Source: http://www.un.int/usa/06_080.htm http://www.un.int/usa/06_080.htm
Date: April 18, 2006

United States Mission to the United Nations
USUN PRESS RELEASE # 80 (06)   
April 18, 2006
CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY	 	 
Statement by John A. Bravaco, Alternate Representative, U.S. Delegation to the UN Disarmament Commission, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, April 18, 2006
 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation: First Things First
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The United States Delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this working group.  We plan to participate actively in these deliberations, and we look forward to learning over the coming days whether other Member States have taken to heart the main lesson provided by last year's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
What is that lesson, Mr. Chairman?  That none of the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can be achieved fully so long as certain States Party to the Treaty continue to seek to develop nuclear weapons, thereby violating their obligations under the Treaty.  In particular, achieving effective nuclear non-proliferation in the world today is the essential element for establishing the international security conditions necessary for the effective pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
Mr. Chairman, the NPT is a key legal barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons and of material and technology related to the production of such weapons. The NPT is fundamentally a Treaty for mutual security.  It is clear that the security of all NPT States Party depends on their unstinting adherence to the Treaty's non-proliferation norms.  The Treaty's principal security benefit goes to those States Party that do not possess nuclear weapons and that can be assured -- if compliance is observed and enforcement of compliance is pursued -- that their neighbors also do not possess nuclear weapons.  Strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations is essential to regional stability, to forestalling nuclear arms races, and to preventing resources needed for economic development from being squandered in the destabilizing and economically unproductive pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, the refusal by some States to comply with their non-proliferation obligations also puts at risk the benefits that cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy offers to all NPT States Party.  States will be willing to pursue such cooperation only if they are convinced that cooperation will not undermine their own security by contributing to nuclear proliferation.  Only through strict measures to prevent proliferation --verified through the effective application of strengthened international safeguards, and ensured through the concerted enforcement of compliance -- can nuclear energy achieve its promise as a source of clean energy for sustainable development.
Mr. Chairman, the NPT is facing the most serious challenges in its history because some of its States Party have fallen out of compliance with their non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty, and because the other States Parties have failed to unite to insist upon -- and enforce -- universal compliance with the Treaty.  The United States continues to support universal NPT adherence, but recognizes that this objective cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of willful violation of the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations, let alone in the absence of effective enforcement. The United States long has urged all States not party to the NPT to adhere to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, and to accept the requisite, full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of their nuclear activities.
At the same time, we recognize, as has IAEA Director-General ElBaradei, that States that have never been adherents to the NPT are unlikely to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States for the foreseeable future.  Certainly, if non-adherents cannot be assured of the seriousness with which NPT Parties comply with and enforce the Treaty's central objective, i.e., non-proliferation, their motivation to join the Treaty regime is likely to remain minimal.  Focusing only on non-adherence, while ignoring non-compliance, suggests that NPT Parties consider proliferation by a non-adherent State unacceptable, but are prepared to tolerate such proliferation by a non-compliant Treaty Party.
Mr. Chairman, the NPT's non-proliferation obligations are its reason for being; they constitute the Treaty's most important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.  While the vast majority of States Party have lived up to these obligations, some have not.  Still others have turned a blind eye to these violations of the NPT's non-proliferation obligations, weakening their own and international security in the bargain.
It is wrong to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the reason why some NPT States Party are violating the Treaty is because the pace of nuclear disarmament is not going fast enough.  The truth is that regimes such as those in Iran and North Korea have their own national motivations for cheating, and they need to be called to account, openly and publicly, by every government that prizes the future viability of the NPT.
Those who suggest that the mere existence of nuclear weapons in the world explains, and even justifies, proliferation give tacit encouragement to those NPT States Party that are violating, or contemplating violation of, their non-proliferation commitments. Violators of the NPT inevitably interpret international silence or indifference regarding their actions as signs that Treaty Parties are unwilling or unable to confront nuclear armament activities, or that they even endorse such activities.
Mr. Chairman, the international community must resist the temptation to bribe or subsidize NPT violators to come back into compliance with the non-proliferation obligations that they and all other Treaty Parties freely accepted.  Appeasement did not work during the 20th Century as a method to restrain regimes determined to threaten international peace and security, and it will not work in our own time.  The only way forward is to hold accountable NPT States Party that violate the non-proliferation undertakings of the Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, our Delegation looks forward to addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament during a future session of this working group.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.