Senate Floor
Introduction of Proliferation Security Initiative Amendment 
March 2, 2007

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized. 
   Mr. THUNE. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for yielding. 
   Mr. President, I do have an amendment I would like to call up and ask for its immediate consideration. Is there an amendment pending at this time? 
   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. There are pending amendments. 
   Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that those amendments be set aside. 
   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. 
   AMENDMENT NO. 308 TO AMENDMENT NO. 275 
   Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 308 be called up. 
   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report. 
   The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: 
   The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Thune] proposes an amendment numbered 308 to amendment No. 275. 
   The amendment is as follows: 
(Purpose: To expand and improve the Proliferation Security Initiative while protecting the national security interests of the United States)
    At the appropriate place, insert the following: 
   SEC. __. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE. 
    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress, consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, that the President should strive to expand and strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the President on May 31, 2003, with a particular emphasis on the following principles: 
    (1) The responsibility for ensuring the national security of the United States rests exclusively with the Government of the United States and should not be delegated in whole or in part to any international organization, agency, or tribunal or to the government of any other country. 
    (2) The freedom of the Government of the United States to act as it deems appropriate to ensure the security of the American people should not be limited by, or made dependent upon, the action or inaction of any international organization, agency, or tribunal or by the government of any other country. 
    (3) The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land and cannot be subordinated to, or superseded by, the decisions, rulings, or other acts of any international organization, agency, or tribunal or by the government of any other country. 
    (4) In carrying out its responsibility for ensuring the national security of the United States, the Government of the United States has sought and should continue to seek the cooperation and support of international organizations, agencies, and tribunals, including the United Nations and its affiliated organizations and agencies, as well as the governments of other countries, but no decision or act taken by the Government of the United States regarding its responsibility to provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the liberty of the American people should be deemed to require authorization, permission, or approval by any international organization, agency, or tribunal or by the government of any other country. 
    (5) The United Nations Security Council should not be asked to authorize the PSI under international law, and in order for the United Nations to be helpful in combating terrorism and proliferation, it should first-- 
    (A) establish a comprehensive definition of terrorism that condemns all acts by individuals, resistance movements or other irregular military groups, or nations intended to cause death or serious injury to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government to do or abstain from doing any act; 
    (B) fulfill the September 2005 commitment of the Summit of World Leaders to establish a comprehensive convention against terrorism; 
    (C) have the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee establish a list of individuals, organizations, and states that commit terrorist acts or support terrorist groups and activities; 
    (D) prohibit states under sanction for human rights abuses or terrorism by the United Nations Security Council from running for seats on or chairing any United Nations body, such as the Human Rights Council or the United Nations Disarmament Commission; 
    (E) prohibit member states in violation of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter and seen as a threat to international security and peace from sitting as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; and 
    (F) prohibit giving United Nations credentials to nongovernmental organizations that promote or condone terrorism or terrorist groups. 
    (6) Formalizing the PSI into a multilateral regime would severely hamper PSI's flexibility and ability to adapt to changing conditions. 
    (b) Strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative.--The President is not authorized to-- 
    (1) seek to subject the Proliferation Security Initiative to any authority, oversight, or resolution of the United Nations Security Council, international law, an international organization, agency, or tribunal, or the government of any country not participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative; or 
    (2) formalize the Proliferation Security Initiative into a multilateral regime. 
   Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, this amendment will expand and improve the Proliferation Security Initiative in the national security interest of the United States. The Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, is now 4 years old. It is a program whereby the United States is working with 80 allied countries to jointly interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction-related materials in a timely manner when critical intelligence is received about imminent transfers of weapons of mass destruction. 
   The PSI is based on voluntary cooperation by participating countries and relies on the ability to react quickly to time-sensitive intelligence on the movement of weapons of mass destruction material. According to the Department of State, the Proliferation Security Initiative was critical in uncovering Libya's weapons of mass destruction program in the AQ Khan proliferation network in 2003. PSI halted more than two dozen weapons of mass destruction-related transfers from 2005 to 2006. PSI has improved the capabilities of our partnering countries to take coordinated action to interdict proliferation-related shipments. 
   The House-passed version of this legislation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations bill, or H.R. 1, significantly changes the Proliferation Security Initiative in two key ways: First, the House would surrender the Proliferation Security Initiative to the U.N., a multilateral bureaucracy. Second, the House wants to give countries such as Russia and China veto power on U.S. national security by subjecting the Proliferation Security Initiative to U.N. Security Council approval. This is the wrong direction to take for a key U.S. tool in fighting the war on terror. 
   For the Proliferation Security Initiative to be successful and intervene in time to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction, there must be a rapid-response capability and flexibility to respond to intelligence information. H.R. 1, the House-passed version of this legislation, would place the Proliferation Security Initiative in a regulatory and inflexible straitjacket overseen by an international bureaucracy. 
   When we receive intelligence that al-Qaida is shipping material for a nuclear bomb through the waters of one of our allies, that intelligence demands immediate action, not deliberation and redtape. By removing the Proliferation Security Initiative from the safety and discretion of unique and bilateral relationships, the House-passed bill will likely reduce the willingness of other countries to cooperate, especially countries where cooperation could produce domestic political problems. 
   The Proliferation Security Initiative is an effective means to help our allies use their own legal authorities to implement their commitments under existing multilateral nonproliferation regimes that include the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group. In addition, the State Department believes that PSI cooperation is an effective way to implement countries' commitments to U.N. Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1718 on North Korea and Resolution 1737 on Iran. Turning the PSI into yet another multilateral regime would not only be unnecessary but would also be a hindrance to effective nonproliferation. 
   H.R. 1, the House-passed bill, by creating a multilateral regime for PSI, would limit our ability to share intelligence on proliferation-related shipments because it would subject sensitive U.S. intelligence sources and methods to broad international disclosure. This disclosure of sensitive and, at times, classified intelligence would expose our sources, covert agents, and methods to our enemies, including the very weapons of mass destruction traffickers we seek to shut down. 
   H.R. 1 would require annual GAO reports on Proliferation Security Initiative activities even though there are already several other reports currently required on nonproliferation matters that are sent to Congress, including reports that discuss PSI-related activities, such as the ``Periodic Report to Congress on the National Emergency Regarding Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.'' Adding another hoop for PSI to jump through would be counterproductive, and annual reports on PSI may even expose PSI's methodologies to proliferators. 
   The House-passed bill is also flawed because it would require the President to seek authorization from the U.N. Security Council for PSI. H.R. 1 implies that international law written by the U.N. Security Council is required to authorize U.S. measures to protect itself and the world from the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Security Council members should not be given a veto over what a bilateral national security program can and cannot do. As it is, China has refused to endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative, probably because Chinese traffickers are likely targets for PSI. We have already seen China wielding its veto power to undermine and delay U.S. national security priorities. Because of their objections, it took months of extra deliberations for the Security Council to finally confront the leading state sponsor of terror, probably the world's greatest proliferation challenge--Iran. Granting the U.N. Security Council an intrusive role in our national security activities would compromise highly sensitive intelligence. 
   PSI activities already are legal. All activities are undertaken in full compliance with international law. PSI already cooperates well in its existing form with the United Nations and other international organizations. In 2005, the U.N. Secretary General applauded the efforts of the Proliferation Security Initiative to fill a gap in our defenses. PSI has also won European Union and G8 endorsement. Why would our Democratic friends in the House want to change a program so highly regarded by our European friends? 
   Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.N. has a failing grade when it comes to effectively fighting the war on terror. The U.N. has failed to establish a comprehensive definition for terrorism. The U.N. has failed to fulfill its September 2005 commitment of the Summit of World Leaders to establish a comprehensive convention against terrorism. The U.N. Counter-Terrorism Committee has failed to identify terrorist groups and states. 
   Finally, the U.N. has failed to prohibit state sponsors of terror from running for seats on or chairing any U.N. body, such as the Human Rights Council or the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In fact, in April of 2006, the leading weapons proliferator and state sponsor of terror, Iran, served as vice chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. 
   The U.N. has failed to prohibit giving U.N. credentials to nongovernmental organizations that condone or promote terrorism or terrorist groups. 
   H.R. 1, the House-passed version of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the legislation we are considering currently in the Senate, returns us to the failed policy of the previous decade where the preference was for unenforced multilateral regimes instead of effective U.S. programs. H.R. 1 would be a step backward toward policies that left the United States vulnerable to terrorist attacks on 9/11. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment to maintain the integrity of the Proliferation Security Initiative and to help keep our Nation secure. 
   I yield the floor. 
   Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from South Dakota for his statement. 
   I believe the Senator from Maryland has been here a while. If he is not ready to proceed, we will go to the Senator from Oklahoma, and then the Senator from Maryland will be next. 
   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized. 
   Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment. I think it is important for the people of America to understand, first, what is at stake here and, No. 2, the tremendous failure of the U.N. in terms of proliferation. The best example of that right now is the enrichment of uranium for purposes of weapons of mass destruction by Iran. The reason Iran continues to do that is because two world powers, China and Russia, through the U.N., failed to support adequate enforcement of sanctions for behavior that would otherwise not allow nuclear proliferation. 
   Senator Thune very thoroughly outlined the failures of the U.N., but let me outline them a little further. This country sends over $5.3 billion a year to the U.N. Our entire contribution to peacekeeping is wasted, according to the U.N. Inspector General's own reports. We don't get to find those reports because the U.N. won't be transparent on either how it spends its money or who gets the money it does spend or whether they are held accountable for it. Senator Thune outlined the effectiveness of this initiative by the State Department with 80 other countries. That is 80 countries that help us every day to interrupt, disrupt, and stop either the passage, transfer, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I do not understand the motivation, why someone would want to take this to a bureaucracy that has proved, time and again, it fails to accomplish the very purposes for which it was set up--whether it be the rape of U.N. peacekeepers in the areas in which they are serving; whether it be the U.N. Oil for Food scandal, where only one person out of several has even been indicted in the corruption racket that was ongoing with that. The fact is the U.N. has failed in multiple areas at multiple times to accomplish the very things it set out to do. 
   Senator Thune mentioned that the No. 2 position on the nonproliferation committee at the U.N. is chaired by none other than Iran. What we do know is, had adequate sanctions been applied to Iran, the continued enrichment of uranium would not be there. The House has gutted one of the most effective tools we have, in terms of interdicting weapons of mass destruction from across this world. 
   Why is it important? Let me give an analogy. Today, when somebody comes into the emergency room and they are bleeding internally, we don't stop and have a committee meeting among doctors on what to do. What we do is look at the signs and symptoms we find--i.e., the intelligence, the actual knowledge of what is going on--and then we treat the condition on an emergent basis. This whole initiative will be gutted by bringing it to the bureaucratic process of the U.N. The thing that happens now is good intelligence, in terms of cooperation with people--the other 80 countries that are working cooperatively--institutes action. The failure to act on internal bleeding ends up with death. The same thing is going to happen if we let a bureaucracy, dominated with a veto power by China and Russia, determine whether we can intercept weapons of mass destruction. 
   I understand we need a world body. I understand the U.N. is that world body. But the U.N. has so many problems today in terms of being effective at what it is trying to accomplish. It is absolutely nontransparent with how it does that--nontransparent with how the money is spent and is utilized today, so that every step of the way two countries are blocking our attempts to block the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iran. 
   We can let the patient die, bleed to death internally, while we have a committee hearing and get the approval and then get it vetoed by China or Russia because it plays out more powerfully to their benefit, or we can continue to do what we have been doing successfully 24 times in the last year. Twenty-four times in the last year, in coordination with these eight countries, based on great intelligence, we have interrupted or disrupted the transmission of weapons of mass destruction. Why would we want to get rid of that? Why did this PSI get started in the first place? Because of problems in the U.N. If the U.N. were to work as it should, there would be no need for a PSI. It will not and it does not because it is not necessarily to everybody's advantage in the U.N. that these weapons be controlled. 
   I believe the House has been very shortsighted. My hope is if this is included when it comes out of conference, this bill is vetoed. It should be vetoed. It ties the hand of a President trying to do what is best for this country and instead makes the rest of the world have veto power over our ability to defend ourselves. We should never give up that right. 
   I am very thankful Senator Thune has put this amendment on the floor and my hope is we will have a vote on it next week. What this bill does is to violate our Constitution. We give up sovereignty to protect ourselves by giving that sovereignty to the United Nations. That is something we ought not do. It would be different if the United Nations were transparent. It would be different if a third of peacekeeping funds were not wasted every year out of the billions that are spent in the U.N. $15 to $20 billion budget. But that is not the case. That is not the real world. 
   Until we have cogent, realistic, proper reforms, including transparency, at the U.N, including equality at the U.N., including accountability at the U.N., we should not move any initiative affecting our own protection and that of those other 80 countries that are working with us in this regard, to give them veto power over our own security. 
   I yield the floor. 
   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse). The Senator from Maryland. 
   Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be set aside. 
   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.