

## UN Sanctions: a Glass Half Full?

Andrew Mack and Asif Khan\*

### *Introduction*

By the end of the 1990s, following a series of embarrassing failures, the utility of the UN Security Council's two primary collective security enforcement mechanisms--military force and sanctions--was being subjected to increasingly serious critique both in the research and in the policy communities. Resort to force by the Security Council in the second half of the 1990s was constrained both by doubts about its efficacy, following the debacle in Somalia, and by the reluctance of member states to put the lives of their citizens at risk in distant UN operations where no perceived vital national interests were at stake. The increase in the resort to sanctions in the 1990s should be seen in this light--as a substitute for, as well as a precursor or complement to, the use of force.

Prior to 1990 the Security Council imposed sanctions regimes on only two occasions, on Rhodesia and South Africa. The 1990s saw a dramatic surge in UN-imposed sanctions regimes, with the Security Council invoking Chapter VII to impose a variety of economic and political sanctions, travel bans, and arms embargoes on both governments and nongovernmental actors (e.g. UNITA in Angola). Sanctions were imposed on Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia. In the cases of Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia, sanctions have been fully lifted, whereas in the case of Libya, they were suspended. In the case of Iraq, sanctions have been lifted, with the exception of some prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related *materiel*.

How effective have these regimes been? This question is less easy to answer than might be imagined, not least because what the ostensible rationale for actions were and what the real reasons were sometimes differed radically. The UN lacked the resources to undertake its own "lessons learned" review of its sanctions regimes and no comprehensive scholarly studies were produced in this period either. Indeed, it was not until the new millennium that the first comprehensive study of the efficacy of the UN sanctions in the 1990s was published.<sup>1</sup>

UN sanctions, of course, only amount to a small percentage of the total. More than one hundred sanctions regimes, mostly unilateral, were imposed during the twentieth century. The most comprehensive, most heavily cited, and influential study of the efficacy of these regimes was produced by the International Institute of Economics (IIE) in 1990.<sup>2</sup> The IIE study found that sanctions failed to achieve even "partial success" in coercing desired changes in target regime behavior in 66 percent of 115 cases between World War I and 1990. Moreover, the failure rate increased over time as the global economy became more open. Between 1973 and 1990, only one in four sanctions regimes achieved even partial success. The major reason for the overwhelmingly negative assessment of the efficacy of sanctions evident in almost all studies is that success in coercing target states to change their behavior has become *the* criterion of effectiveness. But while coercing compliance is clearly an

important (albeit rarely achieved) goal, critics tend to forget that sanctions often seek to realize other objectives as well--from stigmatizing and containing transgressor states to serving as instruments of prevention and deterrence. No studies have systematically examined the effectiveness of sanctions in realizing these latter goals.

The most damaging charge against sanctions, particularly comprehensive sanctions, is that they impose widespread suffering on ordinary people, while leaving the regimes they target not only relatively unscathed but also sometimes enriched and strengthened. In part as a consequence, almost all studies today argue for one variant or other of what have come to be known as "smart sanctions," i.e., those sanctions intended to target regimes, not peoples. The effect, though not the intent, of a number of recent sanctions regimes, most notably in the case of Iraq, has been the reverse. Peoples have been harmed far more than regimes.

### *The Efficacy of Sanctions*

The only real disagreement in the contemporary sanctions literature relates to the *degree* to which sanctions fail as an instrument for coercing changes in the behavior of target states. No study argues that sanctions are, *in general*, an effective means of coercion, although individual sanctions regimes can and sometimes do succeed. Part of the difficulty in making judgments about the efficacy of sanctions arises from disagreements about what constitutes "success" even with respect to coercion. For example, supporters of sanctions argue that the comprehensive sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) played an important role in coercing Slobodan Milosevic to agree to the 1995 Dayton Accords. Critics argue that sanctions were of negligible import, that the Bosnian Serbs were losing their war against Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims, and that it was this fact, together with the use of NATO military force, that determined the successful outcome of the talks. Dayton suited the FRY because it froze the status quo and prevented a greater Bosnian Serb defeat. Military force, not sanctions, was the decisive factor. In reality, the relative impact of sanctions and war on Milosevic's decision making will likely never be known. Sanctions were probably a contributory factor in determining the outcome of the Dayton negotiations, but they were certainly not a sufficient condition for success--and probably not a necessary one either.

The Yugoslavia case exemplifies the difficulty of determining the relative impact of sanctions on outcomes that have multiple causes, but this is by no means the only methodological problem raised by the sanctions literature. Supporters of UN sanctions, for example, argue that pessimistic findings of the International Institute of Economics study are of little relevance to the UN because a large number of the cases examined in the IIE study involved unilateral sanctions, mostly by the United States. The UN, by contrast, only imposes sanctions multilaterally, and multilateral sanctions, so it is argued, are inherently more effective than unilateral sanctions.

The logic of this argument is clear enough; whether UN multilateral sanctions are *in practice* more effective than unilateral sanctions is less so. Strongly enforced sanctions by a superpower like the United States against a small country that is dependent on U.S. trade, aid, and investment may well be more effective than

weakly implemented multilateral sanctions. The United States has demonstrated the efficacy of economic coercion (of which sanctions are but a special case) on many occasions. Moreover, the actual success rate of the UN's multilateral sanctions in the 1990s is hardly encouraging. The UN recognizes this fact and over the past several years has been actively canvassing ways to make sanctions both more effective and less costly in human terms.

### *Why Sanctions Regimes Fail*

One of the core assumptions of traditional sanctions theory is that the pain inflicted by sanctions on citizens of a target state will cause them to pressure their government into making the changes demanded by the sanctioning body. But, at least in authoritarian states, the assumption that "civilian pain leads to political gain" suffers from an obvious drawback. Those who bear the brunt of the sanctions have no power to influence policy; those in power tend to be relatively unaffected. From this it would seem to follow that sanctions directed against multiparty states, where there is some possibility of domestic pressure being brought to bear against the government, would be more effective than those levied on authoritarian states. One recent study provides suggestive evidence that this is, in fact, the case.

Using more demanding criteria for success than those of the International Institute of Economics study, Kim Richard Nossal found only 14 cases out of more than 100 in which sanctions were completely successful. What was remarkable about his finding was that in 86 percent of the small number of cases in which sanctions had "worked," the targeted state had a functioning multiparty electoral system. Sanctions against authoritarian states failed in more than 98 percent of the 100-plus cases.<sup>3</sup> Insofar as UN sanctions have been directed primarily against authoritarian states, the potential significance of this finding is obvious.

*Sanctions may strengthen the regimes they seek to coerce.* When trade embargoes are imposed on a target state, the sanctions-induced scarcity of goods causes prices to rise, often dramatically. Between 1990 and 1995, price increases for basic commodities of around 1000 percent a year were not uncommon in Iraq. The consequences were predictable. First, the poor who could afford least suffered terribly. Second, the economic independence of the middle class, a building block for democratization and source of potential resistance to the regime, was destroyed. Third, regime members and their allies who controlled the black market profited hugely. Elizabeth Gibbons has argued that the imposition of sanctions on Haiti created a perverse economic interest in their perpetuation amongst the very regime members they were targeted against.<sup>4</sup>

In Iraq, efforts by the international community to relieve the suffering of the people had a further perverse effect. Regime control over much of the food and medical supplies distributed under the oil-for-food program has increased the dependence of the people on the state and further undermined civil society, while providing an additional lever of control and coercion for the regime.

*Sanctions bodies, rather than the target regime, may be blamed for sanctions-induced suffering.* The "pain-leads-to-gain" assumption of traditional sanctions

theory also assumes that it will be the regime, not the sanctioning body, that will be blamed for the privations imposed. In reality, sanctions often increase popular support for the regimes against which they are targeted, especially when the state controls the media and can guarantee that its “spin” on who is responsible for the sanctions-induced hardship gets the widest hearing. The so-called “rally round the flag” phenomenon is true of authoritarian as well as democratic regimes.

*Failure to compensate for third-party costs may encourage cheating.* Sanctions, by definition, impose disproportionately high economic costs on the economic partners of target states, but despite calls from the UN General Assembly for these costs to be borne more equitably by the international community, this almost never happens. Where little or no assistance is available, disadvantaged states will have an incentive to break sanctions and renew their traditional economic relationships to avoid harm to themselves.

Some provision for third-party compensation has been made in those cases where the implementation of sanctions regimes has engaged the interests of major powers, notably in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. No such aid has been forthcoming in the case of the African sanctions regimes. Here and elsewhere, demands for compensation have generally been ignored by the wealthy states.

*Implementation, monitoring, and enforcement problems can undermine sanctions regimes.* Many critics assume that because sanctions rarely succeed, there must be some inherent flaw in sanctions strategy. But failure in many cases has been due to the inadequate monitoring and enforcement of sanctions regimes. In the case of Rhodesia, for example, sanctions busting took place on such a massive scale that exports actually *rose* after sanctions were imposed.

If it is indeed the case that the failure of many sanctions regimes is due to lack of enforcement, one might be tempted to assume that sanctions would work if only they were implemented seriously. This is a superficially attractive argument, but it ignores the fact that the difference in the way sanctions are implemented is not accidental. The level of resources allocated to monitoring, assessing, and enforcing sanctions is a function of the degree to which the perceived interests of major powers are engaged; it may be politically impossible to implement sanctions successfully when they are not. Thus, implementation of UN sanctions directed against African states, where the major powers have only minor interests at stake, generated so little effort that the regimes in question have been described by one UN insider as “atrophic.” By contrast, quite extraordinary efforts have been devoted to the sanctions imposed on Iraq, where the perceived vital interests of major powers--particularly the United States and United Kingdom--were engaged.

But even when there *is* serious commitment to the regime in question, most studies point to the need for improvements in UN planning, monitoring, assessment, and enforcement procedures. A 1996 report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict noted that major problems in monitoring and enforcing economic sanctions had become glaringly apparent to professionals both within the UN and national governments.<sup>5</sup> Little has changed since, and many subsequent reports have stressed the need for greater technical expertise to guide the work of the Security Council’s sanctions committees. As David Cortright and George Lopez note in *The Sanctions Decade*, the UN’s ability to enforce sanctions has been “woefully

inadequate.”<sup>6</sup> UN officials and Security Council members concede that this is the case but note the difficulty in persuading member states to allocate the needed resources.

### *The Humanitarian Issue*

Numerous recent studies have pointed out that sanctions, and in particular comprehensive sanctions, are not a nonviolent alternative to armed force. Like war, they can result in death and suffering, even though all UN sanctions regimes exempt food and medicines. Unlike war, however, the casualties are all on one side. The human suffering associated with some sanctions regimes has become a major political issue both within the United Nations Organization (UNO) and in the wider international community.

The most politically sensitive question, namely, the level of sanctions-induced deaths, is difficult to resolve because of real problems in obtaining reliable data. In the Iraqi case, which has generated the most concern, media and some NGO reports have sometimes cited Iraqi government claims of one-million-plus deaths attributable to sanctions, notwithstanding the obvious need for caution in using data from such a source. But in 1999 a careful Columbia University epidemiological study, which did not rely on Iraqi data, indicated that *at least* 100,000, and more likely over 200,000, children below the age of five died between August 1991 and March 1998, *over and above the number that would be expected to die in normal times*. Three-quarters of these excess deaths were attributable to sanctions.<sup>7</sup> This is more than the total number of Iraqis killed in the first Gulf War when the overwhelming majority of casualties were combatants.

The primary responsibility for these deaths clearly lies with the regime. Iraq’s deliberately obstructive tactics meant that humanitarian aid under the oil-for-food program did not start reaching those in need until March 1997, despite the fact that the Security Council had made provision for such aid as early as 1991. But critics of the Security Council have argued that once it had become clear that the regime would do nothing to prevent the sanctions-induced starvation of Iraqi children, then Council members had to share at least part of the responsibility for the continued suffering.

Few doubt today the considerable tension that can exist between the Security Council’s pursuit of political goals via sanctions and the UN’s parallel commitments to the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in his 1998 *Annual Report on the Work of the Organization*, “The international community should be under no illusion . . . humanitarian and human rights policy goals cannot easily be reconciled with those of a sanctions regime.”<sup>8</sup> When comprehensive sanctions regimes are imposed and effectively enforced, it is difficult to avoid major suffering and severe social dislocation. The impact of sanctions on the Iraqi economy was so large, for example, that it dwarfed any and all relief programs. Moreover, while the post-March 1997 flow of food and medicine under the oil-for-food program reversed the rise in the under-five mortality rate, it did not arrest the insidious decline in the economic development infrastructures of Iraq, in the education and public health systems, and in the institutions of civil society. These may be

the most serious long-term cost of sanctions to Iraqi society and are one reason why the current post-war reconstruction program is so expensive.

Critics argue that where comprehensive sanctions generate great human suffering and destroy the social fabric of a target state without achieving their political goals, support for them will decrease and the UN's moral authority will be undermined.

### *Measuring Success and Failure*

As noted earlier, most studies on the efficacy of sanctions ignore the fact that they may do more than simply seek to coerce states to change their behavior. In fact the variety of goals, other than coercion, that the Security Council may pursue by imposing sanctions is considerable. A complete list would include the following:

- Stigmatizing a transgressor state and, in so doing, signaling the international community's opposition to aggression, terrorism, gross violations of human rights, and other major transgressions of international law and norms.
- Containing a target state even when there is little expectation that the measures imposed will lead to the desired change in its behavior. This was clearly a central U.S. concern with respect to Iraq. Sanctions helped contain Iraq militarily by preventing it from spending tens of billions of dollars to rebuild its conventional military capability.
- Deterring other would-be violators of international laws and norms and deterring repeat violations by the target state. Even sanctions that do not succeed in changing the behavior of the transgressor state may contribute to deterrence.
- Serving as an instrument of prevention. A sanctions regime that includes an effective arms embargo will help prevent force modernization and expansion in the target state. Economic sanctions that reduce gross domestic product (GDP) levels may force reductions in defense expenditure. Both may reduce the capacity, and hence the incentive, for aggression.
- Building support for the use of force by ensuring that it not only is, but is seen to be, a measure of last resort. In this sense sanctions can be seen as a crucial rung in an escalating program of coercive measures.
- Responding to the political imperative to "do something," where the use of force is ruled out and where mere verbal condemnation would be seen to be insufficient.
- *Not* lifting sanctions may also serve domestic political interests. It is clear, for example, that even though the Clinton administration came to regard sanctions on Iraq as largely ineffective, it felt constrained by the anticipated political costs from doing much to ameliorate their humanitarian impact.

Reviews of the utility of sanctions occasionally note these additional roles that sanctions may play but almost never examine them in any detail. To the extent that they fail to do so, they present an unduly pessimistic assessment.

### *Enhancing the Effectiveness and Reducing the Human Costs of UN Sanctions*

Most reviews and studies of the Security Council's sanctions machinery and implementation and monitoring processes have offered both criticism and detailed proposals for improvement. Some have argued for quite radical structural change, such as the creation of a UN Sanctions Agency or for the General Assembly to play a major role in sanctions implementation and enforcement.

On the critical issue of the impact of sanctions in terms of human suffering, major reports commissioned by the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, published in 1995 and 1997, proposed a wide range of reforms. Both studies recommended that humanitarian impact assessments be conducted before and after sanctions are imposed. Few would disagree, but the central problem is again one of resources. The question of assistance to third parties has been addressed by both the General Assembly and the Secretariat. In 1998 an ad hoc experts group was set up by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs to examine practical measures of assistance to third-party states affected by sanctions. The recommendations have been presented to the General Assembly, but few observers believe that the resources will be found to implement them.

### **Inducements or "Positive Sanctions"**

Over the past decade, numbers of academic studies have drawn attention to the use of inducements as a means of helping secure compliance with UN resolutions. Inducement strategies on their own are neither realistic nor appropriate. Sanctions are imposed in response to gross violations of international law. Simply offering inducements to states to return to compliance with their legal obligations would create a "moral hazard," rewarding illegal behavior. But many students of sanctions argue that sanctions regimes are generally biased too far towards coercion and pay too little attention to the use of inducements *as a complement* to coercive measures. A more effective strategy, they argue, would embrace positive as well as negative sanctions.

The historical and some game-theoretic evidence suggests that mixed strategies work better than coercive strategies on their own. For example, a recent study by Gitti Armani that examined some 22 cases of inducement and coercive strategies intended to change state behavior found that mixed strategies were three times more effective in promoting desired changes in state behavior than coercive measures alone.<sup>9</sup> In 1993 Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans made the case for a "tit-for-tat," carrot-and-stick strategy, arguing that sanctions should be progressively lifted as the target regime moved towards compliance with UN resolutions.<sup>10</sup> Evans noted that Commonwealth sanctions on South Africa were based on this conditionality principle. In a similar vein, in 1997 the General Assembly also called for the "progressive" lifting of sanctions as an inducement to compliance.

The case of the UN sanctions regime imposed on Libya in 1992 provides further suggestive evidence for the utility of inducements as a complement to coercion, though declining oil prices were also a factor. For years Tripoli had steadfastly refused to comply with UN demands to hand over two Libyan suspects to either Scottish or U.S. authorities. The Libyans were wanted for their alleged role in the 1988 Lockerbie air disaster. Libya argued that its citizens would not get a fair trial in Scotland, where the downed plane had crashed. Only in 1998, when the United States and United Kingdom eventually conceded that the trial could take place elsewhere, was the long process set in motion that eventually led to the suspects being handed over.

### Smart Sanctions

Today few dispute that sanctions are, to use Kofi Annan's words, a "blunt instrument," notwithstanding the measures introduced to alleviate their impact in terms of human suffering. One response to these concerns has been a rapid growth in support for the idea of "targeted," or "smart" sanctions. "Smart" sanctions, like "smart" weapons systems, are supposedly precision targeted and designed to reduce "collateral damage," that is, they are designed to coerce regimes without imposing major harm on ordinary citizens. Normal commercial trade would not be stopped under a smart sanctions regime, though particular categories of imports and exports might well be. Targeted sanctions may include:

- The freezing of overseas financial assets of government and regime members.
- Specific trade embargoes on arms, luxury goods, etc.
- Flight and travel bans.
- Political sanctions intended to stigmatize the target regime, including diplomatic isolation and withdrawal of accreditation.
- Denial of overseas travel, visas, and educational opportunities to regime members and their families.

The suspension of credits from national governments and from international institutions like the UN, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund and the denial or limitation of access to overseas financial markets have also been identified as possible smart-sanction options. However, unless targeted very carefully, such sanctions risk having the same harmful consequences as across-the-board trade sanctions. The advantages claimed for smart sanctions are considerable:

- They are morally appropriate: when directed against authoritarian states, the regime feels most of the pain, not the people.
- Minimizing human costs is not only a desirable goal in itself, it also makes the UN less vulnerable to charges that it subverts its own humanitarian commitments by imposing sanctions regimes that harm the innocent.



- Minimizing human costs also makes it more difficult for target regimes to rally foreign and domestic support against sanctions, as Iraq sought to do with some success.
- Because smart sanctions do not normally disrupt nonmilitary trade, they minimize costs to third-party states, reduce incentives to cheat, and thus make it easier to sustain the sanctions regime in the long term.
- In denying target regimes the black-market opportunities provided by comprehensive sanctions, smart sanctions reduce perverse incentives for elite members to benefit from sanctions.
- By reducing the need for humanitarian assistance, smart sanctions deny regimes the opportunities to extend their control over the population through control over the disbursement of aid.
- By reducing the impact on social infrastructures, smart sanctions also reduce long-term damage to educational and health systems and to the institutions or proto-institutions of civil society.

The appeal of smart sanctions is obvious, but they confront a number of difficulties. First, sanctions theory suggests that the greater the costs of sanctions to the regime, the greater the probability of compliance. Because they hit harder, comprehensive sanctions should, in principle, be far more effective than more selective targeted sanctions.<sup>11</sup> Second, monitoring and implementing limited trade bans is in some ways even more difficult than across-the-board trade bans, but the international community has not been very imaginative in this regard. Time-consuming and expensive border and ship searches may not be the only way to prevent “sanctions busting.” A market-incentive approach, as opposed to a regulatory one, could be more effective. Such an approach could involve rewards for information leading to the detection of sanctions violators. Fines imposed on violators could form a pool for the payment of rewards. This idea is similar in principle to the concept of “citizen verification” of arms control agreements that has some support in the arms control community and to the activities of human rights organizations that are in the forefront of human rights monitoring. Other creative ideas, such as passing legislation that would invalidate the insurance coverage of sanctions-busting companies, have been proposed but not yet implemented.

The third general problem with “smart” sanctions relates to the option that has generated the most interest and has the greatest potential economic impact, namely, freezing the overseas financial assets of governments and of regime members. An oft-cited example of the effectiveness of this approach is the freezing of Iranian financial assets in the United States during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980, but this case is of little relevance to the UN. The Security Council never imposes sanctions immediately; there is always debate that will forewarn transgressor regimes that sanctions may be applied. Moreover, many in the UN believe as a matter of principle that target states should be warned before sanctions are imposed. The net effect is that regimes under threat of sanctions will always have time to withdraw any overseas assets liable to be frozen before sanctions are implemented. “Targeting is difficult,” one commentator dryly observed, “if there is nothing to target.”

If sanctions are to be preceded by pre-assessment of their likely human impact as a number of reform proposals have suggested, then the warning time will be lengthened and opportunities to evade the financial sanctions increased still further. Freezing the overseas financial holdings of target regimes and elite members will be further hampered if fund ownership is disguised (thus negating the utility of name-recognition / searching software packages) or if the accounts are located in recalcitrant tax havens.

Supporters of comprehensive sanctions point out that, unlike financial sanctions, across-the-board trade embargoes, which are the sanctions with the greatest potential impact, cannot be evaded by forewarning. But nor can the suspension of credit, aid, and foreign investment--all options in the "smart" sanctions portfolio. However, sanctions against individuals cannot succeed or fail unless they are first attempted, and it is interesting to note in this context that during the 1990s the Security Council *never* mandated compulsory financial sanctions against individual members of a transgressor state. In Haiti the assets of individuals belonging to the regime *were* specifically targeted, but the Security Council resolution only "urged" states to freeze the funds in question. The resolution was not legally binding on member states.

Smart sanctions are certainly not the panacea that some of their less reflective advocates seem to believe, but nor are the problems they confront insuperable. A second Swiss-government-sponsored meeting on financial sanctions in Interlaken in March 1999 examined the key critiques of targeted financial sanctions and found them wanting. Thus, while financial assets can be readily moved electronically, their movements can be traced. If foreign currencies are repatriated to the sanctioned state, they cannot be seized by the international community, but neither can they be used by the target state without again sending them abroad, when they are again vulnerable to tracing and seizure. Notwithstanding the problems, financial sanctions were technically feasible, the experts concluded, and much could be learned from international experience in combating money laundering. The difficulties were not technical but political--securing the commitment to what needed to be done.

Following the Swiss-funded "Interlaken Process," Germany launched the Bonn / Berlin Process in 1999, which convened expert groups to examine how to improve arms embargoes and travel bans. The German program was succeeded in turn by the Stockholm Process, funded by Sweden, which focused on how targeted sanctions will be implemented and monitored. A report from this latter working group was presented to the Security Council early in 2003.

### ***Conclusion***

History suggests that only when the interests of major powers are engaged will sufficient economic and political resources be made available to enforce comprehensive sanctions effectively. But, as Iraq has so forcibly reminded us, effective enforcement can cause great suffering, and even sanctions whose impact is devastating do not necessarily achieve compliance. While "targeted" sanctions undoubtedly have a lesser impact than comprehensive sanctions because they focus on regimes rather than peoples, they also have far lower human and third-party costs. They are politi-

cally easier to initiate and to sustain in the long term and less likely to bring the sanctions instrument into disrepute. But even the most enthusiastic proponents of smart sanctions agree that more work is needed to evaluate their potential.

Among analysts there is broad agreement that sanctions should be seen as a tool of policy, not a substitute for it. To be effective, a sanctions regime must be guided by a coherent and comprehensive political strategy, one that seeks broad international support for the regime and minimization of the human costs it will inevitably incur. Such regimes should be implemented, monitored, and assessed with the aid of highly professional staff, while consideration should be given to the selective use of inducements as well as coercion. Unfortunately, these simple requirements are almost never met in practice.

Despite their critiques of current UN practice, none of the academic studies, nor even the most critical of the NGOs, argue that sanctions should be abandoned as an instrument of UN policy. Indeed, there is a widespread consensus that, when confronting major transgressions of international law, the international community needs an instrument of suasion that lies between mere diplomatic censure, on the one hand, and war, on the other. For this purpose there is no real alternative to sanctions. Major reform is needed, not wholesale rejection.

## Endnotes

\* The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

1 David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* (New York: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

2 Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberley Ann Elliot, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990). A revised and more up-to-date study was published in 1999. The broad findings of the earlier study were confirmed. See Cortright and Lopez (note 1 above), 15.

3 Kim Richard Nossal, "Liberal-Democratic Regimes, International Sanctions and Global Governance," in *Global Governance and Enforcement: Issues and Strategies* ed. Raimo Väyrynen (Lanham, M.D.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 127-149.

4 Elizabeth Gibbons, *Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy Under Assault*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington Papers 177 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999).

5 John Stremmlau, *Sharpening International Sanctions: Towards a Stronger Role for the United Nations* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, November 1996).

6 Cortright and Lopez, 5.

7 Richard Garfield, *Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 to 1998: Assessing the Impact of Economic Sanctions* (Notre Dame, IN: Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame and Fourth Freedom Foundation, March 1999). Available at <http://www.fourthfreedom.org/sanctions/garfield.html>.

8 See United Nations, *Annual Report on the Work of the Organization A/53/1*, para. 64. Available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report98/con98.htm>.

9 Gitty M. Armani, "A Larger Role for Positive Sanctions in Cases of Compellence?" Working Paper no. 12 (Los Angeles, CA: Center for International Relations, University of California, May 1997).

10 Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993).

11 Iraq's persistent defiance of the UN in the face of the most effective (in terms of impact) sanctions regime ever imposed on a modern state is not what sanctions theory would predict--or can easily explain. Even though individual regime members may have benefited from the sanctions-stimulated black market, there can be no doubt that the reduction in Iraq's material power that came with a halving of the Iraqi gross domestic product and the denial of arms imports would have been a serious blow to the regime.