United Nations s/2006/80 Distr.: General 7 February 2006 Original: English Security Council Letter dated 6 February 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 4 February 2006, which I received today from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA (see annex). I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the Members of the Security Council. (Signed)Kofi A. Annan 06-23613 (E) 130206 I11111ni iimii1iii~~uiii~~ii~ niw sl2M)waQ Annex Letter dated 4 February 2006 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council In paragraph 2 of resolution GOV/2006/14of 4 February 2006 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, the Board requested that I transmit to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see enclosures). The Board also requested me to report to the Security Council the steps required of the Islamic Republic of Iran as specified in paragraph 1 of the same resolution. I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its enclosures to the attention of all Members of the Security Council. (Signed)Mohamed ElBaradel Enclosures List of enclosures concerning the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Reporlslnecling recorddupd,m brieJ . Page Update brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards dated 3 1 January 2006 Report GOV/INF/2006/2 dated 10 January 2006 Report GOV/INF/2006/1 dated 3 January 2006 Report GOV/2005/87 dated 18 November 2005 Report GOV/lNF/2005/13 dated 2 November 2005 Report GOV/2005/67 dated 2 September 2005 Report GOV/2005/62 dated 10 August 2005 6 10 11 12 ......................... , , . , . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. ... ............... 17 18 33 34 35 38 Report GOV/2005/61 dated 8 August 2005.. . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... Extract (paras. 102-121) from meeting record G0VIOR.I 119 dated 1 March 2005 . . . . . . . . . Report GOV/2004/83 dated I 5 November 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Report GOV/2004/60 dated 1 September 2 0 0 4 , . . Report GOV/2004/34/Corr.l dated 18 June 2 0 0 4 , . . . . ............. ........... Extract (paras. 48-61) from meeting record GOV/OR.I 130 dated 16 June 2005. ReportGOV/2004/34dated lJune2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Report GOV/2004/11 dated 24 February 2004 Report GOV/2003/75 dated 10 November 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Report GOV/2003/63 dated 26 August 2003 43 75 98 99 119 132 161 171 180 ., . .. .. . , . ., ReportGOV/2003/40dated6June2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Extract (para. 24) from meeting record GOV/OR.1062 dated 17 March 2003. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ro~oluriona/in/ormorion eirculwlmeeling record Resolution GOV/2006/14 dated 4 February 2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , . . . . . . . . , . , Result of roll-call vote taken on 4 February 2006 on draft resolution GOV/ZO06/12/Rev.l Resolution GOV/2005/77 dated 24 September 2005 . . . . , . , . . , 182 185 186 188 189 191 198 200 203 206 .. .... Result of roll-call vote taken on 24 September 2005 on draft resolution GOV/2005/76, , , . , , Resolution GOV/2005/64 dated 11 August 2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . Information circular INFCIRC/648 dated 1 August 2005 Resolution GOVI2004190 dated 29 Novembe Resolution GOV/2004/79 dated 18 September 2004 Resolution GOV/2004/49 dated 18 June 2004 Resolution GOV/2004/21 dated 13 March 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . , . , , , , . , , , , , , . , , , . . .................. ......... 3 S/2006/80 Resolution GOV/2003/81 dated 26 November 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Resolution GOV/2003/69 dated 12 September 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Extract (paras. 52-58) from meeting record GOV/OR.1072 dated 19 June 2 0 0 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 212 215 4 Reportsheeting recordslupdate brief 5 Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran's Suspension of Enrichment-related and Reprocessing Activities Update Brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards* 31 January 2006 The purpose of this brief is to provide an update on the developments that have taken place since November 2005 in connection with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Ageement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and on the Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The brief provides factual information concerning those developments; it does not include any assessments thereof. Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and access to locations. 1. Enrichment Programme As detailed in the Director General's report of 18 November 2005, during meetings that took place in October and November 2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide additional information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme. Responses to some of these requests were provided during discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between Iranian officials and an Agency team, headed by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards. This information is currently being assessed. l.A. Contamination As part of its assessmeut of the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the source@) of low enriched uranium (LEU)particles, and some high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components had been manufactured, used andor stored. 1.B. The 1987 offer As previously reported to the Board, Iran showed the Agency in January2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary concerning the possible supply of a disassembled centrifuge (including drawings, descriptions and specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings, specifications and calculations for a "complete plant"; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment; a liquid nitrogen plant; a water treatment and purification plant; a complete.set of workshop equipment for mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium reconversion and casting capabilities. On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that the one-page document was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this to the secret nature of the programme and the management style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at that time. Iran stated that no other written evidence exists, such as meeting minutes, administrative documents, reports, personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its statements concerning that offer. 1.C. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer According to Iran, there were no contacts with the network between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and by key members of the network about the events leading to the mid-1990s offer are * 6 Previously issued in English only, still at variance with each other. In this context, Iran has been asked to provide further clarification of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by AEOI staff members in the mid-1990s. P-I cenIriYuge component deliveries in the mid-1990s Iran has been unable to supply any documentation or other information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of SO0 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The Agency is still awaiting clarification of the dates and contents of these shipments. P-2 centrifugeprogramme Iran still maintains that, as a result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the mid-1990s. the intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2 centrifuge components (which contained no supporting specifications), and that no P-2 components were delivered along with the drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this period did it ever discuss with the intermediaries the P-2 centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge components. In light of information available to the Agency indicating the possible deliveries of such component%which information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November 2005 to check again whether any deliveries had been made after 1995. In connection with the R&D work on a modified P-2design said by Iran to have been carried out by a contracting company between 2002 and July 2003, Iran has confiied that the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased, magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design. The Agency is still awaiting clarification of all of Iran's efforts to acquire such magnets. 2. Uranium Metal Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to have been the drawings, specifications and supporting documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of which are dated from the early- to mid-1980's. Among these w s a 15-page document describing the procedures for the a reduction of UFs to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document had been provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI.Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal. 3. Transparency Visits and Discussions On I November 2005, the Agency was given access to a military site at Parchin, with a view to providing assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at that site, where several environmental samples were taken. Final assessment is still pending the results of the analysis of those samples. Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional information and clarifications related to efforts made by the Physics Research Centre (F`HRC), which had been established at Lavisan-Shian,' to acquire dual use materials and equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion According t Iran, the PHRC w84 established at Lavism-Shim i 1989, inter alia, to "suppat and pmvidc scimthic advice o n and scrviocs t the Minisby of Ixfcncc" (scc OOVROW/60,psra 43). a ` 7 activities. The Agency has also requested interviews with the individuals involved in the acquisition of those items. On 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency documentation the Agency had previously requested on efforts by ban, which it has stated wen unsuccessful. to acquire a number of specific dual use items ( e l h c drive equipment, power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye laser). Iran stated that, although the documentation suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor. However, Iran declined to make him available to the Agency for an interview. The DDG-SG reiterated the Agency's request to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential for a better understanding of the envisioned and actual use of the equipment, which included balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment (equipment that appears to be relevant to uranium enrichment). On that same day, the Agency also presented to Iran a list of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to see, and to take environmental samples from, the equipment in situ. The following day, some of the high vacuum equipment on the Agency's list was presented at a technical university, and environmental samples were taken from it. On 26 January 2006, Iran provided additional clarification about its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use material (high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium and special oils), as had been discussed in January 2005. High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and environmental samples were taken therefrom. Iran stated that the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing, but had not been used because of its specifications. Iran agreed to provide additional infomation on inquiries concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and special oils. Iran also presented information on Iran's acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves, and filters, which were made available to the Agency on 31 J e n q 2006 for environmental sampling. On 5 December 2005, the Agency reiterated its request for a meeting to discuss information that had been made available to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF, ("green salt''), as well as tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile reentry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the "issues related to baseless allegations." Iran agreed on 23 January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the clarification of the Green Salt Project, but declined to address the other topics during that meeting. In the course of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the Agency presented for Iran's review a copy of a process flow diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the allegations were baseless and that it would provide further clarifications later. 4. Suspension The Agency has continued to verify and monitor all elements of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities. In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to resume, as from 9 January 2006, "those W D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension" (GOViINF/2006/1). On 7 January 2006, the Agency received a letter from Iran requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz, Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of suspension of enrichment related activities (see GOVmJFlzOO6/2). The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January 2006 in the presence of Agency inspectors. Since the removal of the seals, Iran has started what it refers to as "small scale M D " . As of 30 Janwuy 2006, Agency inspectors had not seen any new installation or assembly of centrifuges, o r the feediig of UF6 material for enrichment. However, substantial renovation of the gas handkg system is underway at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natar~z,and quality control of components and some rotor testing is being conducted at Farayand Technique and Natanz Due to the faa that all centrifugerelated raw materials and components arc without IAEA seals, the Agency's supervision of the R&D activities being carried out by Iran cannot be effedive except at PFEP, where containment and surveillance measures are being applied for the enrichment process. The two cylinders at Natanz containing U F 6 , from which seals had been removed on 10 January 2006. were again placed under Agency containment and surveillanceon 29 January 2006. The Uranium conversion campaign which commenced at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan on 16 November 2005 is continuing and is expected to end in Maroh 2006. All UF6 produced at UCF thus far has remained under Agency containmentand surveillance. Using satellite imagw, the Agency has continued to monitor the ongoing civil engineering at construction of the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (R-40) Arak. 9 Board of Governors GOVmaoOall Date: 3 January 7.006 Restricted Distribution Original. English Communication dated 3 January 2006 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Report by the Director General The Secretariat of the Agency received on 3 January 2006 a Note Verbale o f the same date from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran in which Iran informed the Agency that "in benefiting full privilege and inalienable rights for research and development on nuclear energy as recognised in article 111 of the Agency Statute and article 1V of the NPT, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AFiOI) has decided to resume from 9 January 2006 those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and nonlegally binding suspension. The Agency is thus requested lo take necessary and timely preparation in this regard. It is to be noted that the said R&D will be conducted in accordance with Iran's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA." The Secretariat is in the process of seeking clarifications from Iran as to the implications of the Note Verbale. The Director General will continue to report to the Board as appropriate. 11 Board of Governors GOV~OOSls7 Dale: 18 Novmba uwl5 Reatrlcted Dlatributlon original:English Itan 3 0 of the provisional agenda () (00V/2005/81) Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Repor! by the Director General 1. On 24 September 2005, the Board of Govtmors adopted a resolution (GOVlzO05i77) in which, inter alia, it urged the Islamic Rspublic of Iran (herehaflu referred to as Iran), in order to help the Director General to resolve outstandingquestions and provide the necessary B S ~ C C S : To implement transparency measures, as reqmted by the Duectos G e n d in his r p r , eot which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshaps and research and development lwtions; To re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity, as in GOV/2005/64, and reprocessing activity; To reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water; 1 Promptly to ratify and implement in 1 1 the Additional Protocol; Pending completion of the ratification of the Additional Protocol to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, which Iran signed on 18 December 2003. 2. This progress report builds on the previous reporb' of the Director General to the Board of Governors on issues related to the implementation of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for ?ha initial report m the Board of Govcmors on this m a m wlls provided by h c Dinrmr O m 4 orally at the Boanl's meeting on I March 2003. ThC Director (3end has since then submined eleven written rrporrp to thc Board: 7 GOV/2003/40,dated 6 June 2003; OoVi2003/63,dated 2 August 2003; GOV/2003/75, 6 dated 10 Novembcr 2GQ3; 00V~OO4/11. 24 Fcbrualy 2004;GOVR004134,dated 1 June 2004. and c0rr.l. dated 18 June 2004; GOVi2004/60. dated dated 1 SqUcmbw 2004;GOV/2004/83. dated IS NovmLw 2004; MpCIRc/648, dated 1 August 2005; GOV/2005/61. dated 8 August 200s; GOVi2005/62, dated 10 August 2W5; and GOVI2005167. dated 2 Scptamber 2005. l addition, the n Deputy Dirktor General for Safeguards made oral sta1smDnfs 10 the Board on 1 Mnroh 2005 (00V/ORl I 19)and on 1 June 6 ' 2005 (GOV/OR.I 130). 12 Gv 05 . o n 0 B7 page 2 the Application of Safeguards in connection with the T e t on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear ray Weapons (the Safeguards Agreemene). A. Developments since September 2005 A.l. Contamination 3. The Agency is continuing to analyse the sourcc(s) of low enriched uranium (LEU) particles, and some high enriched uranium (HEW particles, which were found in Iran with a view to assessing the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment activities (set paras 9 and 10 of GoV/2005/67). analysis of the environmental samples collected at a location in another The Member State where, according to Iran, the centrifuge components had been stored by the procurement network in the mid-1990s prior to their shipment to Iran (see para 11 of OOV/2005/67), did not indicate any traces of nuclear material. A 2 Enrichment Programme .. 4. In October and November 2005, a number of meetings took place during which futther documentation said to have been provided to Iran by the procurement network was made available to the Agency, and the Agency was able to interview two individuals (not previously available to the Agency) who had been involved in Iran's discussions with the procurement network A 2 1 The 1987 offer ... 5. As previously reported to the Board, in January 2005 Iran showed to the Agency a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary for certain components and equipment (see paras 14 and 15 of GoV/2005/67).' Iran stated that only some components of one or two disassembled centrifuges, and supporting drawings and specifications, were delivered by the procurement network, and that a number of other items of equipment referred to in the document were purchased directly h m other suppliers. Most of these components and items were included in the October 2003 declaration by Iran to the Agency. 6 The documents recently made available to the Agency related mainly to the 1987 offer; many of . them dated from the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s. The documents included: detailed drawings of the P-l centrifuge components and assemblies; technical specifications supporting componmt manufacture and centrifuge assembly; and technical documents relating to centrifuge operational performance. In addition, they included cascade schematic drawings for various sizes of research and development (WD) cascades, together with the equipment needed for cascade operation (e.g. cooling water circuit needs and special valve consoles). The documents also included a drawing showing a cascade layout for 6 cascades of 168 machines each and a small plant of 2000 centrifuges arranged in the same hall. Also among the documents was one related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UFs to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms, with respect to which Iran stated that it had ~rNFClRU214. The document contained a list including: B disassembled centrihge, includiag drawin@, dcacriptions and spifications for production of centrifuges; drawings. spacifEations and cnlculutions for a "complete plant"; and mulaids for u x ) O cmtrifige machines. The docummt ale0 made refercnce t: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive quipmml; a liquid nimgm plms a o water Ueannent and purification plant; a camplac sel of worksbop equipment for mechanical, e l s t r i d and electmnic support; and uranium reconversion and casting capabilities. 13 been provided on the initiative of tbe procurement network, and not at the request of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). 7. The Agency is assessing all the documentationreferred to above and comparing it with, inter alia, documentation from other somes. A.2.2. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer 8. Very little new information has been made available regarding the events preceding the mid-1990s offer. Iran has maintained that no documentation on the offer exists apart from the shipping documents confirming the delivery of the P-l components during the 1994-1995 period. Iran has provided M additional information or documentation to support its statement that it did not pursue any work on the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002. 9. As indicated in earlier reports to the Board, Iran has stated that, between 2002 and 2003, a contracting company had briefly carried out some R&D work on a modified P-2 design, but that this had been terminated in July 2003. Iraf~ re-confirmed that, as part of this R&D work, the contractor had purchased some magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design, and made some additional inquiries regardiug magnets. Since September 2005, Iran has provided documentation concerning purchases by the contractor of copper aluminium and by the P-1 team of maraging steel and special oil which were also made available to the contractor. The Agency's assessment of these purchases, and the quantities delivered, is continuing with the assistance of Member States. A.2.3. Shipping documents and other documentation 10. In addition to the documentation referred to above, since the last report to the Board, Iran also provided the Agency with access to a substantial amount of information and documentation relevant to its procurement efforts in the late 1980s and early 199Os, along with more details on the 1994-1995 deliveries. This information, taken together with information obtained through the interviews held in Iran, the Agency's findings and other information supplied to the Agency thus far, seems to be consistent with Iran's declarations of what had been procured in the late 1980s and early 1990s for the first stage of the P-l R&D programme of the AEOI. Iran has been asked to provide some additional hs procurement documents in order to enable the Agency to complete its assessment in t i regard. A 2 4 Technical discussions between Iran and the intermediaries ... 11. Iran has maintained that, after the meetings leading to the 1987 offer and the actnal receipt of components and documentation,no contacts were made between Iranian officials and the procurement network before 1993. Iran reiterated that the contact for the mid-1990s offer had been an initiative by the network, and not by Iran. 12. Iran has previously confmed that, following the mid-199os offer, up to t n meetings were held e with the intermediaries during the period 1996 to 1999. Information supporting this statement was supplied by one of the individuals interviewed by the Agency. Iran has stated that these meetings were all related to discussions about the poor quality of many of the P-1 components that had been supplied to Iran and to obtaining answera to specific technical questions arising fiom Iran's efforts to operate the P-1 cenhifuges. Iran has maintained that at no time during this period did it discuss the P-2 centrihge design, nor did Iran discuss the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge components, sub-assemblies or rotors. 14 QOV/2005/87 Page 4 A.3. Other Implementation Issues 13. With reference to the other aspects of Iran's past nuclear programme, as identified in para. 48 of GOV/2005/67, there a n no new developments to report with respect to Iran's Uranium minirig activities (see paras 26-31 of GOV/2005/67) or with respect to Iran's activities hvolvhg polonium and beryllium (see para. 34 of GOV/2005/67). 14. The Agency is awaiting from IAEA network laboratories the results of the dyse-s of plutonium samples taken in August 2005 to complete its final assessment of Iran's plutonium wcperimcntS (SM para^ 21-25 of GOV/2005/67). A.4. Implementation of the Additional Protocol 15. As undertaken in its letter to the Agency of 10 November 2003, Iran has continued to act 88 ifits Additional Protocol were in force. Since September 2005 the Agency bas conducted thne complementaryaccesses. AS. Transparency Visits and Discussions 16. On 1 November 2005, following a meeting held on 30 October 2005 between Mr. Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran,and the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG), the Agency was given access to the buildings requested within the a ~ e a of interest at Parchin (see para. 41 of GOV/2005/67), in the come of which environmentalsampleswere taken The Agency did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited. Its final assessment is pending the results of the environmental sample analysis. ~ e r have been no new developments c with regard to questions and access related to the Lavisan-Shian site (set paras 37-40 of GOV/2005/67). A.6. Suspension 17. The Agency has continued to monitor installations related to the uranium gas centrifuge and laser enrichment programmes, and has not obselved any inconsistency with Iran's voluntary undertaking not to carry out any enrichment activities. 18. On 24 October 2005, Iran informed the Agency that the uranium convmion campaign begun in August 2005 at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) would end around 1 November 2005, and that another campaign with 150 drums would start afler a oneweek maintenance period (GOV/INF/2005/13). Feeding of yellow cake to process started on 16 November 2005. All UF6 so far produced at UCF has remained under Agency containmentand surveillancemeasures. 19. In November 2005, the Agency canied out a design information verification visit at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak, during which it was noted that the civil engineering construction of the reactor building was continuing. B. Current overall assessment 20. In the September 2005 report to the Board of Governors, it was noted that, in light of the difficulty of establishing a definitive conclusion with respect to all of the contamination, it was important to make progress on the issue of the scope and chronology of Iran's P-1 and P-2 programmes (see paras 4447 of GOV/2005/67). Since that time, Iran has been more forthcoming in providing access to additional documentationrelated to the 1987 offer and permitting interviews with individuals who had been involved in discussions with the procurement network. However, there still remain issues to be resolved in connection with the genesis of the mid-1990s offer. The Agency is still 15 seeking additional assurance that no P-2 programme was conducted between 1995 and 2002. The Agency is currently reviewing the new information provided by Iran on the P-1 and P-2 enrichment programmes and has emphasized to Iran the importance of providing the additional requested supporting documentation. 21. As also noted in the previous report to the Board, in order to clarify some of the outstnnding issues related to Iran's enrichment programme, Iran's h l l eaaSparency is indispensable and overdue. Transparency measures should include the provision of information and documentation related to the procurcmcnt of dual use equipment, and permitting visits to relevant military owned workshops and R&D locations associated w t the Physics Research Cenlre and the Lavisan-Shim site. In this regard, ih the Agency welcomes the access provided to the Parchin site. The Agency, however, is still awaiting additional information and permission to undertnke additional visits. These should also include interviews on the acquisition of certain dual use materials and equipment, and the taking of environmental samples from the above locations. 22. The Secretariat will continue its investigation of all relevant information available to it as well as of outstanding issues pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme. The Director General will continue to report to the Board as appropriate. 16 Board of Governors ~v/INFn005/13 Date: 2 Novmbw 2035 Restricted Distribution OriBinfIb English Communication dated 24 October 2005 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Report by the Director General The Secretariat of the Agency received on 25 October 2005 a N t Verbale dated 24 October 2005 oe from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran forwarding a communication dated 24 October 2005 from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. In that communication,the Agency was informed that the operator of the Uranium Conversion Facility had announced that "current verified U308 dnuns will last until 1st November 2005. AAer finishing the operation, each unit will have one week overhaul maintenance and the next campaign will start with 150 UOC drums." 17 Board of Governors Gov/2005/67 Dale: 2 scptcmber m 5 Restricted Distrlbutlon original: English I 6(d) of &s provisional agenda m (GOV/2005/57) implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General 1. A meeting of the Board of Governors was held fiom 9 to 11 August 2005 to discuss the implementation of the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (the Safeguards Agreement'). 2. On 1I August 2005, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/64) which it, in inter alia: . 8 Expressed serious concern at the 1 August 2005 notification to the IAEA that Iran had decided to resume the uranium conversion activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility (VCF) in Esfahan, at the Director General's report that on 8 August Iran had started to feed uranium ore concentrate into the fust part of the process line at UCF and at the Director General's report that on 10 August Iran bad removed the seals on the process lines and the UF, at that facility; Underlined the importance of rectifying the situation resulting from the developments reported by the Director General and also of allowing for further discussions in relation to that situation; Urged Iran to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities including the production of feed material, including through tests or production at UCF, on the same voluntary, non-legally binding basis as requested in previous Board resolutions, and to permit the Director General to re-instate the seals that had been removed at that facility; Requested the Director General to continue to monitor closely the situation and to inform the Board of any further developments as appropriate, and 0 Requested the Director General to provide a comprehensive report on the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement and this resolution by 3 September 2005. GOV/2005/67 Page 2 3. Since March 2003, the Director General has been reporting to the Board of Governors on issues related to the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement' Tbe present report builds upon the previous reports. A. Findings as of November 2004 4. In the comprehensive report of the Director General to the Board of Governors dated 15 November 2004 (GOV/2004/83), it was concluded, on the basis of all information available to the Agency as of that date, that Iran had failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of fecilities wherc such material had been processed and stored. In that report, these failures, as assessed in the light of the available information, were summarized as follows: a. Failure to report: the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer for further processing; the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material wherc appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting thereftom; 6 the use of imported natural m for the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Elechic Company workshop in 1999 and 2002, and the consequent production of enriched and depleted &um @v); the import of natural uranium metal in 1993 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enricbment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations and the production and transfer of resulting waste; the production of UO,, UO,, U. U F 6 and ammonium m y 1 carbonate (AUC) F, and from imported depleted UOz, depleted USOS natural U308,and the production and transfer of resulting wastes; and the production of natural and depleted UO2 targets at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) and their irradiation in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the subsequent processing of those targets, including the separation of plutonium, the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets at the Tehran Nuclear Research CenW (TNRC). ThC initial nporl to the B o d of O o v m m on thip matter was provided by ulc Direcfor Gem1 d l y at the Board's meeting on 17 M m h 2003. The D k t o r Gmcral has since then submiacd ten winen nportn to the Board: GOVi2003/40, dated 6 June 2003; GOVi2003/63,dated 26 August 2003; GOVi2003/75, dated 1 November 2003;GOVRW/II. dated 24 0 Febnmy 2004;GOVR004/34, dated 1 June 2004, and Com.1, dsted 18 June 2004; GOViZW/M), dated 1 Septwber 2004; GOV/2004/83, dated 15 November 2w4; INFCIRU648, dated 1 August 200% GOVi2005/6I, dated 8 August 2005; and GOV/2005/62, &led 10 August 2005. In addition, the Dcputy Director G m d for Safe@ made oral statements to the Boardon I March2005 (GOV/ORI119)andon16JuneZ~S(GOV/OR.1130). 19 ' - OOV12005/67 Page 3 b. Failure to declare: (i) the pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop; and the laser enrichment plants at TNRC and the pilot uranium laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab'ad. () i c. Failure to provide design information, or updated design information, for: (i) the facilities where the natural uranium imported in 1991 (including wades generated) was received, stored and processed (tbe Jabr Ihn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories at TNRC (JHL); TRR; ENTC; waste storage facility at Esfahan and hak); (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) the facilities at ENTC and TNRC where UO,, U03, UF,, U F 6 and AUC from imported depleted U02,depleted u30, and natural U30, had been produced; the waste storages at Esfahan and at Anarak, in a timely manneG the pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop; the laser enrichment plants at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad, and locations where resulting wastes had been processed and stored, including the waste storage facility at Karaj; and TRR, with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets, and the facility at TNRC where plutonium separation had taken place, as well as the waste handling facility at TNRC. (vi) d. Failure on many occasions to cooperate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, as evidenced by extensive concealment activities. 5 . As corrective actions, Iran: a. b. c. Submitted inventory change reports relevant to imports, transfers, domestic receipts and shipments, losses and discards of nuclear material; Provided physical inventory listings and material balance reports with respect to all declared nuclear material, and presented the available material for Agency verification; Submitted declarations with respect to the pilot enrichment facility at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, the laser enrichment plants at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad and the waste storages at Esfahan and Anarak; and Provided design information with respect to the facilities identified above (the facilities located at TNRC and ENTC). d. 6. As a result of these corrective actions and other activities, the Agency was able by November 2004 to confm certain aspects of Iran's declarations (related to conversion activities and laser enrichment), which, as indicated to the Board, would be followed up as matters of routine safeguards implementationunder the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. 7. As reported to the Board of Governors in March 2005, Iran failed to report to the Agency in a timely manner certain underground excavation activities that were already underway in December 2004 at the UCF at Esfahan. Although Iran submitted the necessaty design information in December 2004, Iran should have provided such information to the Agency at the time the decision 20 GOV/2005/67 Page 4 was taken to authorize or carry out such construction, in accordance with the Safeguarda Agreement SubsidinryArrangements. 8. No additional failures have been identified Iran has, however, provided some new information with respect to the dates of the plutonium research activities that is at variance with some of the dates provided earlier (see discussion below). As in November 2004, while there are a number of other matters requiring follow-up, the two important outstanding issues relevant t the Agency's efforts to o provide assurance that there is no undeclared nuclear material and that there are no undeclared enrichment activities in Iran are: the origin of LEU and HEU3 particle contamination found at various locations in Iran; and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs. B. Developments since November 2004 B.1. Contamination 9. A a vital part of its investigation into Iran's enrichment programme, the Agency has conducted s extensive environmental sampling at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components were manufactured, used and/or stored, with a view to assessing the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment activities.` 10. Analysis of these samples has revealed particles of LEU and HEU indicative of types of nuclear material that are not included in Iran's inventory of declared nuclear material, and has thus called into question the completenessof Iran's declarations about its centrifuge enrichment activities. The Iranian authorities have attributed the presence of these particles to contamination originating h m imported centrifuge. components. In that context, Inm has stated that it has not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-234 using centrifuges. 11. In January 2005, an Agency team re-visited locations in a Member State where, according to I a , rn the centrifuge components imported by Iran had been stored by the supply network prior to their ac shipment to Iran. Additional samples were taken in M r h 2005 at one of the locations.The analysis of the environmentalsamples collected at these locations is still in progresp. 12. On 21 May 2005, the Agency received fiom another Member State a number of centrifuge components, environmental sampling of which was thought might provide informationon the origin of the LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran. The analysis of swipe samples taken h m those components, which was carried out at the Agency's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL), was completed in early August 2005. Based on the information currently available to the Agency, the results of that analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. 'High mrichcd uranium (NEU) is unvlivm enriched toU-23%or above in the isatop0 11-235; low mrichrd uranium 0 20% is urao*m mriched to between 0.72% and less than 20% %e most important observations with to h e analytical results h the envimnmental samplmg, as uf o r n 15 November 2004,were oummarizal in paw 36-41 ofthc Director General`s November 2004 nport to the Baard 2i GQVl2005l67 Page 5 B.2. Enrichment Programme 13. As explained by the Deputy Director Qeneral for Safeguards @ a - S G ) in March 2005, there r have been developments since November 2004 in four am related to the Agency's verification of Iran's P-1 centrifuge enrichment programme, specifically in connection w i k (a) a 1987 offer for centrifuge related design, technology and sample components; @) the genesis of the mid-1990s offer for P-1 centrifuge documentation and components for 500 centrifuges; (c) shipping documents and other documentation related to the delivery of items in connection with the mid-1990s offer; and (d) technical discussions held between Iran and the intermediaries concerning centrifuge enrichment. These developments, as well as the status of the Agency's inquiries about Iran's P-2 programme, are addressed below. B.2.1. T h e 1987 offer 14. During a meeting on 12 January 2005 in Tehran, Iran showed the Agency a handwritten onepage document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. The document suggests that the offer was for the delivery of: a sample machine (disassembled), including drawings, descriptions and specifications for production; drawings, specifications and calculations for a "complete plant"; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also reflects an offer to provide auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment and uranium re-conversion and casting capabilities. Iran stated that only some of these items had been delivered, and that all of those items had been declared to the Agency. Iran further stated that the intermediaries had offwed the rc-conversion unit with casting equipment on their own initiative and that, as the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOl) bad not requested it, the AEOI had not received it. 15. The Agency has repeatedly asked to have access to, and copies of, original documentation related to the 1987 offer. Iran has maintained that the only document that exists reflecting the 1987 offer is the handwritten one-page document. Iran has also reiterated its previous statement that it had not received the re-conversion unit, but has agreed to continue its search for additional supporting documentation on this and other items included in the offer. B.2.2. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer 16. Iran has informed the Agency that there is no written document reflecting the mid-1990s offer, made initially to an Iranian company unrelated to AEOI, for the delivery of P-l centrifuge documentation and components for 500 centrifuges. According to Iran, an employee of that company (said by Iran to have been set up to purchase computer software and hardware for the State Organization for Management and Planning (OW) was approached with an oral offer from the network. This information was conveyed to the head of the OMP, who, according to Iran, realized that the OMF' did not have a mandate for the transaction, and reported it to higher authorities. The President of the AEOI was made aware of the offer, which resulted in renewed contacts in 1993 between the AEOI and the network intermediaries. B.2.3. Shipping documents and other documentation 17. The Agency has sougbt from Iran access to documentation which supports Iran's declarations conceming the number of shipments of enrichment related equipment received by Iran, and the specific contents of those shipments. In January 2005, Iran provided the Agency with copies of a number of shipping documents indicating four shipments between I994 and 1995. In a letter dated 1 April 2005, the Agency asked Iran for permission to review the original folder containing the 1994 4 sbipping documents and to be provided with supporting documents reflecting the content of the shipments made in the 1994 consignments. In August 2005,Iran showed the Agency the originals of 22 GOV/7.005/67 Page 6 the shipping documents, as well as cso clearance sheets relevant to the 19941995 shipments. utm However, these documents did not provide additional details about the actual contents of the shipments. The Agency has reiterated its request for more information about the contents, and in particular far access to unpacking and storage documents. W e Iran has stated that very few such records had bem kept in those days, it has agreed to search forther for such information. 18. From the shipping documents presented to the Agency in January 2005, it a p p e d that the 6mt deliveries of the P-1 components started in January 1994, i.e. before what had previously bccn declared as the first m e i g in October 1994, of the two AEOI representatives with the network etn, intermediaries.In its letter of 6 April 2005, Iran stated that, having checked the service passport of one of the AEOI representatives,"it is clear that he had ma& two trips relating to the matter in August and December 1993." Since this was not consistentwith the eailier informationprovided by that individual during his discussions with the Agency, the Agency asked to see original supporting documentation (e.g. passports) of the two Iranian representatives who had participated in the meetings with the intermediaries. In August 2005, Iran allowed the Agency to review the service passport of one of the W a n representatives, which contained stamps appearing to combrate W s statement regrudillg the two trips in 1993. Iran promised to provide further clarification about the trips said by that individual to have taken place in 1994, and to provide supporting documentation for such clarification. 6.2.4. Technical discussions between Iran and the intermediaries 19. The Agency still needs to understand what contacts took place during the period 1987 through 1993 between Iran and the intermediaries and why P-1 centrifuge design documents similar to those that had been provided rn 1987 were delivered again in commtion with the offer made around 1994. This is important for establishing the chronology and sequence of events associated with the development of Iran`s enrichmentprogramme, in particular with a view to ensuring that there has been no other development or acquisition of enrichment design, technology or components by Iran. The Agency also has inquired about other subsequent contacts between Iran and the intermediaries ( h m 1994 to the present). In its communication received on 8 June 2005, Iran stated that, apart from the meetings and discussions about which Iran had already informed the Agency, no other discussions on centrifuge enrichment had taken place. B.2.5. The P-2programme 20. Another aspect of the Agency's investigation is related to h n ' s statement that it did not pursue any work on the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002.As reported in November 2004, Iran has stated that no work was canied out on the P-2 design (or any centrifuge design other than the P-1 design) prior to 2002. Iran has said that, due a shortage in professional resources and changes in the management of the AEOI, priority had been placed at that time on resolving difficulties being ih The encountered by Iran in connection w t thc P-1 cen~fuge. reasons given by Iran for the apparent gap between 1994/1995 (when the P-2 design was said to have been received) and 2002, and the evidence provided to date in support thereof, do not yet provide sufficient assurance that no related activities were carried out during that period, particularly given that the individual contracted to work w t the P-2 design was able to make modifications necessary for composite rotors within a short ih rn period a h early 2002 when, according to I a ,he had seen the drawings for the first time? Iran has been requested to provide more information, along with any supporting documentation,relevant to the P-2 programme, in particular with regard to the scope of the original offer related to the P-2 design and Iran's acquisition of items in connection with that programme. 'See GOV/7.004/83, 4248, for a morecompletedetailing afthis issue. pw 23 GOV/2005/67 Page I B.3. Plutonium Experiments 21. As indicated in previous reports to t e Board, the Agency has been pursuing with Iran the issue of h the date of its plutonium separation exprhents, which Iran initially said had begun in 1988 and were completed in 1993. Iran also stated that no plutonium had been separated since then.` 22. The result of the Agency's analysis of plutonium solntions sampled by it in September2004 confirmed the Agency's earlier finding that the age of the plutonium solutions in the bottles appeared to be less than the declared 12-16 years, indicating that the plutonium could have been separated after 1993. During follow up discussions with Iran in April 2005, Iran told the Agency that, in 1995, the plutonium nitrate solution contained in one of the two bottles said to have been a result of the experiments had been purified and a plutonium disk had been produced as a result for alpha spectroscopy, and that, in 1998, the plutonium solution in the other bottle had been purified and another plutonium disk had been produced. Following these discussions, at the request of the Agency, ks the plutodium d k were shipped to SAL for further analysis to determine the exact isotopic composition of the plutonium. 23. In a letter to the Agency dated 17 June 2005 r e f k g to the statement by the DDG-SG, Iran explained that there was a clear distinction between the date of termination of the research project on plutonium and the dates of the other activities, such as the ones related to purification and related an waste management of the liquid, which it had not considered as part of the m i research project. Iran reiterated that the "research project had been terminated in 1993" and added, "That is, no more samples were sent for irradiation to the research reactor for the purpose of [plutonium] production and subsequent [plutonium]separation."' 24. With the cooperation of Iran, the Agency was able, between 1 and 9 August 2005, to conduct detailed verification of the unprocessed irradiated UOZtargets stored in four containers. A preliminary assessment of the data collected and the measurements performed during that verification seems to corroborate Iran's declaration with regard to the quantity of uranium present in the containers, although the total number of targets found in those containers was much higher than had been declared by Iran. In a letter dated 24 August 2005, Iran provided further detail about the numbers of targets. 25. A h a 1 assessment of Iran's plutonium research activities must await the results of the deshuctive analysis of the disks and targets. B.4. Uranium Mining and Concentration 26. As indicated by the DDG-SO in his statement to the Board on 16 June 2005, while there are no indications of undeclared mining or milling activities at Gchine, the Agency has been hying to achieve a better understanding of the complex arrangements governing the past and current administration of the Gchine mine and mill. In particular, the Agency wished to investigate !inther how a tum-key project for a uranium ore processing plant could have been implemented by a newly founded company, described as having had limited experience in uranium ore processing, in such a relatively short period of time. In particular, the Agency has focused on the period between 2000 and mid-2001, As indicated in the November 2004 npart to the Board, i N o v m k 2003, the Agency m k samples f o two bonles n rm cnnteining plutonium solutions resulting from the experiments, and placed under Agency scsl a numbtr of disks which had been pmduced from the solutions. In September 2004, the Agenry took a second set of samples for hnhw analysis using differentanalytical techniques at different laboratories. The Agency's current understanding of Iran's activities in connection wiih the plutonium separation aperimeats is set out in Annex 1 to this report. 24 GOVRoo5/67 Page 8 during which time, according to Iran,the company had been able to design, procure, build and test the grinding process l i e for the mill. 27. In response to the Agency's request, Iran, in April 2005, showed the Agency, and provided an oral translation of, a copy of a contract dated 13 June 2ooO.The Agency was also shown a comprehensive i" set of "as W t drawings provided by the engineering company to the AEOI,88 well as a number of other documents and drawings. 28. During a meeting in Iran fmm 13 to 18 August 2005, the Agency requested to speak with the individual who had previously been in charge of the &hhe project, aa well as to the AEOI representative currently in charge of the project. The Agency was only able to meet with the current AEOI representative, who had assumed responsibility for the project in 2002. The AEOI representative provided a chronology of the construction of the uranium ore cotlcmtration plant, and in particular, of the design and C O I I S ~ ~ U C ~ ~ O ~ griading process line, stating that procurement of of the parts for that line had been started in September 2000, that the civil enginecsing construction had begun in February 2001 and that the equipment was first tested in April 2001. 29. During the meeting, files containing drawings and documents related to the Gchine mine ore processing activities were shown to the Agency. Most of the files were those which had been shown to the Agency in April 2005, and consisted of the final =as built" drawings. Only some of the files contained originals of drawings related to the first attempts to design and construct the grinding ~~ process line. In these latter documents, the names of the p e r s who had designed, drawn, checked or approved the drawings, and the name of the company that had prepared the drawings, along with project numbers and dates, were blacked out Iran explained that "the coverage of names was done to protect the commercial secret" 30. During the August 2005 meeting, Iran also showed the Agency some of the delivery documents (receipts) for items purchased off the shelf, which matched the time line declared by Iran, as well as examples of purchase orders placed around 2002 with various subcontractors. According to Iran, however, no purchase orders or contracts existed for the procurement of equipment for the grinding process line. Iran explained that, since the company had just started in business in 2000, the company had not had a great deal of experience and had purchased most of the equipment for the grinding process off the shelf with the intention of assembling that part of the facility by itself on site, but that, after the fist unsuccessful cold testing, the company had changed its operating practice and had subcontracted for the production of parts for the process lines. According to Jran, this explained the relative abundance of such documentation for the subsequent development of the process l i e as compared with the paucity of such documentation for the first efforts. 31. In addition to the above questions associated with the chronology, the Agency is still hying to acquire a better understandingabout why no work waa carried out at the Gchine site between 1993 and 2000. Iran has stated that, during that period, research and development experiments on Gchine ore were carried out at a TNRC laboratory. B.5. Other Implementation Issues 32. A described in the Director General`s November 2004 report, Iran brought into operation in 1985 s a Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL) at Esfahan (which is still in operation), about which it informed the Agency in 1993 and for which design information was provided in 1998. Iran is also building a ZirconiUm Production Plant at Esfahan. Construction of the Fuel Manufachuiag Plant at Esfahan, which is scheduled to be commissioned in 2007, wus started in 2004. There are no other new developments to report with respect to Iran's fuel fabrication activities. Further follow up of these activities will be carried out as a routine safeguanls implementationmatter. 25 GOV/2005/67 Page 9 33. Iran is in the process of constructing a heavy water research reactor (IR-40) at Arak (planned to go i t operation in 2014) and a heavy water production plant (HWPP) at Arak. As indicated in the no November 2004 report, the Agency has requested additional information about Iran's efforts to acquire equipment for hot cells for the I R 4 . However, no new information has been received concerning hot cell equipment since that time. In Marcb ZOOS, Agency inspector8 visited the Arak site to cany out design information verification (Dnr), and noted that construction of the I R 4 building had been started. The March 2005 visit also included complementary access to HWPP,which is currently being commissioned. The Agency will confinue to monitor Iran's heavy water reactor programme as a routine safeguards implementationmatter. 34. Iran's activities involving poloninm extraction, and the Agency's findings with respect thereto, were discussed in paragraphs 79-84 of the November 2004 report! As indicated in that report, the issue is of interest to the Agency since polonium-210 can be used not only for certain civilian applications, but also, in conjunction with beryllium, for military purposes (specifically, as a neutron initiator in some designs of nuclear weapons). There are no new developments to report in connection with the polonium separation experiments.The Agency has, however, investigated evidence provided to it of attempts by Iran to acquire beryllium metal, and has been able to confirm that the attempts indicated in that evidence were uot successhl. B.6. Cooperation in the Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol 35. The Additional Protocol to Iran's Safeguards Agreement was signed on 18 December 2003. According to Iran,entg into force of the Additional Protocol will require ratification, which has not yet takenplace. Notwithstanding, as undertaken in its letter to the Agency of 10 November 2003, Iran has continued to act as if its Additional Protocol is in force. 36. As noted in the Director General's November 2004 report, since December 2003, Iran has facilitated, in a timely manner, Agency access under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to nuclear materials and facilities, as well as to other locations in the country, and has permitted the Agency to take environmental samples as requested by the Agency. Iran still maintains some restrictions on the issuance of multiple entry visas to designated inspectors. As of August 2005, Itan had agreed to provide fifteendesignated inspectors with such visas. B 7 Transparency Visits and Discussions .. 37. Iran has, since October 2003, provided the Agency upon its request, and as a transparency measure, access to certain additional information and locations beyond that required under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. A summary of the relevant developments through November 2004 is set out in paragraphs 96-105 of the 15 November 2004 report to the Board. 38. In connection with the Lavisan-Shim site and the two whole body counters (WBCs) that had been located there, as indicated in the November 2004 report to the Board, although Iran's description of events concerning the WBCs appeared to be plausible, the Agency still wished to take environmental samples from the remaining trailer said to have contained one of the WBCs. BeWem 1989 and 1993,Iran inadiated Wo bismuth targets, and attempted to extract polonium from one of them, at TRR part of a feasibility study for the production of neutron sources. lran continua to maintain that the purpase of the inadlation had been to produce pure Pc-210 on a laboratory scale, noting that, if production and extraction of Po-210 were successful, it could bc used in radioisotope thennoelectric baneries. The Agency d m not have any concrete information that is conmry lo the statements made by Iran, but still m a i n s somewhat uncertain regarding the plausibility of the stated purpose of the e p r m n s xeiet. 8s 26 39.However, with regard to the razing of the Lavisan-Shian site, in August 2005, Iran provided fiuther clarification and additiod documentation in support of ite statement that the site had been razed following the reof the site to the Municipality of Tehran in wnuection with a dispute between the Municipality and the Ministry of Defence. Iran explained fitrther that the razing of the site had been carried out by the Municipality, and that it had begun in December 2003 and was completed he n within two or t r e months. The information provided by Iran appeared to be coherent a d consistent with its explanation of the razing of the Lavisan-Shian area 40.The Agency i still awaiting additional information and clarifications h m Iran regarding, and s e interviews with the individuals involved in, efforts by the Physics Research Centre, which had b m located at Lavisan-Shian, t acquirc dual use materials and equipment that could be used in uranium o enrichment or conversion activities. 41. Tbc Agency has discussed with the Iranian authoritiesopen source information relating to dual use equipment and materials which have applications in the conventional milihy area and in the civilian spbere as well as in the nuclear military area. As described by the DDG-SO in his 1 March 2005 statement to the Board,in January 2005,Iran agreed, as a transparency measure, to permit the Agency to visit a site located at Parchin in order to provide assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at that site. Out of the four areas identified by the Agency to be of ra potential inhest, the Agency was permitted to select any one a e The Agency was requested to minimize the number of buildings to be visited in that area, and selected five buildings. The Agency was given free access to those buildings and their surroundingsand was allowed to take environmental samples, the results of which did not indicate the presence of nuclear material, nor did the Agency see any relevant dual use equipment or materials in the locations visited. In the course of the visit, the Agency requested to visit another area of the Parchin site. The Agency has been pursuing this matter with Iran since then with a view to being able to access the locations of interest at Parchin. C. Current overall assessment 42. The Director General provided in paragraphs 106414 of GOV/2004/83a detailed overall assessment of Iran's nuclear programme and the Agency's efforts to verify Iran's declarations with respect to that programme. As indicated in that report, Iran has made substantial efforts over the past two decades to m t e r an independent nuclear fuel cycle, and, to that end, had conducted experiments to acquire the know-how for almost every aspect of the fuel cycle. Many aspects of Iran's fuel cycle activities and experiments, particularly in the areas of uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium research, had not been declared to the Agency in accordance with Iran's obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. Iran's policy of concealment continued until October 2003,and resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with that Agreement (summarized in paragraph 4 above). 43. Since October 2003,good progress has been made in Iran's correction of the b m h e s , and in the Agency's ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran's current declarations,which will be followed up as a routine safeguards implementationmatter @articularlyin connection with conversion activities, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and the heavy water research reactor programme). 44.Two important issues were identified in the Director General`s November 2004 report as relevant to the Agency's efforts to provide assurance that there are no undeclared enrichment activities in Iran, specifically: the origin of LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran; and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifugesof both the P-1 and P-2 designs. 27 GOVIZWS/67 Page 11 45. With respcct to the first issue - contamination - as indicated above, based on the information currently available to the Agency, the results of the environmental sample analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran'sstatement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. It is still conclusion with respect to all of the not possible at this time, however, to establish a d e f ~ t i v e contamination, particularly the LEU contamination. This underscores the importance of additional work on the scope and chronology of Iran's P-l and P-2 centrifuge programmes, which could greatly contribute to the resolution of the remaining contamination issues. 46. With respect to the second issue - the P-l and P-2 centrifuge programmes although, CIS indicated above, some progress has been made since November 2004 in the verification of statements by Iran regarding the chronology of its centrifuge enrichment programme, the Agency has not yet been able to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's statements concerning those programmes. While Iran h s provided further clarifications, and access to additional documentation, concerning the a 1987 and mid-1990s offers related to the P-l design, the Agency's investigation of the supply network indicates that lran should have additional supporting information that could be useful in this regard. Iran has agreed to endeavour to provide further supporting information and documentation. Iran has also been asked to provide additional details on the process that led to Iran's decision in 1985 to pursue gas centrifuge enrichment and on the steps leading to its acquisition of centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987. 4 7 . No additional information or documentation has been provided with respect to Iran's statement - that it did not pursue any work on the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002. As indicated above, Iran has been requested to provide more information, along with any supporting documentation, relevant to the P.-2 programme, in particular with regard to the scope of the original offer related to the P-2 related design and Iran's acquisition of items in connection with that programme. 48. The Agency is still assessing other aspects of Iran's past nuclear programme, including: statements made by it about plutonium research, in particular with respect to the dates they were carried out; Iran's activities at Gchine; and Iran's activities involving polonium. 49. The Agency continues to follow up on information pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme and activities that could be relevant to that programme. In this regard, it should be noted that, absent some nexus to nuclear material, the Agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited. The Agency has, however, continued to seek Iran's cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications.in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area. Iran has permitted the Agency, as a measure of transparency, to visit defence related sites at Kolahdouz, Lavisan and Parchin. While the Agency found no nuclear related activities at Kolahdouz, it is still assessing information (and awaiting some additional intormation) in relation to the Lavisan site. The Agency is also still waiting to he able to re-visit the Parchin site. 50. In view of the fact that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation, Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue. Given Iran's past concealment efforts over many years, such transparency measures should extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol and include access to individuals, documentation related to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations. Without such transparency measures, the Agency's ability to reconstruct, in particular, the chronology of enrichment research and development, which is essential for the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the statements made by Iran, will be restricted. 28 51. As indicated to the Board in November 2004, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and thexefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities. The Agency is, however, still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities rn in I a . The process of drawing such a conclusion, after an Additional Protocol is in force, under normal circumatanws, is a time consuming process. In view of the past undeclared nature of significant aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, and its past pattern of concealment, this conclusion can be expected to take longer than in normal circumstances. 52. The Secrehiat wl continue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran's il nuclear programme, and the Director General will continue to report to the Board as appropriate. D. Suspension 53. Pursuant to the Board`s resolution on 29 November 2004 (GOV/2004/90), and previous resolutions, the Agency has continued its activities to verify and monitor all elements of Iran's voluntary suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. 54. Prior to 22 November 2004,the Agency had already established a baseline inventory of all UF6, essential centrifuge components, key raw materials and equipment, and the assembled centrifuge rotors at declared workshops said by Iran to have becn involved in the manufacturing of centrifuge components, and had applied containment and surveillance measures to these items. 55. The Agency has continued its monthly monitoriug activities at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, most recently from 30 to 31 August 2005, to ensure that the suspension of enrichment activities at P E P is filly implemented. The surveillance records fiom the cascade hall have been reviewed to ensure that no additional centrifuge machines were installed. The seals on the equipment and nuclear material have been replaced and verified. The inventory of centrifuge components has been verified periodically, and the seals on the essential components replaced and verified. The cascade hall, and the 20 sets of centrifuge components stored at the feed and withdrawal station, continue to be under Agency surveillance, and all the previously declared UFSfeed material at PFEP, as well as product and tails, remain under Agency containment and surveillance. 56. The Agency has also continued to monitor the suspension by conducting: DIV activities at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz and at the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Facility at TNRC; monitoring of the decommissioned status of the Lashkar Ab'ad atomic vapour laser isotope separation pilot plant through complementary access at Lashkar Ab`ad and to laser enrichment equipment stored at TNRC and the Nuclear Research Centre for Agriculture and Medicine at Karaj; inspections and D V at JHL.;and I visits to several declared workshops, randomly selected by the Agency, where centrifUge components had been manufactured andor stored, including the Kalaye Electric Company workshop. 57. On 9 May 2005,during a D V at FEP, Agency inspectors observed some construction work being I carried out in the underground cascade hall of Building A and in the ventilation building above the 29 OoV/2005/67 Page 13 cascade hall foreseen in the design information for FEP submitted by Iran. Iran has described this work as civil cons&uction, not covered by its voluntary suspension undertahg. In subsequent DNs, the Agency has noted that this construction work is continuing. 58. The Agency also continued its verification of Iran's volunkay suspension of conversion activities at UCF. As reported previously, in August 2004, Iran introduced about 37 tonnes of uranium ore concentrate (UOC or yellowcake) into the process area of UCF as feed material for facility testing. As of 22 November 2004, all of the UOC had been dissolved and converted into intermediate products, principally AUC and UF,, and part of the intermediate UF, had been converted into UF6. On 22 November 2004, the Agency installed seals and other tamper indicating devices to verify that no additional feed was inmduced in the process and that there was no further production of UFs. On 18 February 2005, Iran completed its conversion of the AUC into UF4, and conducted clean-out operations. The Agency carried out a physical inventory verification at UCF between 21 and 25 April 2005, in the course of which the UOC, the UF4, the UFSand the scrap and waste generated by the conversion process were verified by the Agency, and the UF, placed under Agency seal. The material unaccounted for (MUF) as a result of the conversion campaign was calculated to be less than 1% of the total quantity of material fed into the process, which is within an acceptable range for similar size conversion plants. The process lines and nuclear material remained under Agency seal until August 2005. 59. On 1 August 2005, Iran informed the Agency of its decision to resume uranium activities at UCF? The Agency installed additional surveillance equipment at UCF between 8 and 10 August 2005. On 8 August 2005, Iran started to feed UOC into the iirst part of the process line and on 10 August removed the Agency seals from the remaining parts of the process line. The UFa remained under Agency seal. 60.As of 29 August 2005, approximately 4000 kg of uranium in the form of UOC had been fed into the process and approximately 600 kg of uranium in the form of AUC produced, from which approximately 110 kg of uranium in the form of AUC was fed into the next process line. As of 29 August, no UF4had been produced as a result of that processing. From the 21 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF4produced during the previous campaign, approximately 8500 kg of uranium in the form of UF, was fed into the UFI to UFe process line; approximately 6800 kg of uranium in the form of UFs was produced therefrom. In a letter dated 29 August 2W5, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to start moving the remaining inventory of UOC to the new storage area, and that it would likely take two months. 61. The Director General will continue to report to the Board as appropriate. INFCIRU648, 30 ANNEX 1 CHRONOLOGY OF PLUTONIUM SEPARATION EXPERIMENTS The Agency's current understanding of the chronology of Iran's activities in connection with the plutonium research is as follows: 1987-1988 The separation process was simulated using imported unirradiated UOi 0; dissolution and purification took place in the Shariaty Building at TNRC; pressed v and sintered pellets were manufacbed using imported UOz @ ) at FFL; the UO, pellets werc M e r manipulated into aluminium and stainless stecl capdes at FFL 1988-1993 The capsules (containing a total of 7 kg of UO, in the form of powder, presscd pellets and sintered pellets) were irradiated in TRR 1991-1993 Plutonium was separated h m some of the irradiated UOr targets in the capsules (about 3 kg of the 7 kg of UOl) and plutonium solutions produced, these activities were carried out at the Shariaty Building and, after the activities were t r a n s f d in Octobcr/November 1992, at the Chamaran Building at TNRC; the restarch and development related irradiation and separation of plutonium were temnhted in 1993 1993-1994 The unprocessed irradiated UO, was initially stored in capsules in the spent fuel pond of TRR, and later t r a n s f d into four containers and buried behind the Chamaran Building 1995 In July, purification of the plutonium solution h m the 1988-1993 period WBS carried out in the Chamarm Building; a plamhet (disk) was prepared h m the solution for analysis 1998 In August, additional purification of plutonium h m the 1988-1993 period was carried out in the C h a m m Building; another planchet (disk) was prepared h m the solution for analysis The glove boxes f%om Chamman Building were dismantled and sent to ENTC the for storage; one glove box was moved to the Molybdenum Iodine Xenon Facility Due to construction work being carried out behind the Chamaran building, two containers holding the unprocessed irradiated UO, were dug up, moved and reburied 2000 2003 31 GOVL?005167 Page 1s ANNEX 2 ABBRJWIA'IIONS AND TERMS AEOI AUC Atomic hergy Organizationof Iran ammonium uranyl carbonate design information verification depleted uranium DIV DU ENTC FEP Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre Fuel Enricbrnent Plant,Natanz Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, ENTC FFJ. HEU HWPP high enriched uranium Heavy Water Production Plant, Arak IR-40 IJHL Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, Arak Jabr fin Hayan MultipurposeLaboratories, TNRC low enriched uranium Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, Seibersdorf,Austria Tehran Nuclear Research Centre Tehran Research Reactor, Tehran Uranium Conversion Facility, ENTC uranium tetrafluoride uranium hexafluoride LEU PFEP SAL TNRC TUR UCF VF, WS I Uol I uo3 I uranium dioxide I uranium trioxide I u@s UOC WBC 1 urano-uranic oxide uranium ore concentrate whole body counter 32 Board of Governors GOV/2005/62 Date 1oAugustzms Reshlcted Dlstributlon original: English Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General With further reference to GQV/2005/61, issued on 8 August 2005, I wish to inform the Members of the Board that Iran has today removed the seals on the process lines and the UF, at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF). I should also note that the surveillance equipment at the UCF is fnlly rnu functional and that the u a i m ore concentrate referred to in GOV/2005/61 has been verified by the Agency. 33 Board of Governors GOV/2005/61 Date: 8 August 2005 Restricted Distribution Original: English . The pmviaiod agenda (GOVi2005lSS) . ... - . .. .. . . 1 . Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General With reference to paragraph 2 of the resolution of the Board of Governors of 29 November 2004 (GOV/2004/90), which the Board asked that the Director General inform Board Members should in the suspension by Iran of its enrichment related and reprocessing activities not be fully sustained, and with reference to INFCIRW8, which was circulated on 1 August 2005, I wish to d o r m the Members of the Board that today, 8 August 2005, Iran started to feed uranium ore concentrate (UOC) into the first part of the process line at the Uranium Conversion Facility (VCF). This activity was commenced following the installation today by the Agency of cameras covering the input stage of the UOC process line, but regrettably prior to completion of the in situ testing of the cameras, which normally takes 24 hours following installation. It should be noted that the sealed parts of the process line remain intact. I will keep the members of the Board informed of any further developments 34 Board of Governors GOV/oRi no* Issued July ZOOS Restricted Distribution Origin& English Record of the 1130thMeeting Held at Headquarters, Vienna. on Thwsday, 16 June ZOOS8 ai 3.20p.m. Extract (paras. 48-61) 48. Mr. GOLDSCHMIDT (Deputy Director General for Safeguards) recalled that, in November2004, the Secretariat had issued (as document GOV/2004/83) a report on the implementation of the agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT and on the Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities. 49. The Director General, in his introductory statement, had already addressed the issues of suspension, transparency and cooperation. He would therefore limit his comments to other issues and to related developments since his oral update at the Board's Ivlarch 2005 meetings. In connection with the Agency's verification activities at NatanS the Agency had noted that Iran was modifying one of the underground structures at that site for the safe storage of equipment, in connection with which it had already submitted updated design information. 50. On 21 May 2005, the Agency had received ffom another Member State a number of centrifuge components, envhmental sampling on which could provide information about the origin of the LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran. The analysis of the swipe samples taken from those components would take approximately two months to complete. 51. The Agency had continued its investigation of the outstanding questions related to Iran's P-I and P-2 centrifuge programmes. As indicated at the March 2005 Board meetings, the r c n emphasis eet had been on: a 1987 offer of a centrifugerelated design, technology and sample components; technical discussions between Iran and the intermediaries between 1987 and 1993; a mid-1990s offer of P-1 centrifuge documentation and components; and shipping documents related to the delivery of those documents and components. * Previously issued in English, Chinese and Russian: Arabic, French and Spanish versions forthcoming. This record i subject to conexion.Concdions should be submitted in one of the working languages. in a memorandum s andlor incoQOIated in a copy of the record. They should be sent to the Secretexiat of the Policy-Making Organs,International Atomic Energy Agcncy, Wagramustrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-I400 Vienna, Austria; fax +43 1 2600 29108; email secpmo@iaca.or& or from GovAtorn via the Feedback link. Conedons should be submitted within b e weeks of the reccipt of the record. 35 GOV/OR 1130 16 June2005, Page 7 52. As regards the 1987 offer, the one-page handwritten document (without dates, names, signatures or addresses) shown to the Agency on 12 January 2005 in Tehran, said to reflect an offer made by a foreign intermediary, suggested that the offer included the delivery of: a disassembled sample machine; drawings, specifications and calculatiomq for a "complete plant"; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The offer had also included the provision of auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment and uranium reconversion and casting capabilities. Iran had stated that only some of the items had been delivered, and that all of those items had been declared to the Agency. The Agency had repeatedly, most recently in a letter dated 14 April 2005, asked to have access to and copies of the original documentation reflecting the 1987 offer. In its 2 May 2005 reply to that letter, and in an amplification provided on 8 June 2005, Iran had stated that "[the] one page document provided to the Agency is the only existing one". Iran had further stated that the intermediaries had offered the reconversion unit with casting equipment on their own initiative and that, as the AEOI had not requested it, it had not received it. 53. Among other issues, the Agency still needed to understand what contacts had taken place during the period 1987-1993 between Iran and the intermediaries and why similar design documents on P-1 centrifuges had been delivered again in connection with the new offer made around 1994. That was important for establishing the chronology and sequence of the events associated with the development of Iran's enrichment programme, in particular with a view to ensuring that them had been no other development or acquisition of enrichment design, technology or components by Iran. In its communication received on 8 June 2005, Iran had stated that, apart from the meetings and discussions about which Iran had already informed the Agency, no other discussions on centrifuge enrichment had taken place. 54. In a letter dated 17 January 2005 and a letter dated 6 April 2005, Iran had informed the Agency that no written documentation relevant to the offer made in 1994 initially to an Iranian company unrelated to the AEOI for the delivery of P-1 centrifuge documentation, and for components for 500 centrifuges, was available to the Agency. 55. As reported i November 2004 (in document GOV/2004/83), Iran had stated that no work had n been carried out on the P-2 design (or any centrifuge design other than the P-1 design) prior to 2002. The reasons given by Iran for the apparent gap between 1994-95 (when the P-2 design was said to have been received) and 2002, and the evidence provided to date in support thereof, did not yet provide sufficient assurance that no related activities had been carried out during that period. The Agency was continuing to investigate the matter and had asked Iran to search further for supporting information and documentation. 56. The Agency had sought kom Iran access to documentation which supported Iran's declarations concerning the number of shipments of enrichment related equipment received by Iran, and the specific contents of those shipments. That was essential for verifying the completeness of Iran's declarations concerning such equipment. Under cover of a letter transmitted to the Agency on 17 January 2005, Iran had provided copies of a number of shipping documents said to have been related to "2 consignments in 1994 and 1995", which dates deviated from information provided earlier by Iran, particularly in the case of the new bellows that had previously been said to have been supplied in 1997. In a letter dated 14 April 2005, the Agency had asked Iran for permission to review the original folder of the 1994 shipping documents and to be provided with supporting documents reflecting the content of the shipments made in the 1994 consignments. In its response, dated 2 May 2005, Iran had stated that the new bellows had been shipped in a consignment which had 36 taken place in 1995. Also, Iran had noted that a copy of shipping documents had been provided to the Agency in January 200.5 and that those documents indicated "exact shipping dates as well BS custom clearance dates." In its amplification provided on 8 June 2005, Iran had reiterated that "[the] only existing shipping documents are those already submitted to the Agency" and that "considering the nature of the items and the deal no detail specificationof the item in the containers exist." 57. From those shipping documents, it appeared that the first deliveries of P-l components had started in January 1994, i.e. before the &st meeting (previously said to have taken place in October 1994) of the AEOI representative with the intermediary. In response to the Agency's 9 March 2005 request for additional information in that connection, Iran had replied in its letter of 6 April 2005 that, having checked the service passport of the AEOI representative, "it is clear that he had made two trips relating to the matter in August and December 1993". Since that was not consistent with earlier infonnation provided by Iran, the Agency had asked to see the original supporting documentation of the two Iranian representativeswho had participated in the meetings with the intermediaries. No positive reply had been received thus far. 58. While there were no indications of undeclared mining or milling activities at Gchine, the Agency had, in order to understand better the complex arrangements governing the current and past administration of the mine, requested that the original contract between the AEOI and the engineering company that had constructed the mill at Gchine be made. available for Agency review, along with related documentation. The Agency was further investigating why the AEOI had suspended the work on the very promising Gchine project fiom 1994 to 2000 in order to focus on a much less promising ore deposit at Saghand. 59. FoUowing Iran's conversion of approximately 37 tons of uranium ore concentrate at the Uranium Conversion Facility, and the subsequent clean-out of the process lines, the Agency had carried out a physical inventory verification of the nuclear material (in the fonn of V , VF,scmp and F, waste) at the Uranium Conversion Facility between 21 and 25 April 2005. From a preliminary assessment, the quantities of material appeared to correspond to those declared by Iran. Until the analysis of the nuclear material samples taken during the physical inventory verification was completed, however, it was not possible to finalize those figures. As indicated in previous reports to the Board, the Agency had been hying to establish the dates of Iran's plutonium separation experiments. Iran had said that the experiments had been completed in 1993 and that no plutonium had been separated since then. The matter had been discussed fiutha with Iran in April 2005. At the request of the Agency, the plutonium discs which had been prepared from the solutions by the facility operator for alpha spectroscopy, and which had been placed under Agency seal in October 2003, had been shipped to Vienna for further analysis. On 20 May 2005, the Agency had written to Iran seeking c o n h a t i o n of statements made by Iran at the April 2005 meeting to the effect that the solution in one bottle had been processed in 1995 whereas the solution in the second one had been purified in 199%. In a letter dated 26 May 2005, Iran had confumed the Agency's understanding with regard to that chronology. Those clarifications would be assessed together with the plutonium disc analysis results when they became available. 60. 61. In March 2005, Agency inspeetors had, for design information verification purposes, visited the Arak site and had noted that constnrction of the heavy water research reactor (IR-40) building had started. The visit had included complementary acces to the H a y Water Production Plant, which was ev currently being commissioned. 37 Board of Governors GOV/oRi 119* Issued: April 2005 Restricted Distribution Original: English Record of the 11lgthMeeting Heldat Headquarters, Vienna, on Tuesday,1 March ZOOS, at 3.05p.m. Extract (paras. 101-121) 101. Mr.GOLDS C m T (Deputy Director General for Safeguards)), introducingthe sub-item, said o that he had nothing to add about safeguards implementation in Egypt t the report contained in document GOV/2005/9 that he would inform the Board about the progress made in the Agency's and verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran and about the issue of Small Quantities Rotocols. 102. In November 2001, the Seaetariat had provided (n document GOV/2004/83) comprehensive i a report on the Agency's verification of compliance by Iran with its NPT safeguards agreement and its voluntary suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. 103. Since the November 2004 m e i g of the Board, Iran had facilitated in a timely manner etns Agency access to nuclear material undsr its safeguards agreement and additional protocol, and the Agency had carried out inspections at facilities in Tehran, Natanz and Esfahan and had had complementary access to three locations outside facilities. 104. As regards the centrifuge programme, the Agency was expecting some progress on the contamination issue. It had agreed with the Member State c o n m e d on the modalities for sampling a number of old centrifuge components, which could provide information about the origin of the lowenriched and high-enriched uranium particle contamination found at various locations in Iran. In January 2005, an Agency team had again visited locations in another Member State where, according to Iran, the centrifuge components had been stored prior to their shipment to Iran. Environmental samples had been collected 60m those locations and would be analysed. Previously issued in English, Chinese and Russian: Arabic, French and Spanish versions forthcoming. This record is subject to comnion. Corrections should be submitted in one of tho working languages, in a memorandum andlor incorprated in a copy of the record. They should be sent to the Secretariat ofthc Policy-Making Organs.International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramcrstrasse 5. P.O. Box 100. A-I400 Vienna, Austria; fax +43 I 2600 29108; mail secpmo@iaea.org; or %om GovAtom ria the Feedback link. Corrections should be submitted within three weks of the receipt ofthe record. 38 GOVIOR I 119 1 March 200.5, Page 10 105. Although there had been no new information about the outstanding questions related to Iran's P-2 centrifuge programme, there had been developments in four other anas related to the Agency's verification of the P-l centrifuge programme, in connection with: an early offer of centrifuge-related technology and sample components; the genesis of the mid-1990s offer of P-l centrifuge documentation and components for 500 centrifuges; shipping documents related to the delivery of those components and documentation; and technical discussions held between Iran and the intermediaries concerning centrifuge enrichment. He would briefly desaibe each of those developments. 106. During a meeting on 12 January 2005 in Tehran, Iran had shown the Agency a handwritten onepage document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. While it was not clear from the document precisely what the offer entailed, Iran had stated that it related to centrifuge technology acquisition. The document suggested that the offer included the delivery of:a disassembled sample machine (including drawings, descriptions, and specifications for production); drawings, specifications and calculations for a "complete planr`; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also reflected an offer to provide auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment and uranium reanversion and casting capabilities. Iran had stated that only same of o those items had been delivered, and that all of those items had been declared t the Agency. That a information w s still being assessed. The Agency had requested that all documentation relevant to the offer be made available to it for review. 107. In response to questions about the procurement history associated with shipments in the mid-1990s of P-1 centrihge components and documentation, Iran had informed the Agency in ht had October 2004 ta, around 1994, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) been informed that an intermediary had made an offer to an Iranian company unrelated to the AEOI to deliver P-1 centrifuge documentation and components for 500 centrifuges. Responding to Agency enquiries in that context, in a letter dated 9 January 2005 Iran had stated that, following the AEOI's being informed about the offer, "instruction [had been] given by high authorily that no other entity or organisation other than AEOI was allowed to conduct centrifuge enrichment projects and enter into negotiations." As a response to an Agency requesf Iran had said that no written documentation a relevant to the initial offer to the Iranian company w s available. 108. As regards the deliveries in the mid-1990s of the 500 sets of P-1 components and additional bellows, the Agency had on a number of occasions requested copies of all relevant shipping documents. Under cover of a letter transmitted to the Agency on 17 January 2005, Iran had provided copies of some shipping documents said to have been related to "2 consignments in 1994 and 1995", which were now being assessed, particularly with respect to the dates and contents of the shipments. The Agency had requested that ban search for any additional information related to the procurement of centrifuge components and technology, particularly information related to shipments that took place around 1997. 109. In response to the Agency's request for documentation related to Iran's technical discussions with intermediaries concerning centrifuge enrichment in the mid- to laW199Os, Iran had during the 12 Janwy meeting in Tehran also provided the Agency with copies of a number of documents, which were now being assessed. 39 GOV/OR 11 19 1 March 2005, Page 1 1 110. Tuming to other matters, he said, regarding plutonium separation, that, as mentioned in the latest report to the Board, the Agency had, in September 2004,taken a second set of samples fiom the plutonium solution for analysis using different analytical techniques in different laboratories, with a view to confirming the date of the separation. The measurement results had been received by the Agency and were being assessed. 111. The Agency had continued implementing the measures of the additional protocol. Complementary access at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) site on 15 December 2004 had revealed underground excavation activities which Iran had failed to report in a timely manner to the Agency as required under Code 3.1. of the subsidiary arrangements to its safeguards agreement (namely, at the time the decision was taken to authorize or carry out such constnrction). Through a letter received by the Agency on 13 December 2004, Iran had submitted an updated Design Information QUeStiOMaire (DIQ)for the UCF providing preliminary design information for a tunnel l that was being constructed at the UCF site. In the D Q entry related to the purpose and nature of the tunnel, Iran had stated that "in order to increase capacity, safety and security of nuclear material, a storage is considered and will be constructed." Iran had also stated that the modifications had been initiated in September 2004. 112. On 8 February 2005,the Agency had conducted complementary access at the Gchine mine -in the south of Iran near Bandar Abbas - and its associated mill. To better understand the complex arrangements governing the current and past administration of the mine, the Agency had requested that the original contract between the AEOI and the engineering company that had constructed the mill at Gchine be made available to it for review, along with related documentation. 113. In its resolution adopted on 18 September 2004 (GOV/2004/79), Board of Governors had the called on Iran `0as a fiuther confidence-buildingmeasure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water". No visit to the site of that reactor had taken place since the Board had adopted that resolution. Iranian officials had indicated that the Heavy Wtr Research Reactor (lR-40) project was progressing. ae 114. C o n d g transparency visits, he said that, as stated in the Director General's November 2004 report, in accordance with its practice in connection with its evaluation of other States' nuclear programmes, the Agency had d i s c u s s e d with Iranian authorities open-source information relating to dual-use equipment and materials which had applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area. 115. In that context, the Agency was continuing to assess information related to the Lavisan site. As etns n reported at the November 2004 Board m e i g , Iran had provided information to the Agency i October 2004 in response t Agency inquiries about efforts by the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), o located at the Lavisan-Shim site between 1989 and 1998,to acquire dual-use material and equipment that could be u e l in uranium enrichment and conversion activities. The Agency had requested that sh the matter be discussed in detail with two officials who had been involved in the procunment activities of the PHRC. In response to the Agency's request for additional information and clarification *om Iran in connection with the matter, in a Note Verbale dated 27 February 2005 Wan had stated "1. The PHRC of Lavisan was not involved in activities declarable under the NPT Safeguards. `2. The dual use items such as those in question could be used in conventional activities, which Jran is not obliged to declare under the Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol." 40 GOVKIIL1119 1 M a d 2W5, Page 12 116. With regard to Parchin, as stated in the Director General's latest report. in October 2004 the Agency had reiterated its request to be permitted to visit tho Parchin site. In response to secun'ty concerns expressed by Iran about a visit, the Agency had, in a note dsted 25 October 2004, proposed modalities under which the visit could take place. At a meeting in Vienna on 7 January 2005, Iran had, in the interests of transparency, agreed to permit the Agency to visit Parchiin. The Agency had been permitted to select one of the four areas which it had identified as beimg of potential interest. It had ra been requested to minimi% the number of buildings to be visited in that a e and had selected five. The Agency had been given fieeaccess to those buildings and their smoundmgs, and permission to take environmental samples, which were currently being analysed. In the course of that visit, the Agency had also reiterated its request to be permitted to visit another area of particular interest on the Parchin site before the end of February. In a Note Verbale dated 27 February 2005, Iran had stated that "the expectation of the Safeguards Department in visiting specified zone and points in the Parchin Complex are fulfilled and thus that there was no justification for any additional visit." 117. As a result of its limited-scope visit to Parchin, the Agency was able to inform the Board that it had seen no relevant dual-use equipment or materials in the location visited. The Agency was awaiting the results of environmental sampling analysis to ascertain whether any nuclear material had been used in the area visited. 118. With regard to the suspension of activities, he said that,pursuant to the Board's resolution of 29November 2004 (GOV/2004/90) and to previous resolutions, the Agency had continued its activities for verifying all elements of Iran's voluntary suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. 119. Prior to 22 Novembk 2004, the Agency had already established a baselime inventory of all U , F, essential centrifuge components, key raw materials and equipment, and the assembled ceneifuge rotors at declared workshops said by Iran to have been involved in the manufacturing of centrifuge components, and it had applied containment and surveillance measures to those items. The Agency had continued to monitor the suspension at the Natanz site, including the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plam (PFEP) and the Fuel Enrichment Plant. A number of solenoid valves that had been removed from the PFEP prior to 22 November 2004 had been cleaned of corrosive produds and stored by Iran at the E, facility, and they were being monitored by the Agency. The 20 sets of centrifuge components tbat I U had initially intended to use for research and development purposes remained under surveillance at the PFEP. The Agency had also monitored centrifuge component production capabilities at the declared workshops selected randomly during Agency visits to Iran. 120. During visits to Farayand Technique in December 2004 and January 2005, the Agency bad noted that quality control activities were being carried out with regard to some centrifuge components (for example, stator bellows, springs and casing suppnts) which had been declared to the Agency but not placed under Agency seals. In response to the Agency's request for clarification concerning those activities, Iran had informed the Agency, by letter of 13 February 2005, that, although those activities were not considered by Iran to be covered by the voluntary suspension of centrifuge enrichment-related activities, Iran had decided to put them temporady on hold until the matter could be discussed with, among others, the EU3. 121. The Agency had also continued its verification of Iran`s voluntary suspension of conversion rn activities at the UCF. As previously reported, in August 2004 I a had introduced approximately 37 tons of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) into the process area of the UCF as feed material for facility testing. As of 22 November 2004, all of the UOC had been dissolved and converted into intermediate products, principally ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC) and UF,, and part of the intermediate UF4had been converted into U S . On 22 November 2004, the Agency had installed seals and other tamper-indicating devices to verify that no additional feed was introduced and that there was 41 OOV/OR.1 I 9 1 1 Maroh 2005, Page 13 no further production of W6.Iran had continued to convert the AUC i t UF4, which had taken longer no than initially planned. It had completed the conversion work on 18 February 2005, and it was now planning to conduct clean-out operations that would take several weeks. The produced UF4 had been verified by the Agency and was now under Agency seal. The produced UF6, which had been transferred liom the process inta cylinders, had been verified and sealed and placed under Agency surveillance. To ensure that there was no undeclared withdrawal of the U , remaining in the UCF F withdrawal stations and installed cameras there. Physical process lines, the Agency had sealed the UFs t inventory verification a the UCF was scheduled to take place in April 2005, after the clean-out operations had been completed. 41 Board of Governors GOV/2004/83 Dats: 15 Novemk 2004 Restricted Dbtrlbutlou Origin& Bnglish Item 4(d) of thcpmvisioaal agenda (00VI20M/82) Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Reporf by fhe Director General 1. At its meeting in September 2004, the Board of Governors considered the latcst report submitted by the Director General on the implementation of the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards Agreement')? 2. On 18 September 2004, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2004/79, wbich, inter in alia, it: Strongly urged that Iran respond positively to the Director General's &dings on the provision of access and information by taking such steps as are required by the Agency and/or requested by the Board in relation to the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, including the provision of prompt access to locations and personnel, and by providing fiuther infomation and explanations when required by the Agency and proactively to assist the Agency to understand the full extent and nature of Iran's enrichment programme and to take all steps within its power to clarify the outstanding issues before the Board's 25 November 2004 meeting, specifically including the sources and reasons for enriched uranium contamination and the import, manufacture and use of centrifuges; Emphasized tbe continuing importance of Iran acting in accordance with all provisions of the Additional Protocol, including by providing all access required in a timely matmer; and urged Iran once again to ratify its Protocol without delay; Deeply regretted that the implementation of Iranian voluntary decisions to suspend enrichmentrelated and reprocessing activities, notified to the Agency on 29 December 2003 and 24 February 2004, fell significantly short of the Agency's understanding of the scope of those commitments and also that Iran had since reversed some of those decisions; stressed that such suspension would provide the Board with additional confidence in Iran's hture activities; and IMFCIRCI214 The initial repart to the Board of Govemors on this specific matter was provided by the Director h e r d oralty at the Board's meeting on 17 March 2003. The Director G c n d subsequently submitted six written repom to the B o d GOV/2003/40, dated 6 June 200); GOVl2003163, dated 26 Augusl 2003; GOVROO3/75, dated 10 Novembw 2003; 00V/2W4/11, dated 24 February Z W GGVROO4/34, dated I June 2004, and C o d , dated I8 Junc 2004; and O, GOV/2W/M1, dated 1 September 2004. 43 GOW2004/83 Page 2 considered it necessary, to promote confidence, that Iran immediately suspend all enrichment related activities, including the manufacture or import of centrifuge components, the assembly and testing of centrifuges and the production of feed material, including through tests or production at the U a i m Conversion Facility (VCF), rnu under Agency verification so that this could be confirmed in the reports requested by the Board in paragraphs 7 and 8 of msolution GOV/2004/79; Called again on Iran, as a further confidencebuilding measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to start conshuction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water; Underlined the need for the f l and prompt cooperation with the Agency of t i d countries in ul hr relation to the clmification of outstandingissues, and expressed appreciation for tht:cmpemtion received by the Agency to date; Requested the Director General to submit in advance of the November Board:a report on lhe and implementation of this resolutio~ a recapitulation of the Agency's findings on the Iranian nuclear programme sincc Septembw 2002, as well as a full account of past and present Iranian cooperation with the Agency, including the timjng of declarations, and a record of the development of a l l aspectx of the programme, as well as a detailed analysis of the implications of those findings in relation to Iran's implementation of its Safeguards Agreement; and Requested the Director Oeneral to submit in advance of the Novembcr Board a report on Iran's response to the requests made of it by the Board in previous resolutions, especially requests relating to full suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. 3. The present report is submitted to the Board in response to these requests. Section I addresses questions relevant to safeguards implementntiou in Iran, including the development of Iran's nuclear programme, Agency &dings, implications, ]Iran's cooperation and an ovcrall assessment; Section XI addresses questions relevant to the suspension by Iran of enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The report also includes a list of locations relevant to the implementation of safeguards in Annex 1 and, in Annex 2, a list of abbreviations and t r s used in this report. em 1 . SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION3 A. Development, Findings and Implications A.1. Development and Findings A.M. Uranium Mining and O r e Concentration Development 4. Iran has a long-standing programme of exploration for uranium deposits, and has selected two locations for development as mines. At the Saghand Mine, located in Yazd in centd Iran,low grade il hard rock ore bodies wl be exploited bough conventional underground mining tecbiqucs. The annual estimated pmductioa design capacity is forecast as 50 t ofuranium. The infrasb.uctureand shaft sinking are essentially complete, and tunnelling towards the ore bodies has started. Ore production is SiocC h e mwling ofthe B o d of Governors in September2004, the Agency has continued its verification activities in h, including inspections, compIanGntsly BCCFSS and design informstionvmification. h addition, w Agency tam. headed by the Deputy Director G c n d for Safegumds and the Director of Ssfegusrds 0paSti0~ Division 3, md in T h a with Innim ern suthorities b m 12 and 16 October zw4 t discuss outstanding isnuex. o 44 ' GOVDCW83 Page 3 forecast to start by the end of 2006. The ore is to be processed into uranium ore concentrate OJOUyellowcake) at the associated mill at Ardakan, the Yellowcake Production Plant. The design capacity of the mill corresponds to that of the mine (50 t of uranium per year). The mill startup is forecast to coincide with the start of mining at Saghand. The mill site is c m t l y at an early stage of development; the installation of the hhstruchlre and processing buildings has been started. In the south of Iran, near B a n k Abbas, Iran has constnrcted the Gchine uranium mine and its cc-located mill. The low but variable grade uraniom ore found in near-snrface deposits will be open-pit mined and processed at the associated mill. The estimated production design capacity is 21 t of uranium per year. Iran has stated that, as of July 2004, mining operations had started and the mill had been hot tested, during which testing a quantity of about 40 to 50 kg of yellowcake was produced. 5. Ira0 has explored two other potential uranium production mutes. One was the extraction of uranium from phosphoric acid. Using research scale equipment, small quantities of yellowcake were successfullyproduced at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre ("NRC) laboratories. Iran has stated that there are no facilities in Iran for separating uranium from phosphoric acid other than the research facilities at TNRC. The second route explored by Iran was the production of yellowcake using percolation leaching. U i g this technique, Iran produced an estimated several hundred kilograms of sn yellowcake using temporary facilities, now dismantled,located at the Gchine mining site. Findings 6. In its Additional Protocol declarations of 21 May 2004, Iran provided information to the Agency on the location, operational status and estimated annual production capacity of the Gchine mine and mill, the Saghand Mine and the Yellowcake Production Plant. The Agency carried out complementary access at Gchine on 17 July 2004, at the Saghand Mine on 6 October 2004 and at the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant on 7 October 2004, in the course of which the Agency was able to confirm tho declared status of these operations. 7. Access to these sites, and clarifications requested by the Agency, have been provided by Iran in a timely manner. The Agency's assessment of the information related to these mines and mills as declared by Iran under the Additional Protocol is ongoing, as is the analysis of samples taken born those locations. A.1.2. Uranium Conversion Development 8. Iran carried out most of its experiments in uranium conversion between 1981 and 1993 at TNRC and at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC), with some experiments (e.g. those involving pulse C O ~ U ~ M Sbeing carried out through early 2002. ) 9. In 1991, Iran entered into discussions with a foreign supplier for the construction at Esfahan of an a industrial scale conversion facility. Construction on the facility, UCF, w s begun in the late 1990s. UCP consists of several conversion lines, principal among which is the l i e for the conversion of UOC to lJF*with an annual design production capacity of 200 t uranium as w . The UF6 is to be sent to the 6 uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz, where it will be enriched up to 5% U-235 and the product and tails returned to UCF for conversion into low enriched UOI and depleted uranium metal. The design information for UCF provided by Iran indicates that conversion lines are also foreseen for the production of natural and enriched (19.7%) uranium metal, and natural UO,.The natural and enriched (5% U-235) UO?are to be sent to the Fuel ManufacturingPlant (FW) at Esfahan, where Iran has said it will be processed into fuel for a research reactor and power reactors. 45 10. In March 2004, Iran began testing the process lines involving the conversion of uoc into UQ F, and U , and U F 4 into UF6. As of Jnne 2004,40 to 45 kg of UF6 had been produced therchm. A larger test, involving the mversion of 37 t of yellowcake into U , was initiated i August 2001. F, n According to Iran's declaration of 14 October 2004,225 t of the 37 t of yellowcake had been fed into F, the process and that approximately 2 t of U , and 17.5 t of uranium as intermediate products and waste, had been prcduced. There was no indication as of that date of VF, having been produced during this later campaign. Mndings 11. Iran has stated that UCF was to have been conshucted under a turn-key contract with a foreign supplier, but that when the contract was cancelled in 1997, Iran retained the engineering designs and used them a the basis to construct UCF with Irauian resources. Iran provided preliminary design s information to the Agency in July 2000. The Agency has been carrying out continuous design iniormation veritication @IV) since that time. 12. The Agency's enquiry into the chronology and scope of Iran's uranium conversion activities has bocused on two central issues: rn Assessment of Iran's statements concerning the basis for its design of UCF (including conversion experiments), with a view to ascertaining whether Iran has declared all of its activities involving nuclear material; and Assessment of the declared intended uses for the products of the various UCF process lines. Design BPrir and Conversion&perhen& 13. In F e b w 2003, Iran ackuowledgcd that it had imported in I991 nahvat d n m , in a variety of forms, which it had not previously reported to the Agency4, and that it had wed some of these materials, at locations which had not previously been reported to the Agency, for testing certain parts of the UCF conversion process (i.e. nranium dissolution, purification using pulse columns and the production of uranium metal). On a number of occasions between February and July 2003, Iran stated that this information, along with documentationprovided by the foreign supplier, had becn sufficient to permit Iran to complete indigenously the detailed design and manufacturing of the qnipment for UCF. Iran repeatedly stated that it had not c a n i d out any research and development (R&D)or testing, even on a laboratory scale, of other more complex processes (e.g. conversion of UOz to UF4 and conversion of UF, to UF6)using nuclear material. 14. Following the discovery by the Agency of indications ofdepleted UF, in samples of waste taken at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JIIL) at TNRC, Iran acknowledged, in a letter dated 19 August 2003, that it had carried out UF, conversion experiments on a laboratory scale during the 1990s at the RadiochemistryLaboratories of TNRC using depleted uranium which had been imported in 1977 and exempted h m safeguards upon receipt, and which Iran had declared in 1998 (when the material was &-exempted) as having been lost during processing. In October 2003, Iran further acknowledged that, contrary to its previous statements, practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion had been produced in labratory and bench scale experiments (in kilogram quantities) carried out at TNRC and at ENTC between 1981 and 1993 without having been reported to the Agency. The information provided in Iran's letter of 21 October 2003 stated t a , in conducting ht these experiments,Iran had also used yellowcake imported by Iran in 1982 but only confixmed in 1990 I the form of up,(1000 kg). VP, (400 kg) and IJO, (400 kg). n 46 Govi2w3 Page 5 as having been received.` Iran subsequently explained that it had decided to stop domestic RBrD on uF4and TJF6 in 1993 in anticipation of its receipt of assistance ftom a foreign supplier in !he design and construction of UCF. 15. The extensive UCF design documentation said to have been provided by the foreign supplier w88 made available to the Agency. Based on an examination of a selection of that documentation, and taking into account the declarations by Iran conceming its UCF related couversion experiments, Agency conversion experts concluded that Iran's declaration that UCF was k i n g built essentially on the basis of this documentation, augmented by the results of the indigenous experiments, appared to be credible. 16. The Agency has also sought to confirm the declarations of Iran concerning the quantities of nuclear material involved in Iran's conversion experiments. Given the inherent difEculties with investigating activities that ended over a decade ago, it is not possible to verify in detail te h chronologies and descriptions of the experiments which took place in Iran. Thus, the Agency's activities have had to focus on assessing the consistency of the information providcd by Iran and examining the remaining equipment and nuclear material. 17. In this context, the Agency focused its investigation on the small quantities of nuclear material said to have been used and produced during these experiments in light o f the size, quality and capacity of the equipment involved, and the status and use of the equipment during the period between when the activities were said to have ceased (between 1991 and 1993) and April 1999, when most of the equipment was said to have been dismantled and put into storage until January 2m6. Taking into account the age of the activities and the lack of records with regard to the amount of uranium (especially that said to be contained in waste), a precise nuclear material accounting is not possible. However, examination of the equipment prior to and during its destruction revealed the equipment to be in very good condition and apparently to have been little used, wbicb is consistent with the declared scale of its use. 18. As indicated in the Director General's last report to the Board (GOV/2004/60), further follow-up on Iran's conversion activities will be canied out as a routine safeguards implementationmatter. Intended uses of UCFproducts 19. In the design information for UCF provided in July 2000, the facility was described as being intended for the conversion of UOC into UFs, for enrichment outside Iran, and for the subsequent conversion (at UCF) of:low enriched m into low enriched UO, (5% U-235); low enriched UF6 into 6 F. low enriched uranium metal (19.7% U-235); and depleted u F 6 into depleted U , In the course of a DIV in 2002, the Agency noticed that the depleted UFI process line had been extended to include a process l i e for uranium metal production, and requested Iran to submit updated design information, which it did in April 2003. Following its declaration in Febrnary 2003 of the Pilot Fuel Enricbnent Plant (PFEP) and the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, Iran also acknowledged that it intended to carry out enrichment of u F 6 domestically, up to 5% U-235, as per the declared maximum enrichment level for PFEP and FEP. Iran has not provided specific information on the intended source of the 19.7% enriched m which will serve as feed for the production at UCF of 19.7% enriched 6 uranium metal, as declared by Iran, but did indicate in 2000 that it would be secured from ahmad. ' In addition, it should be noted that, in 1982, Iran imported 531 t of natural UlQ concentrate, which it reported to he Agency i 1990. n lo January 2004. the equipment was examined by the Agency and the nuclear material hold-up recovered therefrom. the At imriakive oithe Iranian authorities, the equipment was desh`oyed in the m w e of these m v q activities. 41 C10V/2004/3 Page 6 20. Before the revelation by Iran in October 2003 of its h e r enrichment programme, various explanations were given for the intended use of uranium metal. In July 2003, Iranian officials explained, that, "[iln the early [199O's] when the country decided to reconsider its nuclear program, il we were not sure whether it wl consist of CANDUs, Magnox [reactors], or LWRs. Therefore, it was decided to include a U-metal production Line in UCF, which could also be used to produce shielding material. However, as the pichvo is now more clcar, uranium metal experiments could be considered 88 a process to gain know-how in nuclear material prod~~ction.'" The rationale given for the production of depleted uranium m t l was to reduce the storage requirements for depletedU F 6 . ea 21. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran achowledged that the uranium metal had been intended not only for the production of shielding material, as pnviously stated, but also for use in its laser enrichment programme (the existence of which, as discussed below, Iran had previously not acknowledged, and which was only declared to the Agency in that same letter of 21 October 2003). Iran stated that the uranium metal procesa h e at UCF had been developed by Iranian scientists at the TN'RC laboratories, and that a small quantity of the metal produced at TNRC during the development tests (about 2 kg) had been given to the laser group for its evaluation. 22. In light of this, t e declared rationale for the original construction of the natural uranium metal h process line at UCF (is. the supply of uranium metal to its laser enrichmentprogramme) is credible. A.13. Uranium Enrichment - Gas Centrifuge Technology Development 23. In 1985, IIUII initiated its efforts in gas centrifuge enrichment with a search of available technical literature. In 1987, Iran acquired through a clandestine supply network drawings for a P-1 centrifuge, along with samples of centrifuge components. According to Iran,gas centrifuge RBcD testing begm at TNRC in 1988 and continued there until 1995, when those activities were moved to a workshw of the Kalaye Elechic Company, a company in Tehran belonging to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Between 1994 and 1996, Iran weived another -apparmtly duplicate set of drawings for the P-1 centrihge design, along with components for 500 centrifuges. According to Iran, it was at this time as well when Iran received design drawings for a P-2 centrifuge through the same network. Between 1997 and 2002, Iran assembled and tested P-1 centrifiges at the Kalaye Electric Company no workshop where Iran says it fed UFS gas i t a cenhifuge for the first time in 1999 and, in 2002, fed nuclear material into a number of centrifuges (up to 19 machines). - 24. In 2001, Iran began the conshuction of two facilities at Natanz: the smaller scale PFEP, planned to have some 1000 centrifuges for enrichment up to 5% U-235; and the large scale commercial PEP, which is planned to contain over 50 000 P-1 centrifuges for enrichment up to 5% U-235. 25. On 25 June 2003, Iran introduced UF, into the first centtifuge at PFEP. As of October 2003, the installation of a 164-machine cascade was being finalized. In November 2003, the cascade was shut down. As of the Agency's latest inspection on 11 October 2004, the cascade had not been operated t and no fiuther VF, gas had been fed into centrifuges a PFEP. FEP has been scheduled to start receiving centrifuges in early 2005,ahr the design is confirmed by the tests to be conducted in PFEP. 26. According to Iran, the only work that has been done on the P-2 design was carried out between 2002 and 2003, largely at the workshop of a private company under contract with the AEOI,and the work w s limited to the manuficture and mechanical testing of a small number of modified P-2 a 48 GOV/2004/83 Page 7 composite rotors. Iran has stated that "no other institution (including universities), company or organization in Iran has been involved in P-2 R & D and that "no P-2 R&D has been undertaken by or at the request of the Ministry of Defence". Iran has also said that all R&D on P-2 centrifuges had been terminated and that no other work on that, or any other centrifuge design, was done prior to 2002 or has been done since 2003. However, in its Additional Protocol declarations, Iran has foreseen P-2 R&D activities for the future. Findings 27. Between F e b m q and October 2003, Iran took a number of steps intended to conceal the origin, source and extent of Iran's enrichment programme, including: denying access to the Kalaye Electric o Company wokshop in February 2003 and m h i n g t pennit the Agency to take environmental samples there in March 2003; dismantling equipment used at the workshop and moving it to Pars Trash (another subsidiary company of the AEOI located in Tehran); renovating part of the Kalaye Electric Company workshop in order to prevent detection of the use of nuclear material; and submitting incorrect and incomplete declarations. A detailed description of these efforts is reflected in eot the previous r p r s of the Director General to the Board! 28. Following adoption by the Board of its resolution in September 2003: on 16 October 2003, H.E. Dr. H. Rohani, Secreta~~ the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, informed the Director of General that a decision had been taken to provide the Agency with a full disclosure of Iran's past and present nuclear activities. On 21 October 2003, Iran submitted to the Agency a letter providing what it described as a full picture of its nuclear activities, in which it acknowledged, inter alii its use of nuclear material in the testing of centrifuges. P-I Centrifkge Programme 29. In February 2003, in response to Agency enquiries since August 2002 prompted by open source reports, Iran acknowledged for the first time the existence of the two centrifuge enrichment plants under construction at Natanz: PFEP and FEP. Iran also acknowledged that the Kalaye Electric Company workshop in Tehran had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no testing of centrifuges assembled from these components involving the use of nuclear material, either at that workshop or at any other location in Iran. 30. According to information provided at that time by Iran, the design, research and development work, which it said had been started only five years earlier (i.e. 1997), had been based on information available from open sources and extensive computer modelling and simulation, including tests of centrifuge rotors without nuclear material. In June 2003, Iran reiterated that it$ centrifuge R&D had commenced only in 1997, with centrifuge testing having taken place in the Plasma Physics buildings of TNRC. The Agency was shown the areas within the buildings where the testing was said to be been conducted, and was again told that no nuclear material had been used during the test programme. Based on their own observations and their discussions with Iranian authorities, the Agency enrichment technology experts concluded that it was not possible for Iran to have developed enrichment `GOV/2003/40. paras 25-29; GOVROO3/63, parap 2743; GOVR003175, p m 3041. h e x 1 paras 3465; GOV/2M)4/1I , s paras 32-55: GOVR004134,parss 22-30. Annex pms 2145; and GOVR004/60. paras 22-32, Annex paras 17-39. In molution GOVR003169, lhe Board Of Gowrmon decided il wB0 essential and urgent for Iran 10 lake 8 number of measures by the rnd of October 2003, including "pmviding a fill declaration of all imponcd material and components relcvanl 10 the dchmml programme, especially imponed quipmenl and components stated 10 have been conlaminaled with high enriched uranium particlcr. and collaborating with the Agency in identifyng Ihc source and date of receipl of such impom and Ihe locations where they have bcm sbnd and used in Iran." 49 GOV/2004/83 Page 8 technology to the level seen at Natanz based solely on open source information, computer simulation and mechanical testing. 31. In August 2003, Iran amended these statements, informing the Agency that the decision to launch a centrifuge enrichmentprogramme had actually been taken in 1985, and that Iran had in fact received drawings of the P-1 centrifuge through a foreign intermediary around 1987. Iran stated that the centrifuge R&D programme had been situated at TNRC between 1988 and 1995, and had been moved to the Kalaye Electric Company workshop in 1995. According to Iran, the centrifuge R&D activities were carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop between 1995 and 2003, and were moved to Natanz in 2003. 32. During its August 2003 visit to Iran, the Agency was shown electronic copies of the centrifuge engineering drawings (including the general arrangement, subassembly and component drawings). Agency inspectors were also able to Visit and take environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, where they noted that, since their first visit to the workshop in March 2003, considerable renovation had been made to one of the buildings on the site. As was anticipated by the Agency at the time, the renovation, which was canied out in connection with Iran's attempt to conceal the activities carried out there, has interfered with the Agency's ability to resolve issues associated n with Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme, since the Agency was unable to see the equipment i situ and could not take environmental samples while the equipment was there. 33. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran h l l y acknowledged that "a limited number of tests, using small amounts of UFS."had been conducted in 1999 and 2002 at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop. lo 34. In OctoberiNovembtr 2003 and again in October 2004, Agency inspectors interviewed a former official of the AEOI,said by Iran to have been involved in its centrifuge R&D work from 1987 until he left the Knlaye Electric Company in 2001. During the latter meeting, he provided, in particular, details on the negotiations which had resulted in Iran's procurement around 1987 of the P-1 design (and sample components), and on the supply of the duplicate set of P-1 designs and the components for 500 P-1 centrifuges, delivered through intermediaries to Iran in two shipments said to have taken place in March 1994 and July 1996, and the supply of bellows in 1997 to replace previously provided poor quality bellows. He also confvmed that meetings with the intermediary continued after 1996, and included discussions on technical issues. According to the information provided by Iran, 13 official meetings took place with !he clandestine supply network between 1994 and 1999. 35. Iran has been requested to provide information on what, if any, meetings related to Iran's centrifuge programme took place prior to 1994. The Agency has also requested Iran to present the shipping documents associated with the 1994 and 1996 deliveries, and to provide information on the content of the technical discussions held with the intermediaries and explain why no meetings involving AEOI officials tookplace after June 1999. 36. In addition to its enquiries into Iran's acquisition of enrichment technology, the Agency has conducted extensive environmental sampling (approximately 300 samples) at locations where Iran has 10 In a mccting w t Asency enrichment tcchlogy u r s shortly following that lau. rhc Lranian authoriti= aplained that ih pt the Iwts bad iovalved the 1.9 kg oiUF6thslhad brm i m p o d in 1 9 9 1 (and no1 declared 10 the Agency until February ZW3), the absmcc of wbicb the lranian authorities had carlia a m p l e d to cooceal by amibuohg its lass u) evaporation due to leaking valves on the batlles containing the gm during their storage in 8. morn undu the roof ofthe Tchrao Rcscmh Reactor URR) building. h a lcnu dated 4 Febnra~y 2004, Lrsn modified its aplaaatiian for tbc contamination, slating that Ihc s o m e probably bad b&n leakage ofboltlw containing UF, which had bem pmduced h u g b RBLD c o w m i o n activiucs carried out between 1991 and 1993 (wl the UF, irnponed 10 1991, bs had iniually idomed the Agency) stord them between 1997 and 1998. Thc Agency continues 10 regard ns not tshTueally plausible Iran's uplnnaiion that the conmioation WBS due 10 leaking bonk. Howcver, lhc Agmey will only be able to pursue lhir issue ifnew information k a m e svailshle to i t so