16, 20061Doc.llRev.3 . chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and soldiers, and by so doing, shouldered responsibility for tens of thousands of Iranians who continue to suffer and perish as a result of chemical weapons whose components came fiom certain countries permanently represented in the Council. We do not need to go far to find these victims. Only last month, I lost one of my brightest colleagues in the Missiori, Mahdi Vahidi, to cancer caused by these very'chemical weapons. Mahdi was just 39. I dealt with the pretexts used for the involvement of the Security Council in Iran's peaceful nuclear program in the annex* document S/2006/603.It is important to make the following additional points: Bringing Iran's peaceful nuclear program to the Council by few of its permanent members, particularly the United States, is not aimed at, nor will it help seeking a their solution or encouraging negotiations. ~ v e n stated'objcctivehas always been to use the Council as an instrument of pressure and intimidation to compel Iran to abandon its rights. (Knowing their bright recent history, we can all assume what the unstated objective has been.) It is instructive in this regard to examine two examples: An informal paper titled, "Options for Addressing Iran's Nuclear Program at the UN Security Council", circulated by.the US Mission in October 2004 exactly when its EU3 allies were ostensibly engaged in negotiations with Iran states: "the United States has long believed that Iran's nuclear activities must be reported to the UN Security Council The UNSC has the legal authority to require Iran to stop [its enrichment program]." - - ... As to Iran's negotiating partners, the political Director of the British Forkign Office, ac in a letter dated 16 M r h 2006 addressed to his counterparts in France, Germany and the United States, revealed the more conniving British plan: "We may also need to remove one of the Iranian arguments that the suspension called for is 'voluntary*. We could do [that] by making the voluntary suspension a mandatory requirement to the Security Council." The letter gets even more interesting: Y agreed to circulate a short paper which we might use as. a sort pf speaking note with the Russians and Chinese. Implicit in the paper is a recognition that we are not going to bring the Russians and Chinese to accept signriant sanctiom over the coming m o m , certainly not without further eforts to bring the Iranians around... h return for the Russiarrs and Chinese agreeing to [a Chapter U resolurion], we would then want to put together apackage 1 that could be presented to the Iranians as a new proposal."'4 This scheme is what actually motivated the presentation of the so-called package of incentives given to Iran 2006. - a couple of months behind British schedule - on June 6" - It also explains why the United States and EU3 never even took tht trouble of studying various Iranian proposals: they were - from the very beginning bent on abusing the Council and the threat of referral and sanctions as an instrument of "Times Online, M r h 22,2006, & ~ ~ / / w i v w ' ac -Ie/O3-209-. pressure to compel Iran to abandon the exercise of its NPT guaranteed right to peaceful nuclear technology. It is now an open secret that their sole objective f m the negotiations has never been to find a 'iolution but to impose and then prolong and perpetuate the suspension of Iran's right in line with their arbitrary and fluctuating red lines. , . Suspension is not a solutiotr. It is at best a temporary -a stop-gap measure to allow time to find a real solution. And such a suspension was in place for two years and contmy to the excuse that the proponents of the resolution have presented here and there, the IAEA repeatedly verified that I n n fully suspended what it had agreed to 06' suspend in each and every report from November 2003 to February 2 0 . ' So, there was a suspension for two years and on and off negotiations for three. What. has been done during these 3 years to find an agreement? Have the EU3 or the United States presented any proposal on what measures short of outright revision of the NPT - would remove their so-called proliferation concerns? Having failed to do so, did they ever consider the far reaching proposals that were offered by Iran onwarcli 23i 200516,which the EU3 negotiators initially considered to contain "positive elements"? Did they ever propose how those positive elements could be enhanced or how the points of divergence could be bridged? Or did they, after consultations with a certain absent party, simply say "it is not good enough. Continue to suspend." Did they even bother to read our proposal of 18 July 2005, which suggested: "allow the Agency to develop an optimized arrangement on numbers, monitoring mechanism and other specifics for an initial limited o ration at Natanz, which would address our needs and allay [their] concerns"? Did they ponder about the far-teaching non-proliferation potential of the proposal.by the President of the lslamic Republic of Iran in his address to the General Assembly on 17 September 20057 Let me refresh your memories: "in order to provide the greatest degree of transparency, the Islamic .Republic of Iran is prepared to engage in serious partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment . program in Iran.." Did they respond to the concrete proposal by the Iranian Foreign Minster at the Conference on Disarmament on 30 March 20061 Allow me to quote what he said: "In our view one possibility to resolve the issue could be establishment of ngional consortiurns on fbel' cycle development with the participation of regional countries Of course countries outside the region may also participate in such regional arrangements... The facility would also be jointly owned by the sharing countries and the work could be divided based on the expertise of the participants." - r ... " See, infer a h , Statement of the lAEAts Dimor Gcneml at the Board of Oovernors on March 8, 2004, IAEA 00V/2004/1I, paragraphs 72-73, IAEA GOVR004/34,paragraphs 40 and 43,, IAEA - OOV/2004/60 paragraphs 55 and 60, , IAEA - GOV/2005/67 paregmphs 53 and 55, IAEA - - GOV/2005/87 paragraph 17 ' l6 SIXL U t ~ : l h V w w . u n . i n t l i r a n l f a pages 46-48. Also see pages c~ - 39-45 and "S 49-50 for other far-reaching proposals by lran from January 2005 to July 2005. ahttu:l/www.u~cts about ~ e a c t f u l ~ , . p53. e g Were these suggestions not exactly a replica of the main proposal of the JAEA experts on Multinational Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities published oh 22 February 2005? For those of you who have not seen the report, it suggests "Promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities to MNAs, and pursuing them as confidence-building measures, with the participation of NPT non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear weapon States, and non-NIT States," and "Creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or comanagement for frontend and backcnd nuclear facilities, such as uranium enri~hment..'"~ Did the Iranian readiness to implement these ideas not present a unique opportunity to create a global model to strengthen the NPT and remove concerns about fuel cycle activities based on the recommendation of the best international experts brought together by the IAEA for this exact purpose? W s any other country with similar technology prepared to be as flexible as a Iran? Did the US and its European allies kriously consider our detailed reply of 22 August 2006, which unlike their practice -- provided a point by point reply to their June 6~ Package and made genuine proposals to address its short~omin~s?'~ I know is that they even refused to refer to it in the All present resolution. Did they discuss the offer of international consortium which was presented by lran in the course of the September and October 2006 negotiations in Vienna and Berlin and was initially considered very promising, leading to public statements of progress after the meetings;" a prognosis that was rapidly and astonishingly reversed even before the ministerial meeting of 5+lP'? - Many other similar questions may be asked. But the answer to all will be the same. Because what the United States and apparently the EU3 - in spite of what they told us during negotiations wanted, and the only outcome that they were and are ready to .accept from these so-called negotiations, was - and still is -- that lran should "make a binding commitment not to pursue fie1 cycle a~tivities."~~ -- Iran has been brought before the Security Council, because we did not accept that unlawful demand, which as many already know, would not have been their last. At the same time, we were prepared to go to any length to alley their so-called proliferation concerns, in spite of the fact that we all know they are no more tha" unfounded and self-serving sheer excuses. + Indeed, old-hand proliferators and suppliers of chemical weapons2' and nuclearweapon technology2' can hardly have proliferation concerns. " "Multilateral Approaches.tothe Nuclear Fud Cycle: Expert Gmup Report submitted to the Director General of the lntemational Atomic Energy Agency: JAEA INFCIRC1640, 22 February 2005, p. 103, approaches 3.4 and 5. ~ / 6 1 / 5 Sl20061806 ; 14 ; 'O See h ~ ~ : l l w w w . u ~ d a ~ . ~ e w s h v u l d t 2 0 0 6 - 0 9 15 inn-eu " New Yo& Times,Oclober 4,2006, '%e package presented by EU3 to lran in August 2005. IAEA INFClRC 651, parsgntph 34. A US Senate inquiry in 1995 accidentally revealed that during the Iran-Iraq war the US had sent Iraq samples of all the strains of germs used by the latter to make biological weapons. The strains were sent '' - - -. . - The sponsors claim that they do not trust our "intentions." But the problem is that their "intention-o-meter" has a rather abysmal record of chronic malfunction. Sufice it to say that the former US Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, in a testimony before Congress in March 1992.,claimedthat lran was trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and added that this goal was unlikely to be achieved before the year 2000.~' Later, in November of the same year, a draft National Intelligence Estimate by the same CIAj concluded that Iran was making progress on a nuclear arms program and could develop a nuclear weapon by 2000:~ Now the same intelligence establishment is saying not before 2015." Accusing lnrn ~f having "the intention" of acquiring nuclear weapons has, since the early 1980s, been a tool used to deprive lran of any nuclear technology, even a light water reactor or fuel for the American-built research reactor. One wonders which "Iranian intention" or which "proliferation concern" has prompted the main proponents of the resolution to prevent lran, throughout the past 27 years, from buying civilian aircrafts or even their spare parts, thereby jeopardizing the lives and safety of Iranian civilians.whom-theyhypostatically try to court these days. And . might add, to no avail. l As the IAEA Director-General recently said "a lot of what you see about Iran right now is assessment of intentions. ..But one of the lessons we learned from Iraq is that we really need to be very, very careful coming to conclusions because these issue make the difference between war and peace." 28 Talking about "intentions", while the main proponents of the resolution may have self-servingly claimed that they doubt outs, they themselves have said and done plenty so that no body in Iran or elsewhere in the world could have any illusions about is the theirs. The recent dangerously divisive statement by the UK Prime ~ i n i s t d ~ most recent vivid illustration of those intentions. by the Centers for Distasc Control and Prevention [sic] and the Amdcan Type C u l m Colleclion to the same sites in Iraq that UN weapons inspectors later delermincd wem part of Iraq's biological wespons program (Times of India, U10102). See also " How the US Armed Saddam Hussein with Chemical Weapons," at & ! www.nreenleR.or~OO2/506/2760~. &/ For collaboration of other sponsors of the current resolution with Iraq i is chemical weapons program, see for instance: nt htt~:l/www.fas.or~dmidt/imd~~I8z120103,hlml. & @ / / w w w ~ a t i r n c s l M i d d l e and , B05Ak02.html. =for instance: Michael Krpin, The Bomb in ~h B~emml,(S1mon and Schuster, 2006); and Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara R o m . The NucIear Ads, (Time Books. 19781 See also "isesl's -. Nuclear Weapons" at MP;Uwww, I "~effreySmith, Gates W r s ofrJ a nt ,m March 28.1992. 2b~laine Sciolino, C.I.A. Says Iran Makes Progress On Atom A, The New York Times,November & US National Intelligence Estimate, 2005, See Washington Post Augul 2, 2006. ~tt~:llwww.w~n~0st.co~~-dvnlcontentlarticI~05/08/011AR2005080101453 pEhtml. Christopher Dickey, The Power of the Purse, Newsweek, Oct 20,2006. 29 Reuters, December 20,2006, hnpJInews.yahoo.com/slnm/2006 I220/ts_nmlbrfLain-blair-dc-6 30,1992 27 , ' The August 23rd report by the lntelli ence Committee of the US House of Representatives on Iran's nuclear program' is another telling example. That report was so dangerously misleadinend iliustrding the extent to which some wqr-mongers are prepared to go, that it codpelled the IAEA to officially dispute its allegations against Iran. In its letter, the IAEA called parts of the report "outrageous and dishonest," containing "incorrect and misleading assertions" and offered evidence to refute its central claims. The Agency stressed that the report even contained serious distortions of IAEA findings on Iran's nuclear a~tivities.~' The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that the days of weapons of mass mwder have long passed; that these inhumane instruments of indiscriminate slaughter have not brought internal stability or external security for anyone and they will not be able to do so in the future. Unlike some who despise the NPT and international law in general, we have a high stake in preserving, fully implementing, strengthening and universaliw'ng the NPT. The resolution adopted on 23 December 2006 does exactly the opposite. And it should be no surprise, because it was championed by a non-member of the NPT coupIed with its main benefactor.which made no secret of its contempt for this and other disarmament instruments. No one has forgotten last year's Summit, when even the word "disarmament" was struck by the famous "red pen." By the same token, we believe that the days of bullying. pressure and intimidation by some nuclear-weapon holders are gone. We are told we need to build confidence. Indeed. We all do in this tumultuous world. But confidence could only be built through respect for and non-discriminatory application of law. That is the only objective criteria; anything else would be to accept the whim of the powerful. And, international law and international treaties cannot be the subject of arbitrary, fluctuating and self-serving re-interpretations, adjustmentsor d lines even if they are connivingly imposed through resolutions. Such a precedent is dangerous for every one. . The Security Council would gg a long way in addressing its own confidencedeficit, by truly acting on behalf of 1JN membership, as mandated by Article 24 of the Charter. An overwhelming majority of theh are members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Conference who have "reaflmd that States' choices and decisions in the %Id of peaceful usei'bf nuclear technology and and its fuel cycle policies must be res~xxted,"~~ "expressed concern over ... threats and pressures on Iran by certain circles to renounce its inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."33They have also clarified where the real threat to international peace and security does in fact exist by "expressing grave concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and . Staff Report of the US House Pamanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, August 23, 2006. The report had been prepared by a former special assistant to Ambassador Bolton. See Dafna Linzer's article in the Washington Posl, August 24,2006. " Letter by the IAEA dated 12 September 2006, addressed to Chairman of the Pamanent Select Intelligence Committee of the US House. See Guardian, September 15, 2006, /lwww.~uardian.co.uk/iranld& 1873 1 14.00m. &AM/2006/Doc. 12,~. 1, S e p t ~ ~ ~ 16,2006. ~bsr " OIC Resolution 18133-P. 'O continuing threat to the security of neighboring and other ~tates."'~ is the real That issue .that,members of the United Nations wanted the Security Council to be seized with. " Final Document afNAM Summit, sept&ber 16, 2006/Doc.l1Rev.3