

# The Upheaval in Syria Viewed from Inside and Outside

*Dimitar Mibaylov*

*Dimitar Mibaylov is the Bulgarian ambassador to Israel. He formerly served as the head of the Bulgarian diplomatic mission in Syria (April 2011 — June 2012). Ambassador Mibaylov has been with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria for twenty-one years. He holds a PhD in Islamic history from Sofia University and earned his MA at the Department of Arabic Language and Literature, Faculty of Letters, Damascus University.*

The rapidly evolving political realities in Syria for the last two-and-a-half years have had a profound impact on that country's social fabric and its internal, people-to-people relations. Known for centuries, if not millennia, as a multifaceted, multilayered demographic mosaic, where people of all stripes and from different walks of life live *in convivencia*, Syria has gradually morphed into a new and tormented society, riven by mutual antagonism. Apart from the immediate political effect of the civil war on the neighboring countries, this society in upheaval—or rather cluster of distinct emerging societies at odds with one another—will have a profound effect on the region in spheres such as security, economy, and sustainable development.

Now, after the sinister use of chemical weapons against civilians on August 21, 2013, the conflict in Syria may well be approaching a turning point. There is heightened awareness that the civil war is entering a dangerous phase in which a humanitarian “red line” has been crossed. Whatever scenario unfolds in the near future, one thing is clear: Syrian society will never be what it once was. It will evolve into something completely different.

Nascent sociopolitical realities with profound implications for both the country and the region alike cannot be ignored. Whatever unexpected turns and surprises may loom ahead, Syrian society most likely will remain deeply divided, with communities traumatized and antagonized by the protracted conflict and its mounting death toll.

This article focuses on factors that influence the newly emerging society in the Syrian upheaval. Its objective is to define the forces at work shaping this new social landscape. It then provides a glimpse into the immediate future—an especially tricky endeavor in the Middle East—and outlines the new sociopolitical reality that inevitably will emerge and affect the region.

At the outset, it should be stressed that present trends will continue only if a major cataclysmic scenario does not happen, i.e., a sudden collapse of the regime due to a combination of factors such as foreign strikes, a demise of the regime's core, or a grand deal between the United States and Russia on the future of Syria. If such events do not occur—which seems the most likely scenario at this time—the conclusion of the International Crisis Group that the conflict is not a zero-sum game is pretty much on the mark.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, thus far at least, the conflict has been one in which there is no tipping point, wherein one side reaches a critical mass and thus brings about the collapse of the other. Regardless of the current territorial gains of the regime, the area under its control may shrink in the future, while not falling apart. If consolidated with purposeful and effective support from outside, the current Syrian government could stay the course for a long period of time.

On the other hand, the regime cannot and will not be able to “digest” the vast areas in the Sunni hinterland. Even if Bashar al-Assad's officers learn by heart General David Petraeus' field manual for Iraq and meticulously apply the “clear, hold, build” rules, this will not fly. The regime could take Qusayr, Khaldiya, or other Sunni strongholds, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory because to hold that territory will require settling it with a loyal population, ready to endure and sacrifice for the sake of a chimera—the *ancien*, autocratic, Syrian Arab Republic, and always under the watchful eye of the ever-present internal security apparatus.

Let us outline briefly the factors (historic, cultural, psychological, and tactical) that are shaping the fast emerging post-Syrian society.

The first one is the impact of increased political decomposition. What started to ebb in the second part of the nineteenth century with Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi's project of establishing an independent Arab caliphate, and continued with the plan of Greater Syria in the period between the two world wars (1919–39), now seems to be leading to new demographic and religious realities. Paradoxically, the clock seems to be ticking back to the *status quo ante* that characterized the defunct Ottoman Empire. This is the millet system, remnants of which still survive in Lebanese confessionalism until the present. Every day, the various religious and ethnic communities that make up the Syrian tapestry increasingly realize that their future depends on the security provided on a local level, within the framework of their own respective communities. The fact of the matter is that the unitary Syrian state, if we can still speak of such a thing, no longer ensures security for most Syrians, nor does it put bread on their tables.

The Syrian conflict, which started as a peaceful movement for reforms, transparency, and greater civil rights, mutated into a brutal civil war between religious and, to a lesser extent, ethnic communities. A current trend of this conflict is an ever-deepening fault line between the Sunni and the Shia that could infect and aggravate the Middle East with contagious sectarian clashes. The process of disintegration of a seemingly monolithic society into these basic sectarian and ethnic components seems irreversible. That means, paradoxically, that nearly a century after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, we are facing a reincarnation of the millet system.<sup>2</sup>

The second factor shaping the new Syrian society is the obvious absence of any real “glue” to hold its components together, to motivate them to work jointly and cooperate in a unitary state. Whereas once the state (the Ottoman Empire after 1517), the foreign mandate system (after 1920), or the ideology (Arab nationalism after 1945) provided such sociopolitical adhesives, centrifugal forces of disintegration now act to produce the opposite effect. Against the backdrop of horrific scenes of bloodshed and cruelty, to suggest that democracy could be something that could keep Syrian society together would be both pathetic and cynical.

Achieving power-sharing solutions that can preserve both sides’ interests in the conflict (and those of their respective patrons) seems extremely difficult from this perspective. Although it has been suggested that the only way for the war to be ended is by reaching a political solution based on far-reaching concessions by the two parties,<sup>3</sup> one can only wonder how such equilibrium could be achieved. It took Iran and Iraq eight years of devastating, bloody war (1980–88) to finally comprehend that neither of the two sides could prevail in that conflict. Is Syria doomed to suffer such an internal war of attrition for so long? Even if there were not a “zero-sum” mentality, there still would not be a propensity for negotiations and eventual concessions. The process of turning swords into ploughshares in the Middle East has always been a slow and painful one, not an ephemeral act of inspiration. Richard Haas presciently predicts that the will to compromise will appear only “when the situation on the ground changes, something that will only happen with effort and time.”<sup>4</sup> The Islamic state project, vacillating between a relatively moderate blueprint of the Muslim Brothers and an extremely utopian one, as exemplified by the Jihadi Salafi formations such as “Al-Nusra Front,” also seems unlikely to gain wide acceptance within Syrian society. It is a sad fact that the old, Byzantine-like mosaic of the Syrian society of old is unraveling and there is nothing to hold its pieces together.

The third factor is the backlash effect of what Itamar Rabinovich called “Syria: A Case of Minority Might.”<sup>5</sup> Since 1966, a great part of the Sunni population has been living with a sense of political injustice, and views the Alawites as usurpers of power. Although Hafez al-Assad meticulously attempted to mitigate this social disparity, and his son Bashar followed the same course, this social malaise remained the trademark of the Syrian regime. With no real political reforms and a gradual transition to civil society based on meritocracy and equal opportunity for all in the offing, it was inevitable that at a certain point, social tensions would rise to a dangerous level. Protests that began in Dera’a in March 2011 and continued engulfing other, mostly Sunni, areas were, above all, manifestations of this political and social disparity, which backfired on the regime—and which the inexperienced president failed to diffuse. The seeds of disparity sowed in Syria by Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad back in the 1960s are now being reaped by Bashar and his coterie and they have come in the form of a relentless and merciless whirlwind of rebellion.

The fourth factor is what may be described, allegorically, as an awakening of demons from the past. The *fitna*—the great schism that led to the outbreak of the first internal Islamic war and struggle for power as of 656–661, splitting nascent Islam into Sunni and Shia parts—already pitted large numbers of Syrians against one another. A confidant of mine from Busra as-Sham, where Sunni and Shia communities lived in harmony for more than two centuries, told me that after the conflict erupted, an old and trustworthy friend of his from the other denomination began to treat him with inexplicable malice and hatred. My friend got the impression that he was facing not a fellow human being, but rather “a reinvigorated fourteenth-century mummy.” Demons from the past appear here and there—between Protestants and Catholics, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus—but *fitna* demons are especially ferocious and able to engender enmity and hatred among people who once lived like brothers. It is amazing how the distant past—or more precisely the perception of what happened in the past—can project itself onto present-day reality and influence the course of events.

The fifth factor may be described as a change in prevailing religious doctrines and beliefs. Whereas in the past, Sunni Islam dominated with its tolerant approach and its bonds to Sufi orders, after the outbreak of the civil war, a radical trend bearing the trademarks of Wahhabi and Salafi-Jihadi doctrines surfaced. Sheikhs such as Ahmed Kaftaro and Mohamed Said Ramadan al-Bouti (both ethnic Kurds) once opposed military and political activism, derived their religious practices from Sufi orders, and tried to accommodate the dominant Sunnis to accept the fact that the president and his entourage had heterodox bearings. Now, this is a bygone era.

On the other side of the river, ordinary Alawites hardly paid attention to their own esoteric religious credo. Moreover, they were encouraged by Hafez al-Assad not to antagonize Sunnis with different beliefs and practices. Now, it is clear that Twelver Shia followers and Alawites are coalescing to form an anti-Sunni front to defend communities and shrines, and attack whoever is being perceived as *takfiri* [apostates]. There is even a new phenomenon: the appearance of an Alawi-Shia jihad against what is perceived as Sunni *takfiri*.<sup>6</sup> All these trends are leaving deep and indelible scars of division and animosity within Syrian society.<sup>7</sup>

Given the increasing degree of polarization between Sunni and Shia (the Twelvers), the Alawi (Nusairi) creed, with its esoteric cosmogony and eschatology and sophisticated doctrine of revelation,<sup>8</sup> may progressively weaken and dwindle. In the shadow of Sunni confrontation and the predominantly “orthodox” Twelver trend of Shia Islam, it may gradually lose its religious weight and thus, after years, be engulfed in a process of inter-Shia acculturation.

The sixth factor at play in shaping the new Syrian society is the regime’s stunning tactical success in mastering the *divide ad impera* principle. At first, it gradually convinced the Alawite minority of an imminent existential threat to the entire community—not because of what the regime and the Alawites did in the past, but because of who they are. The Alawite “proletariat”—kept in impoverished villages and slums and used to man the army of special corps and security services—were unable to recognize that the threat was not against the poor “have-nots” of Alawite origin but against what Sadeq Jalal al-Azm calls a “Merchant-Military Complex.”<sup>9</sup> Gradually, the Alawite community found itself entrapped in a bitter fratricidal struggle with no bank accounts abroad and no airline tickets to safe havens (which the Makhlufts and Assads always keep in their pockets).

There were no strong voices from within the community to expose the scheme of the regime: The letters of Adonis (Ali Ahmad Said Esber), a prominent exile poet and essayist, to address the turmoil, were too obscure and too conformist; appearances of the actress Fadwa Suleiman in predominantly Sunni protests were too extravagant; the former dean of the Faculty of Economics of Damascus University, Aref Dalila, and the leader of the semi-opposition Building the Syrian State party, Luay Hussein, opposing the regime from within, always left the impression that somehow they still remained connected to the regime; and Nibras al-Fadel from the external opposition seemed a bird of a lonely feather in a mostly Sunni flock.

The same tactics succeeded to a great extent with the Christian communities scattered between Dera’a and Aleppo. Although front-men of different parts of the opposition such as George Sabra and Michel Kilo turned out to be some of its

brightest symbols, the bulk of Christians remained staunch supporters of Bashar al-Assad and loyalists to the regime. In late 2011, I had a long conversation with the late Patriarch Ignatius IV of Antioch. A wise man in his nineties, he was not able to make sense of the subtle and cynical game played by the regime with the Christians. When, at the time, a member of the Christian community was talking about the incoming *takfiri* massacres that would be committed by radical Muslims against the Christians, I asked whether in the past—save for the hapless events in 1861—such an event had ever taken place on Syrian soil.<sup>10</sup> There was no reply. However, if the current tragic evolution of events continues, such grim predictions may become reality.

The seventh factor is the strategic decision of the regime, as of May 2011 and confirmed by the end of July/beginning of August 2011 (on the eve of Ramadan), to apply brutal force to crush the protests and the nascent rebellion. Generals such as Jameel Hassan and Ali Mamluk—members of Assad's inner circle and his security *conseillers*—still believed that what had worked in Hama back in 1982 might be applicable now: Crush opponents—both real and perceived—with massive, brutal force, kill them mercilessly, and the rest would back off in fear. Indeed, most of Assad's entourage are living in the past. In an age of social networking, with the Arab revolutions sweeping across the region, their tactics are obsolete and ineffective.

In fact, Assad's team simply fanned the flames and reintroduced the same old monsters—Jihadi-Salafi fighters from Idleb and Aleppo, once secretly whisked over the Iraqi border to fight the Americans in Iraq. As with the ruling elites of Egypt and Algeria, who sent off their own monsters to perish in Afghanistan but later received hard-core jihadists in return, the regime in Damascus has had to face its own homemade Frankenstein. There is little left for the regime to do but to exploit the arrival of Jihadi-Salafi fighters for propaganda objectives, to further consolidate the Alawite core, and finally to mobilize most of the ethnic and religious minorities.

The immediate consequence of this diabolical tactic was violence and rivers of blood. And, just as the old wounds from Aleppo in 1979 and Hama in 1982 were about to heal, the newly inflicted trauma, terrifying for millions of Syrians, led to division and distrust, which will endure for decades to come. In a country in which a significant part of the population still adheres to the ancient dictum *Lex talionis*—[*al'ain bil'ain*], it is hard to expect that some kind of Truth and Reconciliation Commission will miraculously bring about cohesion and mutual repentance, and in so doing, heal wounds from the past. Sadly, the likes of Gandhi and Mandela are nowhere to be found in the hilly landscape of Syria and its vast *badiya* [steppe].

The eighth factor in forming the new outlines of Syrian society is the ever-growing tendency for its leading components to become proxies of outside patrons. One of the most veteran opposition leaders, Haitham al-Maleh, recently described the Syrian president as a pawn on the Iranian chessboard. It should be noted that Assad the father, while preserving his well-cobbled regional network of allies, nevertheless succeeded in keeping the Iranians at arm's length. Nasrallah and regional proxies of his ilk appeared before him submissive and obedient, much like boy scouts before their scout master. Alas, "like father, like son" is not a universal maxim, and genealogy does not guarantee the making of a shrewd leader. It would also be fair to say that most opposition leaders are using the same playbook: One butters his bread in a Gulf country; the other places his services at a neighbor's disposal; and a third plays in the key and tonality of bygone colonial grandeur.

This means, ironically, that Syria is stepping into the same shoes as Lebanon in the 1970s, something that almost doomed Lebanese sovereignty to ruin (Hafez al-Assad was a main external patron by that time). Since Syria will probably not have a unified political structure in the foreseeable future, the current influence of outside patrons is expected to grow even more. This trend will inevitably deepen the dividing lines among Syrians, pitting one community against the other.

The ninth factor is the identity crisis. In his visionary book *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, Bernard Lewis outlined different, sometimes contradictory, elements that contributed to the identity of people in the Middle East—religion, race, language, country, nation, state, and symbols.<sup>11</sup> William Cleveland, in his fundamental *A History of the Modern Middle East*, defines three main expressions of identity: regionalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic solidarity.<sup>12</sup> The war in Syria, however, demonstrates that the quest for authentic identity is highly nuanced and not yet over.

Since the outset of the conflict in Syria, ethnic, religious, ideological, sectarian, mythological (myths related to *fitna*), irredentist, tribal, local, regional, client-patron, and economic senses of belonging have been manifested. Once proudly identifying themselves as *Arabi Suri*, most of the people in Syria now, especially the minorities, will be more reluctant to label themselves in the same way; they might utter the words, but a voice from inside will shout *Kurdi*, *Durzi*, *Masibi* (Christian), *Hourani*, etc. In the absence of principles and values generally accepted and adopted by all, and with no clear vision on the future of a unified Syria, ordinary Syrians will probably continue to search for their true identity.

Finally, the tenth factor is the Syrian economy, the collapse of which has been much anticipated, but which is still miraculously afloat. Recently, in perusing one of the most popular biographies of Bashar al-Assad, I came to realize the extent



of the naïveté that once existed with respect to expectations for the economic development of Syria.<sup>13</sup> With the political fragmentation, however, economic activities began to adapt to the new political and social realities in different parts of Syria. These processes of “feudalization,” a barter economy, and money poured in from abroad simply accelerate the separation of communities and develop new ways for the disenfranchised population to survive and to make ends meet.

These are the ten factors that are at play in shaping what is expected to be a new social reality for Syria. With the current civil fabric unraveled and eroded to a highly disastrous degree, the new public landscape will most probably bring several challenges to the neighborhood.

Let us consider what these challenges will be. The first is a fragmented and contradictory reality with two types of territories:

- those under the control of political-military entities, such as the territories controlled by the regime (the Alawite mountains, seashore, Damascus and the line to Aleppo); the Kurdish areas of Qamishli and Hassake; Jabal Druz; and probably some Sunni regions: the northern part between Aleppo and the border with Turkey;
- disputed areas with no definitive masters, such as the eastern tribal area, Houran, and parts of Idleb and Homs provinces. Of course, the regime will try to hold on to the main remnant of the Syrian Arab Republic and connect it to the Beqaa Valley to form, with Hizbullah, a Shia-Alawite entity that may stretch as a wall from the northern part of Syria almost to the southern part of Lebanon.

The second is the unending humanitarian crisis due to the lack of governmental authority covering the entire country, a severely damaged economy, rampant crime and violence, and the massive displacement and uprooting of people. The negative effect on the neighboring states will be permanent, especially where neighborhood relations are based on bonds of kinship, as between the tribes of Houran on the part of Syria, and Ghareibeh and other clans in Jordan.

Another challenge stems from radicalization and asymmetric threats. The disputed decentralized areas (lacking any firm control) will certainly allow for further dissemination of different radical Islamist entities. This means not only an “al-Nusra front” and the current organizations that form the “Syrian Islamic front,” but also new players with their own agendas. The Salafi-Jihadi movement and its proponents never fails to exploit a vacuum in the Middle East, North Africa or Asia, but explore it as a breeding ground for sprawling operative structures.



This can be seen on the ground and is much anticipated. Perhaps the best remedy is to exploit the local tribal factor against an expected Salafi Jihadi incursion. A case in point is what happened in Iraq in 2006—not the ideal remedy by far, but nevertheless a pragmatic step in the right direction—with the formation of Sheik Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi’s “Anbar Awakening Movement” to counter the influence of al-Qa’ida in Iraq.

A further challenge, irredentism, is a rallying cry for both Islamist and nationalistic claims. In a society that is both fragmented and deprived of strong and unified values and principles, irredentism—about border areas that were disputed by the Syrian Arab Republic in the past—might be swayed by an easy populist cause.

Spillover and diffusion are already manifested in Lebanon, following Nasrallah’s decision to switch to a hands-on engagement with the war in Syria. Upcoming acts of vengeance against the Shia population loyal to Hizbullah inside Lebanon may galvanize further clashes. This, unfortunately, will be a lasting reality nourished by the outside support from Iran, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, on the other.

Collecting accurate information on the ground will be more arduous if internal fragmentation and controversies continue, especially in the zones in which no firm control exists. Without qualitative humint, the inflow of sigint and imint would resemble pictures and recordings taken on Mars and transmitted back to Earth. Without any diplomatic presence and in the absence of other observers on the ground, internal sociopolitical dynamics will be far more elusive and difficult to decipher.

Finally, the last challenge to be discussed here is the nipping in the bud of any project related to regional development. Ironically, what the Syrian president once naïvely believed to be a strategic vision of “Syria on the Five Seas” (the Mediterranean, Red, Caspian, and Black Seas, and the Gulf) now seems a bizarre delusion of past grandeur. The concept of Syria, positioned as a crossroads for electricity grids and gas pipelines, appears now to be completely absurd.

Thus, the ongoing social realities in Syria portend nothing good. A tormented and divided society cannot bring stability and prosperity to Syria or the neighborhood. As President Lincoln famously declared: “A house divided against itself cannot stand.”

Even if the regime suffers a serious blow, it will not completely disappear. It—or at least its remnants—is here to stay. The regime will simply follow the path from statehood to a militia-based entity. It will do so in much the same way that

Hizbullah desperately tried, during recent years, to traverse an opposite path: from militia-based-entity to statehood. That attempt, of course, ended in failure. At the end of the day, the very tragedy of the regime appears to be the belief that just as the previous generation was able to quash the rebellion of the Muslim Brothers in the 1980s, so will this one. President Assad's brother, Maher, haplessly embodies this illusion. However, the more the regime comes to believe that with just a little more effort the rebellion will be crushed, the more it becomes evident that it is chasing shadows in the night, or following mirages on the rocky horizons of the Syrian landscape.

What is most worrisome is the Nero-like *après moi, le déluge* state of mind, which has been demonstrated on many occasions, such as Assad's recent remarks to American TV commentator Charlie Rose. The beleaguered Syrian president threatened to use "every action," stressing that the unknown may also come from unnamed proxies as well, if the Americans attack Syria. This is worrisome bravado, a "bunker mentality" if you will. Rumor has it that the head of the notorious Air Force Intelligence, Jamil Hassan, once asked Bashar al-Assad to kill a million protesters and thus put an end to the rebellion. That way, Hassan suggested, he would face a trial at the International Court in The Hague, instead of the Syrian president.

Let us, at least, harbor no illusions. Facing reality brings us to the conclusion that ongoing events in Syria are tragic for the Syrian people and worrisome for both their immediate and more distant neighbors.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> International Crisis Group, "Syria's Metastasing Conflict," *Middle East Report* No. 143, June 27, 2013.
- <sup>2</sup> Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 323–324.
- <sup>3</sup> International Crisis Group, September 1, 2013, [www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/syria-statement.aspx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/syria-statement.aspx).
- <sup>4</sup> Richard Haas, "America must stick to a course on Syria," *The Financial Times*, September 2, 2013.
- <sup>5</sup> Itamar Rabinovich, *The View from Damascus* (London, 2008), p. 111.
- <sup>6</sup> In May 2013, Hassan Nasrallah delivered a forceful speech, stating that Hizbullah would fight with Assad whatever the price. The *fatwas* of two Shia clerics have urged the Lebanese followers of Nasrallah to join the struggle in Syria.
- <sup>7</sup> Well-known differences between Sunni and Shia are observed on the ground. For more on that topic, see Shmuel Bar, "Sunnis and Shiites: Between Rapprochement and Conflict," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (Hudson Institute) II (2005): 87–95.

- <sup>8</sup> H.A.R. Gibb, J.H. Kramers (eds.), *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden, 1953), pp. 453–456.
- <sup>9</sup> All4Syria, <http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/93632>, August 19, 2013.
- <sup>10</sup> Suhayl Zakkar, “*Bilad al-Sham fi al-Qarn al-Tasi’a A’shar*” (Damascus, 1982), pp. 210–242.
- <sup>11</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (New York, 1998), pp. 9–11.
- <sup>12</sup> William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, 2004), pp. 234–237.
- <sup>13</sup> David Lesch, *The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria* (New Haven, 2005), pp. 215–228.

**A subscription to The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs is a wonderful gift idea**

Indicate that your subscription is a gift and a special announcement will be sent to the recipient.

Foreign: US \$55  
Domestic: NIS 150



The image shows the cover of the journal. The title 'THE ISRAEL JOURNAL of Foreign Affairs' is printed in white on a dark background. Below the title is a logo consisting of a Star of David and a globe. At the bottom of the cover, the text 'ISRAEL COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS' is visible.

Published by the  
**Israel Council on Foreign Relations** [www.israeljfa.com](http://www.israeljfa.com)



Lauder School  
of Government,  
Diplomacy & Strategy

IPS  
Institute for  
Policy and Strategy

STUDIO NERUBAY

# A Unique Executive Program for Diplomats Serving in Israel

Understanding Israel: Politics, Society, Economy, and Security

**Head of the Program:** Prof. Alex Mintz, Dean, Lauder School of Government, IDC Herzliya; Head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

**Directed by:** Dr. Amichai Magen, Lauder School of Government, IDC Herzliya

## Topics:

- > Israeli Politics and Society
- > Governance in Israel
- > The Israeli Legal System
- > Israeli Society:  
Commonalities and Cleavages
- > Minorities in Israel
- > National Security Decision Making
- > The Economy of Israel
- > The Media in Israel
- > Archaeology in Israel
- > Global Terrorism:  
Israel as a Case Study
- > The Arab-Israeli Peace Process  
in the Age of the Arab Revolts
- > Field Trip

## The Faculty Includes:

Prof. Uzi Arad, Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel; Lauder School of Government, IDC Herzliya

Prof. Aharon Barak, Former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Radzyner School of Law, IDC Herzliya

Prof. Zvi Eckstein, Dean of the School of Economics, IDC Herzliya

Dr. Boaz Ganor, Founder and Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism; Deputy Dean of the Lauder School of Government, IDC Herzliya

Prof. Galia Golan, Head of the M.A. Program in Government at the Lauder School of Government, IDC Herzliya

Prof. Rafi Melnick, Provost, IDC Herzliya

Prof. David Nachmias, Head of the M.A. Track in Public Policy and Administration at the Lauder School of Government, IDC Herzliya

Prof. Amnon Rubinstein, Former Israeli Minister of Education; Radzyner School of Law, IDC Herzliya

- Participants are granted a certificate upon completion of the program.
- The first gathering will convene on Friday, November 1, 2013. Meetings will take place on alternate Fridays, 9:30-13:00.
- For further information and registration contact Ms. Hila Ziv: Tel: 09-9527358, or E-mail: hilaz@idc.ac.il