

**A STATEMENT ON 'OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM' BEFORE THE HOUSE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMRGING THREATS AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (APRIL 21, 2004)**

By

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Mr. Chairman

On January 25, 2004 the Iraqi daily *Al-Mada* published a list of 270 individuals and entities who were beneficiaries of Saddam Hussein's oil vouchers. The Middle East Media Research Institute or MEMRI, translated the list from the Arabic and made it available to the non-Arabic readers on January 29.

Mr. Chairman

In my presentation I will address five questions that we have frequently been asked:

First: what are these oil vouchers and how were they used?

Second, who were the beneficiaries?

Third, is the list authentic?

Fourth, what other means did Saddam Hussein use to subvert the Oil for Food Program?

Fifth, could the administrators of the Oil for Food Program have been unaware of the regime's subversion of the Program?

I shall now answer the questions briefly and in that order.

First: The Nature and Use of the Oil Vouchers

In May, 2002, or two years before the oil vouchers achieved their present notoriety, MEMRI issued a special dispatch entitled "Iraq Buys and Smuggles its Way out of UN Sanctions." That dispatch catalogued techniques that were being used to subvert the Oil for Food Program, including the use of vouchers to buy friends.

In brief, Saddam Hussein granted oil vouchers to various beneficiaries -- individuals as well as public and governmental entities -- who could then sell them to oil dealers or agents operating from the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad. The agents would then sell the vouchers to oil companies which, in turn, would submit them to the State Oil Marketing Company or SOMO, to collect the oil. Both the beneficiary and the agent collected quick and handsome profits. A one million barrel voucher surrendered against \$0.25 per barrel earns \$250,000.

Second: The Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries were from 52 countries and included 19 political parties, and numerous politicians and journalists. Russia led the way among countries, with 46 recipients for a total of about 2.5 billion barrels. Significant individual recipients include the president of Indonesia, the prime minister of Libya, the former prime minister of Yemen, a former French minister of interior and Mr. Patrick Maugein who, according to French sources, is a financial supporter of French President Chirac.

Finally, the beneficiaries included the sons of the former Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, the President of Lebanon Emil Lehou, and the perennial Syrian minister of defense Mustapha Tlass.

Third: The Authenticity of the List

There is a propensity among totalitarian regimes to keep accurate records of their misdeeds. The first half of the last century provides several examples. Saddam's regime provides another.

What gives credence to the authenticity of the list is the statements by many of those implicated that they had received the vouchers for goods which they provided under the oil for food program. These statements are, at best, disingenuous. Under the Program, contracts had to be approved by the U.N., and upon the delivery of goods, the U.N. would reimburse the suppliers from the escrow account held at the French bank BNP-Paribas. No official contracts were financed by oil vouchers. Hence, if vouchers were granted they were given either as bribes or as payment for illicit goods, which could not be purchased under the Program itself.

Fourth: The Subversion of the Program by the Saddam Regime

Despite the sanctions, the regime of Saddam Hussein perfected a number of methods to sell oil for personal gains.

a. By Saddam Hussein's son, Uday, own admission, Iraq exported to Syria approximately 200,000-250,000 b/d through the Kirkuk Banias pipeline. Syria never denied it.

b. Trucks carried diesel oil from Kirkuk to southern Turkey. The Kurds who controlled northern Iraq were happy to collect transition fees

c. Small Iraqi ships carried crude oil across the Persian Gulf mainly to Qatar for transshipment elsewhere. Many were intercepted and quite a few sank causing environmental damage.

d. Grains and other food supplies imported under the program were re-exported

e. Legal shipments of oil were topped up by varying quantities with the excess sold for the benefit of the regime

f. Invoices were inflated—a practice commonly referred to as pricing transfer

Fifth: The Knowledge, if not the Complicity, of the UN Managers of the Program

On February 18, a month after the list was first published by *Al-Mada*, Mr. Shashi Tharoor, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information, wrote a letter to the editor of the *Wall Street Journal* professing ignorance of wrong doing. That letter makes two curious assertions. First, it protests, "No one at the United Nations has yet seen the original list." Note, please, that *Al-Mada* had published the list one month earlier.

Second, it offers an elaborate explanation of procedure. "The oil buyer had to pay the price approved by the Security Council Sanctions Committee into a U.N. escrow account, and the U.N. had to verify that the goods purchased by Iraq were indeed those allowed under the program." Mr. Tharoor then introduces the caveat: "But the U.N. had no way of knowing what other transactions might be going on directly between the Iraqi government and the buyers and sellers." Now comes the shocker: Mr. Tharoor says, "The program itself was managed strictly within the mandate given to it by the Security Council and was subject to nearly 100 different audits, external and internal, [I repeat, Mr. Tharoor says, "100 different audits"] between 1998 and 2003 and, as the secretary-general has said, this produced no evidence of any wrongdoing by the U.N. Official."

It is odd, indeed, that all these audits, paid for from \$1 billion collected by the UN to administer the program could not find one of the several infringements of the program that had been noted two years earlier by MEMRI – which has no access to official records.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

**BACKGROUND MATERIAL RELATING TO HEARINGS ON OIL FOR FOOD
PROGRAM TO BE HELD ON APRIL 21, 2004 BY THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL**

By

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Introduction

This document presents information and comments on the "Oil for Food Program" that appeared in various dispatches published by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) in the two years preceding "Operation Iraqi Freedom." The sources are almost entirely Iraqi and other Arabic newspapers, including the Iraqi daily *Babil* that was published by Saddam Hussein's son, *Uday*. Despite the strict control over the press in Iraq during the Saddam regime, *Uday* Saddam Hussein allowed himself to occasionally cross the red lines with impunity. Two examples illustrate this point. One was the publication in *Babil* of the exact amount of oil Iraq was shipping to Syria daily, and another was publicizing the resumption of oil shipment to Turkey by trucks, both transactions in violation of the sanctions regime.

The material presented in this paper will demonstrate that the Iraqi regime's violations of the "Oil for Food Program" were well documented and should have been evident to all and, in particular, to those who were responsible for administering the program [Annex I]. The publication by the Iraqi daily *Al-Mada* on January 25, 2004 of the list of individuals and entities that received oil vouchers from the regime [annex II] has only colored an already well-outlined picture.

MEMRI'S office in Baghdad forwarded the list of oil vouchers to the office in Washington, where it was translated and from which it was disseminated. As the only non-governmental research institute with an office in Baghdad, MEMRI was able to be the only source to publish the whole list as soon as it was published in Baghdad.

This report is based on the "Oil for Food Program" during the last two years of the Saddam's regime.

Attachment I: "Iraq Buys and Smuggles its Way out of UN Sanctions," MRMRI's Special Dispatch No. 382 of May 22, 2002.

Attachment II: The Saddam Oil Vouchers Affair, MEMRI's Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 164 of February 20, 2004.

Attachment III: Curriculum Vitae of Nimrod Raphaeli

I. The Subversion of the Oil for Food Program by the Iraqi Regime

Based on information pieced together from Arab (including Iraqi) press, MEMRL presented to its readers, at various times, comments and analysis concerning the methods used by the Iraqi regime, aided by, and in connivance, with traders and partners-in-corruption, to subvert the UN sanctions, in general, and the "Oil for Food Program," in particular.

This paper highlights some of these methods. It is by no means complete or comprehensive. As noted in the introduction, all the pieces in this paper are taken from earlier publications by MEMRL. As more Iraqi secret documents are made public, a clearer and more detailed picture will no doubt emerge. It suffices to note, however, that while the "Oil for Food Program" was ongoing, there was considerable detail available indicating subversion of the Program by Iraqi authorities—a problem which should have been addressed and remedied by the U.N., but was not. The investigation of the Program that has been promised by the Secretary General of the United Nations may shed further light on what occurred.

Special Deals for Friends of the Iraqi Regime

There is ample evidence that Iraq used the "Oil for Food Program" to acquire support among writers, artists, singers, and journalists across the Arab world and elsewhere. A "Special Dispatch" in 2002 by MEMRL entitled "Iraq Buys and Smuggles its Way out of UN Sanctions" highlights some of the violations by Iraq, including what would become known two years later as Saddam's Oil Vouchers made public by the Iraqi *Al-Mada* newspaper on January 25, 2004 and subsequently translated and issued with commentaries by MEMRL.²

As was reported in May 2002, one way to secure the support of politicians, intellectuals, artists and journalists was for the government to grant certain among some of them coupons or vouchers allowing them to receive a certain amount of oil, either free or at discounted prices. The recipient of the voucher would then use the services of various local agents, operating at the *Rashid Hotel* in Baghdad, to sell the voucher to a foreign company, allowing both the voucher holder and the local agent to earn a quick commission. The buyer of the voucher would submit it to SOMO (State Oil Marketing Organization) of Iraq, which, in turn, would supply the oil either through one of Iraq's oil terminals or through the Iraqi-Syrian oil pipeline [see below]. The buyer would be responsible for the shipping.

When the list of the 270 recipients of oil vouchers was published many of those who were on the list argued that the vouchers were given to them in compensation for goods and services delivered to Iraq under the "Oil for Food Program." Such protests are disingenuous: suppliers of

goods and services under contracts approved by the U.N. were reimbursed by the U.N. against the escrow account in which oil revenues were deposited. While oil vouchers may, indeed, have been provided by the regime to suppliers of goods and services, such payment will have been for goods and services provided outside the framework of the "Oil for Food Program" and may have covered any range of weapons, weapon equipment or other illicit or luxury goods that, by definition, would not have qualified for financing under the Program.

The Qatar Channel

There were other ways, sometimes quite efficient and definitely rewarding, for the Iraqi government to subvert the sanctions regime. Most of the trading companies in Iraq were owned by members of the ruling *Ba'ath Party* or their children, trade unions, political activists, and media personalities, who turned these companies into "a large political bazaar." Foreign trading companies, which for one reason or another were not allowed to do business directly with the government of Iraq, operated through Iraqi representatives with political clout. Some traders, particularly those from Qatar, entered into contracts through these agents to buy smuggled Iraqi oil at a discounted price. Once the oil reached Qatar, it was issued a new "certificate of origin" and sold into the international markets. In one year, Kuwait seized more than 20 vessels and small tankers of various sizes carrying oil and goods from Iraq in violations of the sanctions.⁴ Given that the U.S. Navy was also active in the Gulf, it most likely has a list of oil-carrying vessels which it intercepted.

One problem is that many of the ships used for oil smuggling were not seaworthy and caused serious environmental damage to the Gulf.⁵ According to the *International Maritime Bureau*, smugglers sailed their ships at night through the *Shatt Al-Arab* waterway between Iraq and Iran. When intercepted, often by U.S. navy ships, they claimed to be heading for Iranian ports. At some point, they turned north and picked up the oil at Iraqi terminals. They sailed back through Iranian waters, sometimes paying a transit fee on the way. Another source claims that the smugglers paid Iran \$50 per metric ton as a tariff for using Iran's territorial waters.⁶

Surcharge on Oil

A major volume of illicit income was derived from the special surcharge of \$0.25-\$0.40 levied by SOMO (the Sate Oil Marketing Organization) on each barrel of oil sold by Iraq. While this surcharge was illegal under the UN sanctions regime, most traders were prepared to pay it to maintain good relations with SOMO because oil from Southern Iraq, light crude with very low sulfur content, is highly desired by California refineries.

To attack the surcharges and ensure that prices were market related, the United States proposed that Iraqi oil should be priced every 15 days – and the United Kingdom proposed every 10 days. The introduction of the *ex post* pricing system was intended to eliminate the illegal reimbursements by buyers to the Iraqi authorities for the difference between the official and the market price of oil which would have been feasible if oil was priced at the point of departure. Iraq argued that it was losing traders who could not earn profit because of the *ex post* pricing mechanism, but these arguments were never considered too serious.⁷ In fact, there was no evidence that the *ex post* pricing of oil had impacted the volume of oil exports.

It is ironic, however, that while the U.S. was trying to eliminate the surcharge on Iraqi oil exports, it had become the largest consumer of Iraqi oil which represented about 9% of its oil imports. *Valero Energy* and *Chevron/Texaco* were the two largest American oil companies which bought Iraqi oil. American companies bought 790,000 b/d of Iraqi oil in 2001, or about half of the Iraqi oil for sale under the "Oil for Food Program." Between July and December of 2001, 70% of Iraqi oil was refined in American refineries. While the U.S. could purchase oil directly from Iraq under the Program, Iraq preferred to sell its oil to the U.S. through intermediaries and petroleum brokers, principally Russian.⁸

"Topping Up" of Oil Shipments

Although U.N. officials were responsible for monitoring the export of Iraqi oil under the "Oil for Food Program" and for keeping records of such exports, it was commonly known that, in connivance with some oil tanker owners, Iraq would add an additional amount of oil to legitimate oil shipments for its own account. There were many instances of "topping up" but there is no record of the amount or frequency. In one instance, the Iraqi government arrested five officials of SOMO for engaging in topping up for their own benefit, or so the Iraqi government said.

Pricing Transfer

Under the "Oil for Food Program," oil revenues were deposited in an escrow account at BNP-Paribas which was administered by the United Nations ostensibly to prevent Iraq from using these revenues to buy weapons, weapon-related equipment, or a whole range of goods and material that were thought likely to strengthen the Iraqi military capability. One should add in parenthesis that the establishment of the escrow account at a French bank was done at Saddam's insistence that oil exports should be transacted in *euro* as a "punishment to the United States." The special account reimbursed the exporters and suppliers for goods exported to Iraq after advance approval by the U.N. However, it was the Iraqi government which negotiated the deals with the exporters or suppliers. At that stage, the two sides (the government and the exporters) connived to add a big margin, a minimum of 10%, to the negotiated price. This additional margin of illicit profit [known in business as *pricing transfer*] was then paid, often in cash, to the Iraqi treasury or to an individual beneficiary, most likely Saddam Hussein himself or a member of his immediate family, designated by the Iraqi government.

Re-Exporting of Goods and Commodities Imported under the Program

A common method of subverting the sanctions regime was to import commodities under the "Oil for Food Program" in excess of national demand. Cereals, mainly wheat and barley, were imported and sold to local merchants who, then, exported them as a domestic commodity. In the process, someone collected a commission on the imports, took a profit on the re-export, and, in the process, paid the cost of the reshipment. There were instances, however, when what was re-exported was not necessarily a surplus commodity but a vital food commodity, such as milk powder meant for Iraqi children. When the Kuwaiti authorities seized a shipment of milk powder from Iraq, the Iraqis were quick to announce that the powder was not of high enough quality for local consumption.

Oil Smuggling through Syria

As part of an effort to break its isolation, Iraq initiated, shortly after the launching of the "Oil for Food Program" in the second half of the 1990s, a trade and diplomatic offensive aimed at gaining the support of the Arab countries. With rapidly expanding imports, thanks both to licit and illicit oil revenues, Iraq was able to offer trade incentives though negotiating bi-lateral free trade agreements. In essence, these agreements represented a one-way flow of goods and products into Iraq since Iraq had little to sell to the other side. In the case of the bi-lateral trade agreement with Syria, it meant shifting transit trade from the Port of *Aqaba* in Jordan to the Syrian Port of *Latakia* on the Mediterranean, opening of the borders (Iraqi officials were instructed to travel abroad via Damascus instead of Amman), renewing the rail connection between Mosul, in the North of Iraq and Aleppo (after an interruption of 20 years) and, most importantly, shipping Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline at discounted prices. Neither side was forthcoming about the volume or pricing of the Iraqi oil shipped to Syria or about the payment mechanisms. The data on the revenues derived from the sale of the oil are not known, in the first place, because the transactions were illegal under the UN sanctions regime and, also, because much of these revenues may have been deposited into the private accounts of Saddam Hussein and his family in multiple banks. In such illicit transactions there are many hidden beneficiaries, including, probably, some on the Syrian side, but it is unlikely that their identity will become known any time soon. Iraq itself had strict rules governing the dissemination of economic data, including figures from the annual budget, and revealing such data was punishable by death.

The Volume of Iraqi Oil Export to Syria

Quoting *Energy Intelligence Journal*, the Iraqi newspaper *Babil* said that in 2001, "without a UN green light," Iraq was exporting to Syria, 222,000 b/d. This figure was arrived at through a deductive process. Syria was producing 510,000 b/d and using 295,000 b/d for local consumption. This left a surplus of 215,000 b/d. However, Syria was exporting 437,000 b/d, thereby exceeding the local surplus by 222,000 b/d. That volume, according to *Babil*, was being filled by the Iraqi imports through the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline.⁹ International petroleum sources have revealed to the London-based *Al-Hayat* newspaper that the Iraqi oil exports to Syria in February 2003 had reached a record of 253,000 b/d.

Syria has always argued that the oil arriving at its port of Banias was meant to test the technical capacity of the pipeline. After becoming a member of the Security Council on January 1, 2002 and, hence, a member of the Sanctions Committee on Iraq, Syria insisted it would not violate the sanctions regime. As a member of the Security Council Syria would often argue that the Iraqi oil it was receiving was "a gift" from Iraq for consumption by the Syrian people. It was a gift worth in excess of \$500 million annually. For Iraq, that was a small price to pay to earn another friend, in addition to France, Russia and China, on the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council.¹⁰ When asked about the smuggling of Iraqi oil to Syria, Iraq's minister of Oil, *Amer Rashid*, answered that Iraq sought to strengthen its relations with all its neighbors, and that the development of economic relations between Iraq and its neighbors was a right exercised by Iraq as an independent and sovereign country, "regardless of American hegemony." At no time had Iraq denied the illicit sale of oil to Syria.

Despite a record of program subversion, Iraq loudly demanded reforms of the system. Iraq asked the United Nations to instruct the Sanctions Committee to stop its financial violations and the

Iraq Calls on Sanctions Committee to Stop Financial Violations

At the conclusion of the negotiation, the Iraqi government announced that, under the new agreement, Iraq would provide Jordan 5.5 million tons of oil in 2002, or 10 percent more than in the previous year at an estimated cost of \$650 million; Jordan would pay 50 percent of the cost through exports (barter arrangement) and would receive the remaining 50 percent as "a gift" from Saddam Hussein.¹³

In late 2001, Jordan and Iraq negotiated a new agreement on the supply of Iraqi oil to Jordan. Jordan's demands were twofold: first, that the price of oil set at \$21.50 p/b, established in the 2000 agreement be reduced to reflect new market prices; and second, that half the oil supplied by Iraq continue to be supplied free as 'a gift from the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.'

Iraq and Jordan Sign a New Oil Agreement

Oil was also trucked to Jordan. However, the sale of oil to Jordan was exempted from the sanctions regime by the United Nations. And, in any event, Jordan received half the oil free as "a gift from President Saddam Hussein" and paid a discounted price for the other half. It was also reported at the time that the road between Amman and Baghdad was crowded with cargo shipments and oil tankers. Big transactions, generating big profits, were common. The Iraqi leadership was famous for its "generosity" toward those who supported its causes, and its financing of Jordanian newspapers was well-known. Journalists who received their salaries from the Iraqi embassy in Amman could be critical of the Jordanian government and even of the Jordanian royal institution but never of Iraq. Another way of supporting Jordanian newspapers was through commercial contracts. In one instance, Iraq contracted with a Jordanian newspaper to publish Iraqi schoolbooks. In another instance, a Jordanian newspaper was contracted to print all official stationary for Iraqi ministries. The Jordanian government was a shareholder in some of these public enterprises and ultimately benefited from these transactions.

The Jordanian Channel

The Turkish daily *Milliyet* reported that, on February 5, 2002, the office of the Turkish chief of staff sent a secret report to Turkey's prime minister requesting an end to the smuggling of diesel and crude oil from Iraq to Turkey. According to the report, 120,000 tons of crude oil were smuggled into Turkey in 2001, and the PKK members and their terrorist organizations refined it. The report estimated that this operation netted the PKK 330 billion Turkish liras (approx. \$15 million) a year and allowed it to generate more money from investment.¹²

Iraq announced that effective January 7, 2002, Turkish tankers, after a brief hiatus, would be able to cross the Iraqi border again to carry Iraqi diesel oil to Turkey. The newspaper *Babil*, published by Saddam Hussein's son Uday, commented, rather cynically, that "while the trade in diesel is a technical violation of the embargo imposed by the United Nations, the Western countries will turn a blind eye to this lucrative trade which is essential for Turkey whose economy is in serious crisis."¹¹

Trucking Oil to Turkey

In a news analysis in the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram*, analyst *Adel Ibrahim* wrote that while an oil embargo resulting inevitably in oil prices could harm the U.S. economy – such an embargo would lead to economic harm to the oil producing countries themselves which they could ill afford, given the present international economic conditions. He asked whether the Arab countries could repeat the "surprise" or the "shock" of 1973 when the oil embargo was introduced to coincide with the October war of that year. His answer was that repeating that exercise would not be feasible because, with rising competition from Russia, Norway, Angola, Mexico and the countries on the Caspian Sea Basin, OPEC had lost its considerable leverage

The call by Saddam Hussein for an oil embargo against the United States and its allies received no support from oil producing countries, either Arab or Muslim, if one excludes lip service as meaningful support.

Is the Oil Embargo Feasible?

After the immediate nervous market reaction which boosted oil prices on that day by about 10 percent, realities and common sense began to set it, and the price of oil fell approximately 19 percent by the end of the first week after Iraq's announcement. There may be two reasons for the markets to have so quickly regained their composure: first, other oil exporters, particularly Saudi Arabia, offered assurances that oil flow would not be affected by political considerations; and second, the Iraqi decision ironically coincided with the news that OPEC members had exceeded their quota in March by 1.3 million barrel per day¹⁴ which is approximately equivalent to the size of the Iraqi oil export under the "Oil for Food Program." Iraq's decision remained completely localized; no other oil exporter followed Iraq's lead. Faced with this reality, the Iraqi Oil Minister, *Amer Muhammad Rashid*, could only beg other oil producing countries, "at a minimum do not increase your oil production."¹⁵ Feeling isolated on the subject, Saddam Hussein addressed another speech on April 22 to "Arab brothers, kings, presidents, emirs and officials" imploring them to reduce oil production by 50% "and directly deprive the U.S. and [the] Zionist entity from the other exported half..."¹⁶

Underlying the suspension of oil exports were four unstated objectives: first, was an attempt to destabilize the international oil market; second, to embarrass the conservative regimes of the Gulf; third, to appear as the true defender of the Palestinian people; and fourth, to try to appear as someone who was still to be reckoned with. Like most previous "dramatic statements" by Saddam, this one appeared to be based more on miscalculations than on political or economic wisdom. It was obvious that no Arab leader would associate himself at the time with a major Saddam initiative regardless of its intrinsic value, and this particular initiative had no value of any kind.

On April 8, 2002, hardly 48 hours after President Bush and Prime Minister Blair declared that Saddam Hussein would be removed from office, Saddam announced, as a part of a speech made to the "heroic and glorious" people of the "Great Iraq," that the country's oil exports would be suspended for one month, effective immediately in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

II. Saddam's Oil Embargo

waste of oil revenues used for the "Oil for Food Program." It demanded that the committee employ the services of the Iraqi national audit agency that had a distinguished record and expert auditors.

over oil supply. He cited the creation in 1974 of the International Energy Agency (a consumer organization headquartered in Paris) which has sought to reduce the world dependency on Arab oil through strategic stockpiling, technological advances and cost reduction. More importantly, OPEC was on record that it would not use oil as a political weapon.¹⁷

Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia which is the largest exporter of oil in the world, stressed that the Arab countries depend on their oil exports for economic growth. He said oil "is not a weapon like a gun or a tank but a resource that benefits the national economy." He concluded, "We are in a war with an enemy [Saddam] and the first thing this enemy will do will be to destroy our oilfields."¹⁸

Iraq's newspaper *Babil* which, as mentioned above, was published by Saddam's son, Uday, quoted Russian sources as saying that Iraq's decision was "a mistake."¹⁹

III. The UN and "Oil for Food Program"

UN Director of "Oil for Food" Calls for Reforms

Iraqi newspaper *Babil*²⁰ reported on the conclusion of a 25-day visit to Iraq of Benon Sevan, the Director of the "Oil for Food Program." He told reporters in Baghdad that the program required "continuous reform." He said it was necessary for the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee to review the instruments used in applying the program and to consider the necessary changes that would meet the needs of the Iraqi people. He expressed his regret that the program "suffers from paralysis." Following his meeting with Sevan, Iraq's Vice President, *Taha Yassin Ramadan* declared, "We call on the United Nations to exercise its role to ensure proper implementation of the memorandum of understanding on the 'Oil for Food Program.'"

Sevan said that there was no substitute for the program as long as the sanctions existed. Regrettably, he was quoted saying, "the program cannot be kept independent of the on-going political debate about Iraq." While in Iraq, Sevan visited both the northern and southern regions of the country. These two regions were guaranteed a certain percentage of the program, not subject to Iraqi government's control.

Commenting on Sevan's visit, the official government newspaper *Al-Thawra*²¹ wrote:

...the so-called humanitarian program has changed from an instrument to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people to an instrument to harm it. Indeed it has turned into a weapon to wage war on Iraq and to impede its economic growth and scientific and cultural progress. And this has been rejected by the **honest employees of the United Nations** [bold added]...including Messrs, Dennis Haliday, Hans von Sponeck, and Dr. Ashraf Biomi.

Both Haliday (Irish national) followed by von Sponeck (German national) served as UN representatives in Iraq for humanitarian affairs following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and Iraq in 1996 and both, up to the fall of the Saddam regime, made numerous speeches and gave a large number of interviews, many on American TV stations, denouncing the U.N. sanctions as harmful to the people of Iraq but never uttered a critical word about the regime abuses of the "Oil for Food Program" or about the regime itself.

The two UN officials could not have been unaware of the abuses of the program, nor of the Saddam regime.

The Involvement of other U.N. Specialized Agencies

While most of the US focus has been on the United Nations management of the "Oil for Food Program," other parts of the U.N. were indirectly involved as suppliers of services and commodities. In recent weeks, as more documents are becoming available, Iraqi officials have begun to point a finger at the performance of the United Nations specialized agencies in Iraq during the "Oil for Food Program."

A senior official in the Iraqi Governing Council has recently accused unnamed senior agency officials of financial infringements worth millions of dollars. He said that the Ministry of Agriculture possesses documents that provide irrefutable evidence of serious intractions on the part of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Two examples illustrate the point. In 2001, Kurdistan needed to import chemical fertilizers for its agriculture. FAO, which is headquartered in Rome, bought the fertilizers for \$7 million from an Italian company despite an offer from an Egyptian firm to provide the same quantity of fertilizers and of the same quality for one-fifth of the cost charged by the Italian company. FAO also imported, in 2002, 1985 model tractors after having them painted in Jordan to give them a newer look. When the London daily, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* which reported the story, asked the source as to why there had been no complaints, the source replied that FAO officials had threatened to cancel the program altogether.²² It should be pointed out that UN agencies normally charge a minimum of 15 per cent as overheads when they enter into what is known as "executing agency" arrangements with one of the UN funding agencies.

The alleged looting of Iraq by the FAO is reported to have been extensive. The daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* mentions by name Amir Khalil, the head of the agency in Iraq, who staffed the agency with six Sudanese nationals out of seven expatriate staff in coordination with Saddam's mukhabarat.

A recent article in the daily *Al-Itihad*²³ of the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) singled out for special criticism the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children Organization (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and United Nations Human Settlement Organization (HABITAT).


The paper argues that most of these UN agencies have been penetrated by elements of the Iraqi *mukhabarat* (intelligence services) which sought to recruit most of their employees, particularly the non-Europeans. Iraqi nationals would have difficulty serving in any of these organizations had they not agreed to collaborate with the Mukhabarat. While the U.N. agencies cannot be blamed for the action of the Iraqi mukhabarat, the paper does accuse them of malfeasance. The paper offers the following examples:

UNICEF organized international demonstrations and protests and the collection of millions of dollars under the banner of protecting the children of Iraq from the effects of the sanctions. The demonstrations were organized under the false pretense that hundreds of Iraqi children were dying because of shortage of medicine and milk. In fact, rather than being spent for the needs of

the children, Iraqi capital was being smuggled to international banks for the benefit of the regime or for buying the consciences of writers, artists and journalists to sing the praise of the regime. At the same time, UNICEF was silent about the killing of thousands of Iraqi children as a result of the forced deportation of Kurdish families and the draining the Iraqi marshes in the south of the country.

Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 986 about "Oil for Food" program, the United Nations World Food Program played a key role in supplying Iraq with food. Under the demands of the regime, imports were limited to Arab countries and friends of the regime regardless of the quality of the food products imported. As an example, an Egyptian trader Mr. Jilda [Imad al-Jilda who is listed in Annex II as having received oil vouchers for 14 million barrels] was given a monopoly for exporting Egyptian food stock to Iraq. Mr. Jilda also brought to Iraq a large number of Egyptian artists and dancers to entertain the Iraqi leadership. Egyptian food exports to Iraq reached \$4 billion in 2001. According to *Al-Itihad*, Mr. Benon Sevan, the executive director of the program, was aware of these abuses but remained silent for unknown reasons.

¹ See Annex I.
² See Annex II.
³ Late 2001, the son of Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy Prime Minister, was sentenced to 6 months in prison for allegedly double-crossing Saddam's son, Uday, in a business transaction.
⁴ MEMRI Economic News Report, November 11, 2001.
⁵ The International Maritime Bureau has called for increased port controls by Gulf States in a bid to stop unseaworthy vessels smuggling oil out of Iraq and reduce the risk of collisions and oil spills. Ships carrying the flags of Albania, Belize, Bolivia, Cambodia, Comoros, Georgia, Honduras, Maldives, Mauritius, St. Vincent and Grenadines have all been involved in oil smuggling. http://www.iccwo.org/ccs/news_archives/2001/Iraq.asp.
⁶ "Iraq: Oil Smuggling Produces High Profits," www.rferl.org/nc/features/2000/06/F_RU.000621122248.html.
⁷ MEMRI Economic News Report, September 5, 2001.
⁸ MEMRI Middle East Economic News and Report, March 11, 2002.
⁹ MEMRI Middle East Economic News and Report, December 31, 2001.
¹⁰ MEMRI Economic News Report, October 26, 2001.
¹¹ MEMRI Middle East Economic News and Report, January 7, 2002.
¹² MEMRI, Iraq New Wire, May 18, 2002.
¹³ MEMRI Middle East Economic News and Report, December 31, 2001.
¹⁴ *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (London), and *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), April 10, 2002.
¹⁵ *Babil* (Iraq), April 15, 2002.
¹⁶ *Babil*, April 23, 2002.
¹⁷ *Al-Ahram* (Egypt), April 6, 2002.
¹⁸ *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), April 20, 2002.
¹⁹ *Babil*, April 9, 2002.
²⁰ *Babil*, February 12, 2002.
²¹ *Al-Thawra* (Iraq), February 12, 2002.
²² *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, February 14, 2004.
²³ *Al-Itihad*, February 23, 2004.



Iraq Buys and Smuggles Its Way Out of UN Sanctions

In an article published recently in the London-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat, reporter 'Hazem Al-Amin exposes the manner in which Iraqi authorities subvert the sanctions regime in an effort to buy friendships and, at the same time, earn illicit income. According to Al-Amin, two interrelated instruments are used for this purpose: First, the "Oil for Food" program administered by the United Nations, and second, the smuggling of oil, primarily through Syria, but also through Jordan and Turkey and via waterways. The following is a summary of Al-Amin's article:

equipment and supplies. The special account reimburses the exporters and suppliers for goods exported to Iraq after advance approval by the U.N. However, it is the Iraqi government which negotiates the deals with the exporters or suppliers. At that stage, the two sides (the government and the exporters) connive to add a big margin, a minimum of 10%, to the negotiated price. This additional margin of illicit profit (known in business as pricing transfer) is then transferred in cash to the Iraqi treasury or to an individual beneficiary designated by the government.

Another way of subverting the sanctions regime is to import commodities under the "Oil for Food" program which are not needed for local markets but are re-exported by the government to earn illicit cash. A good example is importing wheat which is then resold to local merchants who export it as a domestic commodity. Iraq then resells the wheat at a lower price than it cost to import, as the government must allow a margin of profit for local trading companies and for the cost of reshipment.

Oil Smuggling

There are other ways, sometimes even more efficient, for the Iraqi government to subvert the sanctions

The Jordanian Channel

Iraq's relationship with Jordan is a case in point. The road between Amman and Baghdad is crowded with cargo shipments and oil tankers. Big transactions, generating big profits, are common. The Iraqi leadership is famous for its "generosity" toward those who support its causes and its financing of Jordanian newspapers is well-known. Journalists who receive their salaries from the Iraqi embassy can be critical of the Jordanian government and even of the Jordanian royal institution but never of Iraq. Another way of supporting Jordanian newspapers is through commercial contracts. In one instance, Iraq contracted a Jordanian newspaper to publish Iraqi schoolbooks. In another instance, a Jordanian newspaper was contracted to print all official stationary for Iraqi ministries. Al-Amin points out that the Jordanian government is a shareholder in these newspapers and ultimately benefits from these transactions.

Trade Manipulations

Under the "Oil for Food" program, oil revenues are deposited in a special account administered by the United Nations to allegedly prevent Iraq from using these revenues to buy weapons or weapon-related

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regime. As in many other developing countries, Amin points out, "politics and trade are indistinguishable," particularly in view of the fact that the ruling elites often control the economy and monopolize economic activities. In Iraq, most of the trading companies are owned by members of the ruling Ba'ath Party or their children, trade unions, activists, and media personalities, who turn these companies into "a large political bazaar."² Foreign trading companies, which are not allowed to do business directly with the government of Iraq, operate through an Iraqi representative with political clout. Some traders, particularly those from Qatar, enter into contracts through these agents to buy smuggled Iraqi oil at a discounted price. Once the oil reaches Qatar, it is issued a new "certificate of origin" and sold into the international markets.

The problem is that many of the ships used for oil smuggling are unseaworthy and cause serious environmental damage to the Gulf.³ According to the International Maritime Bureau, smugglers sail their ships at night through the Shatt Al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran, claiming to be heading for Iranian ports; then they turn north and pick up the oil at Iraqi terminals. They go back through Iranian waters, sometimes paying a transit fee on the way. Another study claims that the smugglers pay Iran \$50 a metric ton for a tariff to use Iran's waters.

Special Deals for Friends of the

Iraqi Regime

There is ample evidence that Iraq uses the "Oil for Food" program to acquire support among writers, artists, singers, and journalists across the Arab world. One way to secure their support, according to an Iraqi official who fled to Amman, is for the government to grant individuals a coupon which allows them to

¹ Al-Hayat, May 8, 2002.

² Late last year, the son of Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy Prime Minister, was sentenced to 6 months in prison for allegedly double-crossing Saddam's son, Uday, in a business transaction. ³ The International Maritime Bureau has called for increased port controls by Gulf States in a bid to stop unseaworthy vessels smuggling oil out of Iraq and reduce the risk of collisions and oil spills. Ships carrying the flags of Albania, Belize, Bolivia, Cambodia, Comoros, Georgia, Honduras, Maldives, Mauritius, St. Vincent and Grenadines have all been involved in oil

receive a certain amount of oil either free or at discounted prices. The beneficiary of the coupon uses the services of a local agent to sell the coupon to a foreign company. The buyer of the coupon submits it to SOMO (State Oil Marketing Organization) of Iraq, which, in turn, will pump the oil through the Iraqi-Syrian oil pipeline for the benefit of the buyer who is responsible for shipping the oil. There are various estimates about the volume of Iraqi oil exports to Syria through the Kirkuk-Banjan pipeline but it is probably close to \$250,000 b/d.⁵ The potential to use this money for Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction is enormous.

An additional form of illicit income is the special surcharge of \$0.25-0.40 levied by SOMO on each barrel of oil sold by Iraq. While this surcharge is illegal under the UN sanctions regimes, most traders are prepared to pay it to maintain good relations with SOMO. The many efforts by the UN to insist on an ex post-pricing regime of the Iraqi oil have apparently failed.

New Sanctions Regime - No Real

Change

On May 14, the Security Council approved a revised sanctions regime on Iraq. While Iraq is still denied access to items that may be used for dual (military as well as civilian) purposes, such as heavy trucks and communications equipment, it may import everything else subject to a quick review by the Security Council.

As has been the case since the "Oil for Food" program was introduced in 1996, oil revenues will continue to be deposited in the special account administered by the UN, and Iraq will, no doubt, continue to play its old tricks to subvert the system and generate illicit revenues.

smuggling.
http://www.icwbo.org/ccs/news_archives/2001/Iraq.asp.
⁴ "Iraq: Oil Smuggling Produces High Profits," www.rterl.org/nca/features/2000/06/F.RU.000621122248.html.
⁵ Al-Hayat, February 2 and February 14, 2002; and <http://www.al-jazeera.com/economics/>, February 22-3, 2002. A recent study by *The Wall Street Journal* (May 2, 2002) suggests that Iraq receives at least \$1 billion annually from its oil exports to Syria.

The Saddam Oil Vouchers Affair

By Dr. Nimrod Raphael*

Introduction

On January 25, 2004, the Iraqi independent daily *Al-Mada* published a list of approximately 270 individuals and entities who were beneficiaries of Saddam Hussein's oil vouchers.¹ The report evoked reactions from many of those included in the list as well as from the Arab media, among them apologists for Saddam's regime. The fact that so many have opted for silence may give credence to the list's authenticity.

A former undersecretary in the Iraqi Ministry of Petroleum, Abd Al-Sahab Salaman Qutb, said that the ministry possesses documents proving the authenticity of the list published by *Al-Mada*. The list was originally the property of the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), which was responsible for marketing Iraqi petroleum.² Mr. Qutb also said that the ministry was collecting the information for submission to Interpol, which could then pursue the voucher beneficiaries.³

The Iraqi Governing Council has focused on 46 foreign individuals and organizations included on the lists, primarily from neighboring countries, to determine appropriate action.⁴ Council member Muwafiq Al-Rabi'i said during a visit to Beirut that the council has "tons of documents" but emphasized that the publication of these documents will be handled in a constructive way and not "for the sake of vengeance and revenge."⁵

In describing what it called "the curse of the Iraqi vouchers," the London Arabic-language daily *Al-Hayat* said that it expects more names and details to be made public in the near future and anticipates the revelation of a scandal of vast dimensions transcending countries and continents, implicating many prominent individuals and organizations.⁶

How It Worked: The Voucher Transactions Method

In a subsequent article, *Al-Mada* provides details on the allocation and sale of oil vouchers. In general, the vouchers were given either as gifts or as payment for goods imported into Iraq in violation of the U.N. sanctions. The voucher holder would normally tender the voucher to any one of the specialized companies operating in the United Arab Emirates for a commission which initially ranged from \$0.25 to \$0.30 per barrel, though it may have declined in later years to as little as \$0.10 or even \$0.05 per barrel because of oil surplus on the market.⁷ In other words, a voucher for 1 million barrels would have translated into a quick profit of \$250,000-300,000 on the high side and \$50,000-100,000 on the low side – all paid in cash. According to *Al-Mada*, Jordan will seek to tax the illicit profits of citizens who benefited from the sale of the vouchers.

One of the common arguments by recipients of vouchers was that the vouchers paid for goods provided in the framework of the U.N.-administered Oil for Food program. However, under the Memorandum of Understanding governing the program, oil allocations were intended for "end users," meaning those with refineries. Most of the

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voucher recipients would be considered "non-end users." Moreover, if vouchers were used to pay for goods, it would suggest that these were not authorized by the program and should be considered illicit since all contracts approved by the U.N. were reimbursed from the trust account where the oil revenues were kept, at a French bank, at Iraq's insistence. According to the United Nations: "The oil buyer had to pay the price approved by the Security Council Sanctions Committee into a U.N. escrow account, and the U.N. had to verify that the goods purchased by Iraq were indeed those allowed under the program. But the U.N. had no way of knowing what other transactions might be going on directly between the Iraqi government and the buyers and sellers."⁸

This report reviews the Saddam oil vouchers affair, in two parts:

Part I: (A) the list of oil vouchers recipients; and (B) reactions by implicated individuals and organizations.

Part II: Arab media reactions.

The Saddam Oil Vouchers Affair, Part I:

A. Complete List of Recipients of Oil Vouchers (in alphabetical order by country)

(All numbers for barrels of oil unless indicated otherwise)

All names on the list were transliterated from the Arabic. Although every effort was made to be precise, some inaccuracy is inevitable.

Country	Recipient	Quantity
Algeria	1. Abd Al-Majid Al-Attar	6 million
	2. Abd Al-Qadr bin Mussa	6 million
Austria	1. Hans Kogler	2 million
	2. Arab-Austrian Committee	1 million
Bangladesh	1. Mawana Abd Al-Manan	43.2 million
Bahrain	1. Kadhém Al-Darazi Company	2 million
	2. Ali Al-Muslim Company	3 million
	3. Concrete Contracting Company	2 million
Belarus	1. Liberal Party	6 million
	2. Belarus Communist Party	7 tons
	3. Belminal Company	14.2 million
	4. Belfarm Company	4 million
	5. Chief of the President's Bureau	6 million
Brazil	6. Lada Company	2 million
Canada	1. Fuad Sirhan	10 million
	2. October 8 Movement (Chavez)	4.5 million
Bulgaria	1. Arthur Milliholland	9.6 million
	1. The Socialist Party of Bulgaria	12 million

2 million

2. Arak Pau

Chad

1. Chad Foreign Minister

3 million

China

1. Mr. Juan

39.1 million

2. NoreSCO

17.5 million

3. Zank Ronk

13 million

4. Biorg

13.5 million

5. South Holken

1 million

Cyprus

1. Muhammad Al-Hawny

17 million

2. Nefra Petroleum

13.2 million

3. Continental

1 million

Egypt

1. Ancom Co. (Muhammad Shatta)

14 million

2. Abd Al-Adham Manaf

6 million

3. Khaled Gamal Abd Al-Nasser

16.5 million

4. Imad Al-Jilda

14 million

5. Muhammad Salah

7 million

6. Muhammad Hilmi

4.5 million

7. Arab Company Limited

6 million

8. Nile & Euphrates Co.

3 million

9. Mahmoud Mahdi Al-Ma'sarawi

7 million

10. Al-Hami Bashanti Foundation

2 million

11. International Multaqaf Foundation

2 million

France

1. ADDAX

8.3 million

2. Tafioura Patrick Maugein

25 million

3. Michel Grimard

17 million

4. Franco-Iraqi Friendship

15.1 million

5. Ayix

47.2 million

6. Charles Pasqua

12 million

7. Alias Al-Gharzali

14.6 million

8. IOTC (Claude Caspert)

4 million

9. Jean-Bernard Merimee

3 million

10. Jean-Bernard Merimee

8 million

11. de Souza

11 million

Hungary

1. Hungarian Interest Party

4.7 million

India

1. Biham Singh

5.5 million

2. Indian Congress Party

4 million

Indonesia

1. Daughter of President Sukarno 2 million
2. Hawa Atlantic 2 million
3. Makram Hakim 3 million
4. Megawati 8 million
5. Muhammad Amin Rayzis 4 million
6. Natuna Oil 2 million

Ireland

1. Riyadh Al-Taher 11 million
2. Afro-Eastern 2 million

Italy

1. Roberto Frimagoni 24.5 million
2. Salvatore Nicotra 20 million
3. Mr. Feloni 6.5 million
4. Father Benjamin 4.5 million
5. West Petrol 2 tons
6. Hetralk 2 tons
7. FPS (Italian Petroleum Assoc.) 1 million

Jordan

1. Leith Shbeilat 15.5 million
2. Fakhri Qa'war 6 million
3. Grand Resource 2 million
4. Al-Rashid International 9 million
5. Fawwaz Zuraiqat 6 million
6. Salem Al-Na'ass 3 million
7. Zayyad Al-Ragheb 7 million
8. Mashhur Haditha 4 million
9. Shaker bin Zayd 4 million
10. Muhammad Saleh Al-Hourani 6.5 million
11. Tojan Faisal 4 million
12. Ministry of Energy (Jordan) 3 million
13. Zayyad Yaghmour 5 million
14. Wamidh Hussein 2 million

Kenya

1. Muhammad Othman Sa'id 10.5 million

Lebanon

1. B.B. Energy 2 million
2. Fadi Al-Alamiyya (International) 2 million
3. Haitham Seidani 2 million
4. Plant [Blunt?] Petroleum 1 million
5. George Tarkhaynan 7 million
6. President Lehoud's son 4.5 million
7. Ali Toma 1 million
8. Al-Hilal Co. (Adnan Al-Hanani) 1 million
9. International Company for Trade 1 million

Inquiry & Analysis
 and Investment
 10. Faisal Darimqa 3 million
 11. Fim Oil Company 1 million
 12. Najah Wakim 3 million
 13. Osama Marout 3 million
 14. Zuhair Al-Khatib 3.5 million

Libya
 1. Shukri Ghanem 6 million

Malaysia
 1. Fa'iq Ahmad Sharif 12.5 million
 2. Pitmall Company 4 million
 3. Trader Babar 4 million
 4. Mastek (Fa'iq Ahmad Sharif) 57 million
 5. Hawala 7 million

Myanmar Federation [Burma]
 1. Minister of Forestry 5 million

Morocco
 1. Abdallah Al-Sallawi 7.2 million
 2. Nadhel Al-Hashemi 5.7 million
 3. Muhammad Al-Basri 4.5 million

Netherlands
 1. Sy Bolt 3 million

Nigeria
 1. Hayson 7.2 million
 2. Raz Company 7.5 million
 3. A.A.G. Company (Nigerian Ambassador) 1 million
 4. Comeback 4 million

Oman
 1. Shantari Group 5 million

Palestine
 1. Abu Al-Abbas 11.5 million
 2. Abdullah Al-Hourani 8 million
 3. Wafa Tawfiq Sa'igh 3.5 million
 4. Liberation Organization 4 million
 5. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 5 million
 6. Liberation Organization (Political Bureau) 5 million

Pakistan
 1. Oil & Gas Group 10 tons
 2. Abu Abd Al-Rahman 11.5 tons
 3. Sayyed Azzaz 1 ton

Panama

1. Sevan

11.5 million

Philippines

1. Philippines Production Group

3 million

Qatar

1. Hamad bin Ali Al-Thani

14 million

2. The Duleimy Group

4 million

3. Gulf Petroleum

2 million

4. Petrolina Oil

2 million

5. Petroleum Wells Maintenance

2 million

Romania

1. Delf Aderink

1 million

2. Romanian Labor Party

5.5 million

Russia

1. The Russian State

1.366 billion

2. Zarubesneft

174.5 million

3. Russneft Ampex

86.9 million (for the office of the president, including 1 million to Mr. Tezenko, Russian Ambassador to Baghdad)

4. Communist Party Companies

137 million

5. Amircom (Unity Party/ Ministry for Emergencies)

57 million

6. Mishinoimport

1 million

7. Al-Fayco (Russian Foreign Ministry)

128.8 million

8. Yatumin (Russian Foreign Ministry)

30.1 million

9. Slavneft

25.5 million

10. Zan Gaz

49.1 million

11. Rosneft Company

35.5 million

12. Caspian Investment

8.5 million

13. Kamaneft Company

7.5 million

14. Gasprom

26 million

15. Tatneft

1 million

16. LUKoil

63 million

17. Surgut Neftegas

4 million

18. Siberia Oil & Gas company

1 million

19. Nafta Moscow Company

25.1 million

20. Onaco Company

22.2 million

21. Sidanco Company

21.2 million

22. Sibneft

8.1 million

23. Transneft

9 million

24. Yukos

2 million

25. Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovskiy)

79.8 million

26. Peace and Unity Party

34 million (the list mentions party chairwoman Sazhi Umatova)

27. Russian Committee of Solidarity with the People of Iraq

28. Russian Association for Solidarity with Iraq

29. Russneft-Gazexport

30. Uralinvest (Stroyev)

31. Moscow Science Academy

32. Romain (son of former ambassador to Baghdad)

33. Zarabsneft (Gobkin University)

34. Nordvest Group)

35. Zarbsneft & Gas

(Mr. Hassan)

36. Soyuzneftgaz (Yuri Shaftrannik)

37. Nikolayi Ryzhkov

38. Stroyneftgas

39. Akht Neft Company

40. Chechna Administration

41. Adel Al-Jablawi (I.N.M. Airways)

42. Khrozolit

43. Trader Natia

44. Chief of the President's Bureau

45. Russian Orthodox Church

46. Russian National Democratic Party

1. Najah Company

2. Asiss Company

1. Najah Company

2. Asiss Company

1. Najah Company

2. Asiss Company

1. Najah Company

2. Asiss Company

1. Najah Company

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1. Najah Company

2. Asiss Company

1. Najah Company

2. Asiss Company

1. Najah Company

2. Asiss Company

1. Najah Company

2. Asiss Company

Switzerland

- 1. Media 2 million
- 2. Delta Service 2 million
- 3. Blom 1 million
- 4. Sipol 1 million
- 5. Glencore 12 million
- 6. Lakta 2 million
- 7. Elkon [or Elcon] 23 million
- 8. Taurus 8 million
- 9. Petogas 5 million
- 10. Finar [Holdings] 21 million
- 11. Napex Company 3 million

Syria

- 1. Awadh Ammura 18 million+
- 2. Beshara Nuri 12 million+
- 3. Ghassan Shallah 11 million
- 4. Muhammad Amar Nofel 3.5 million
- 5. Tamam Shehab 1 million
- 6. Hamida Na'na' 9 million+
- 7. Farras Mustapha Tlass 6 million
- 8. Salim Al-Toon 3.5 million
- 9. Lutfi Fawzi 2.5 million
- 10. Lid Quarantees 3.5 million
- 11. Ghassan Zacharia 6 million
- 12. Muhammad Ma'moun Al-Sab'i 4 million
- 13. Hassan Al-Kayal 2 million
- 14. Anwar Al-Aqgad 2 million

Thailand

- 1. Thai Rice Trader Jaiporn 1 million

Tunisia

- 1. Madex Petroleum 6.7 million
- 2. Farnaco 3.7 million
- 3. Maydor 4 million

Turkey

- 1. Zayn Al-Abideen Ardarn 27 million+
- 2. Lutfi Dughan 1 million+
- 3. Muhammad Aslan 13 million
- 4. Techfen 15.5 million
- 5. KCK Company 1.5 million
- 6. Delta Petroleum 1 million
- 7. Sita 1 million
- 8. Ozia 2.5 million
- 9. Samir 2 million
- 10. Muhtashem 2 million
- 11. Magdar Sarjeen 2 million

- Ukraine**
1. Social Democratic Party 8.5 million
 2. Ukraine Communist Party 6 million
 3. Energy Resources 2 million
 4. Fazmash Ampex 2 million
 5. Nefogas 8 million
 6. Hugh Company (Sokolov) 5 million
 7. Orshansky 4.5 million
 8. Fiderality Torkovy 1 million
 9. Trans Isko 1 million
 10. The Ukranian House 1 million
 11. F.T.D. 2 million
 12. Socialist Party of Ukraine 2 million

United Arab Emirates

1. Fal Petrol 1.8 million
2. Ahmad Mani' Sa'id Al-Utaiba 11 million
3. Jewan Oil 7.5 million
4. Sultan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan 4 million
5. Al-Huda 22.9 million
6. Issa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan 5 million
7. Millennium 2 tons
8. Bony Fiol 1 ton

United Kingdom

1. George Galloway/Nawaf Zuraiqat 19 million
2. Mujahideen Khalq 36.5 million

U.S.A.

1. Shaker Al-Khatfaji 7 million
2. Samir Vincent 10.5 million

Vietnam

1. Vinapco 1.2 million
2. Darlink Med 2 million
3. Vinafod 6 million
4. O.S.C. 2 tons

Yemen

1. Abd Al-Karim Al-Aryani 7.8 million
2. Tawfiq Abd Al-Raheem 1.5 million
3. Shahr Abd Al-Haq 7 Million+

Yugoslavia

1. Socialist Party 22 million
2. Left Party 9.5 million
3. Italian Party 16 million
4. Kokostancha Party 9 million

B. Reactions of Implicated Individuals and Organizations

It is hardly surprising that most of those interviewed or those who reacted otherwise denied receiving such vouchers or claimed that the vouchers were received in the framework of the Oil for Food program. This latter argument is somewhat disingenuous because legitimate suppliers of goods and services under the program were paid from a trust account administered by the United Nations, and with vouchers from Saddam. Some may have made statements to newspapers not readily available to MEMRI, and others may have opted to remain silent.

Algeria

Abd Al-Majid Al-Attar, a former director-general of the Algerian national oil company SONATRAC (6 million barrels) wrote a long rebuttal in the London daily *Al-Hayat* stating that the 6 million barrels were marketed by Algerian companies. According to him, the profits were used for humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people. Al-Attar likes to remind the reader "that every airplane [carrying assistance] which landed in Baghdad cost hundreds of thousands of dollars without getting involved in details" [emphasis added].⁹ Radio Algiers announced that the state would investigate allegations of corruption.¹⁰

Bahrain

All Al-Muslim (3 million barrels) said he had visited Iraq 22 times before the war but his trips were primarily "humanitarian," and that he had sent food and cleaning materials within the framework of the Oil for Food program. As a sign of appreciation, the regime offered Al-Muslim the opportunity to sell, as a broker, 3 million barrels. Al-Muslim ran into difficulties selling the vouchers and hence he withdrew from the deal.

Hassan Al-Darazi, the son of businessman **Kadhem Al-Darazi** (2 million barrels), said his father had made a pilgrimage to Mecca but that all his activities were "purely commercial."¹¹

Bulgaria

The Socialist Party of Bulgaria (12 million). **President Georgi Parvanov**, head of the Socialist Party, characterized the allegation as "ill-advised black humor," but ordered an inquiry into the accusation.¹² President Parvanov also met with the U.S. Ambassador in Sofia and sought his help to clarify the facts regarding the list.¹³

Arthur Millholland, CEO of the Calgary-based Oilexco (9.6 million barrels), denied he had received vouchers and criticized MEMRI, which he claimed "was critical of the recent U.S.-led war with Iraq and participated in the UN's Oil for Food program to help Iraqi children [sic]." "Obviously," he hinted, MEMRI "has some motives."¹⁴

Egypt

Abd Al-Adhim Manaf (6 million barrels), the owner and editor of *The Voice of the Arabs (Sawt Al-Arab)*, and a member of parliament, offered to show evidence that he had been offered oil vouchers, but had refused them.¹⁵ **Muhammad Shatta** (14 million barrels) maintained that he served as an agent for two international petroleum companies and that all his transactions were under the Oil for Food Program. He said there was small-scale smuggling of oil of 3000 barrels at a time by small merchants, but did not explain how the smuggling was related to the vouchers he received.

Khaled Abd Al-Nasser, the son of the late Egyptian president **Gamal Abd Al-Nasser**, (16.5 million barrels), could not be reached by the Egyptian weekly *Roz Al-Youssef* because all his phones "were out of order." However, the weekly cites a number of instances of Abd Al-Nasser's involvement in activities for solidarity with Iraq.

Egyptian MP Imad Al-Gilda (14 million barrels) denied receiving any vouchers. *Roz Al-Youssef* reported that there were rumors before the war that Al-Gilda was "part of the Iraqi propaganda machine."¹⁶ **Mahmoud Mahdi Al-Ma'sarawi** (7 million barrels) attributes the inclusion of his and other names on the list to their stand against U.S. actions in Iraq.

Muhammad Hilmi (4.5 million barrels), who named his son Saddam, said he would be proud if his son would be another Saddam Hussein.¹⁶ Otherwise, he denied the allegation.

It is noteworthy that Egyptian activist **Mamdouh El-Sheikh** filed suit in May 2003 against several Egyptian politicians and journalists, accusing them of accepting bribes from Saddam which violated Egyptian law.¹⁷

France

Former interior minister Charles Pasqua (12 million barrels) denied any involvement and suggested another, unnamed former French interior minister may have been the beneficiary.¹⁸ According to *The New York Post* Mr. Pasqua, "a close friend and former colleague of Chirac ... fought to allow visits by top Iraqi officials to France in 1993."¹⁹

Patrick Maugein, CEO of the oil firm **SOCO International** (25 million barrels), was quoted as saying that he did a lot of business in Iraq under the Oil for Food program, "but none of it was illegal."²⁰ It was mentioned that the 55-year old businessman "appears to wield [influence] with **President Jacques Chirac**."²¹

Jean-Bernard Merimee (3 million and another 8 million barrels) was the French Ambassador to the United Nations and France's representative in the Security Council.

Michel Grimard (17 million barrels) is the founder of the French-Iraqi Export Club.

Gilles Munier, secretary general of the Franco-Iraqi Friendship Association, said his organization introduced numerous businesses, oil and otherwise, to contracts in Iraq, but that it was all perfectly legal. For each successful introduction, he said he "received a commission."²²

Hungary

Quoting from the **Hungarian daily Nepszabadas**, the MEP was established by **Izabella Kiraly B.** in the fall of 1993 after her expulsion from the **Hungarian Democratic Party**. Ms. Kiraly refused to talk to the Hungarian newspaper but her website includes slogans such as: "Hands off Iraq!" "Peace Instead of War," and "America! Leave the World Alone in Peace!" On her site, President Bush in a Nazi uniform with the U.S. flag in hand repeats a famous statement by Hitler: "One People, One Empire, One Ruler" (*ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuehrer*).²³

Indonesia

President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2 million as "daughter of President Sukarno" plus 8 million barrels under her own name). A spokesman told the **Australian Broadcasting Corporation** that President Megawati was "aware of the allegations."²⁴

People's Consultative Assembly speaker Muhammad Amin Rayis (4 million barrels) did not respond to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

Italy

Roberto Formigoni (24.5 million) is the president of Lombardia.

Father Benjamin (4.5 million barrels) is a French Catholic priest who arranged a meeting between the **Pope** and **Tariq Aziz**, Iraq's former deputy prime minister.²⁵

Salvatore Nicotra (20 million) is a former NATO pilot who became an oil merchant.

Jordan

Leith Shbellat (15.5 million barrels) is an Islamist with a pro-Saddam record. He stressed that the United Nations system was so stringent that it would not have allowed anyone to play with oil contracts and that the publication of the list was intended "to slander those who were defending the Iraqi people."²⁶ Ironically, he served as the chairman of the anti-corruption committee of the Jordanian parliament.²⁷

Fawwaz Zureiqat (6 million barrels) whose name was linked with the British MP **George Galloway** (see United Kingdom) said that the accusations are silly. He said that he had earned a commission of five cents per barrel, which had not been paid by the Iraqi government.

Tojan Faisal, a member of parliament (3 million barrels), said she acted to help a friend in need. She identified him as **Abd Al-Rahman Al-Qatarna**.²⁸

Fakhri Q'war (6 million barrels) is a former Jordanian MP and a journalist. He said the list "has no basis in truth and we do not know its reasons." He added that the accusation "is an attempt to slander those who stand

Wamidh Hussein (Majali) (1 million barrels) denied receiving oil. He said: "I was a member of the Popular Jordanian Committee for Solidarity with Iraq, and provided medicines. We paid for it from our own pockets."³⁰ In response to a parliamentary question, Deputy Prime Minister **Muhammad Al-Halajqa** said: "The issue is under follow-up, and we are seeking to verify whether some people have acquired [Iraqi] graft."³¹

Lebanon

Emil Emil Lahoud (4.5 million barrels) is a Lebanese MP and the son of Lebanese President **Emil Lahoud**. In an interview with **the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat**, Lahoud maintained that his inclusion on the list was aimed at undermining the position taken by his father which "supports the [Palestinian] resistance, stands by Syria, rejects the occupation of Iraq, and demands the liberation of all the Palestinian lands."³²

Osama Ma'rouf (3 million barrels), another MP and head of the Nasserite Popular Organization, admitted receiving a voucher to sell oil for commission. However, he added that the voucher had cost Iraq nothing and that he had in any event never exercised the option.³³

Najah Wakim (3 million barrels), a former MP, denied the allegation, maintaining that **Al-Mada** editor **Fakhri Kareem** said on television, without specifying time or venue, that he received the list from the CIA without supporting evidence.³⁴ Kareem told **the Lebanese daily Al-Nahar** that he had never spoken with Wakim.³⁵

Libya

Shukri Ghanem (6 million barrels) is the Libyan prime minister.

Morocco

Muhammad Al-Basri (4.5 million barrels) who has since died, was a former Moroccan Socialist leader.³⁶

Panama

One surprise on the list was **Mr. [Benon] Sevan** (11.5 million barrels) who is the Executive Director of the Oil for Food program. A U.N. spokeswoman denied the charges and said that the U.N. secretary-general was completely satisfied with Sevan's integrity.³⁷ Mr. Sevan denied the allegations and stated that "it was incumbent on those who published these allegations to provide the necessary documents."³⁸

Qatar

Abd Al-Aziz Mubarak Al-Duleimi (4 million barrels) said he had contracts to sell 10 million barrels as a broker under the U.N. supervision and had nothing to do with Saddam's coupons or bribes.³⁹

Romania

Two entities are listed under Romania: **Delf Aderlink** (1 million barrels) and the **Romanian Labor Party** (5.5 million barrels). The following is a slightly edited version of an email to MEMRI from a Romanian journalist: "The owner of **Bulf Drilling**, **Cornel Bulf**, is a pretty well known Romanian businessman, deeply involved in oil business. He has a lot of privileged businesses with the state-owned oil company **Petrom**. He claimed that all the Iraqi oil that he sold was with U.N. permission – and he showed me some approvals in this regard. Nevertheless, I take into consideration that he could have traded Iraqi oil both with and without approval, and that U.N. approvals were meant to cover his illicit trade.

"The son of the president of Labor Party, **Ioan Cristian Nicolae**, in connection with some politicians, has just bought a huge building in Bucharest for \$1.5 million."⁴⁰

Russia

Russia, which received the greatest number of oil vouchers, has said nothing. **Nikolay Ryzhkov** (13 million barrels) was a U.S.S.R. prime minister.

South Africa
Tokyo Saxwele Mvelaphanda Holdings (MVL) reacted angrily to its inclusion in the list, but has not denied buying oil under the Oil for Food program.⁴¹

Spain
Ali Balout or Balout (8.8 million barrels) is a Lebanese journalist.⁴²

Switzerland
Glencore (12 million barrels) is the largest commodity trader in Switzerland.
Petrogas (5 million barrels) is listed in Switzerland under three sub-companies – Petrogas Services, Petrogas Distribution, and Petrogas Resources – and is associated with the Russian company Rosneftegazetroy (35.5 million barrels).

Syria
Hamida Na'na (over 9 million barrels) is the owner of *Al-Wifaq Al-Arabi* and the author of a biography of former Iraqi deputy prime minister *Tariq Aziz*. She is currently writing a biography of Iraqi general Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as *Chemical Ali*.⁴³
Farras Mustafa Tlass (6 million barrels) is the son of Mustafa Tlass, Syrian Defense Minister and one of the pillars of the Syrian Bath party. He said his company had bought oil from Iraq under the Oil for Food program and denied receiving any oil outside the framework of that agreement.⁴⁴

United Kingdom

1. There is a reference on the margin of the list to "a Mr. Burhan Al-Chelebi" and "Fortrum and Gas-Oy," a Finnish purchasing company, in an agreement on December 29, 1999. There is also another reference to former MP George Galloway, as beneficiary of 3 million barrels.
2. There is another reference to George Galloway's receiving 4 million barrels, through Jordanian Fawwaz Zureiqat, of Aredio Petroleum, in an agreement on July 10, 2001.
3. Similarly, Middle East Advance Semi-Conductor, a Jordanian company, referred to Galloway as receiving 3 million barrels in an agreement on June 8, 2001, also via Mr. Fawwaz Zureiqat.
4. Similarly, March 5, 2001 - 2 million barrels
5. Similarly, December 12, 2002 - 3 million barrels
6. Similarly, June 3, 2002 - 3 million barrels

Thus, "George Galloway as beneficiary is cited six times, twice in the name of Finnish and French companies and the rest Jordanian under the name of Fawwaz Zureiqat. All these requests were approved by the minister of oil, with his signature."⁴⁵
When asked by *ABC News* about being on the list, Galloway replied: "Not one brass farthing. I've never seen a barrel of oil, owned one, bought one."⁴⁶
The *Mujahideen Khalq* (36.5) is an organization which opposes the Iranian regime which had operated from within Iraq under the Saddam regime. The United States has classified it as a terrorist organization and it has recently been ordered to leave Iraq.

United States

Shaker Al-Khafaji (7 million barrels) advanced \$400,000 to Scott Ritter, former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq. Ritter produced a documentary purporting to tell the true story of the weapons inspections, which in his telling were corrupted by sinister U.S. manipulation.⁴⁷
Samir Vincent (10.5 million barrels): In 2000, Vincent, an Iraqi-born American who lived in the U.S. since 1958, organized a delegation of Iraqi religious leaders to the U.S., which met with former president Jimmy Carter.

The Saddam Oil Vouchers Affair, Part II: Arab Media Reactions

Arab Media Ignore the List

In an op-ed titled "Beautiful Masks over Ugly Faces" in the London daily *Al-Hayat*, **Salama Na'mat** criticizes Arab television and other media for showing little interest in the oil voucher scandal. Because releasing the list shows Saddam Hussein's bribery of hundreds of politicians and journalists from 50 Arab and foreign countries, the Arab media have neither pursued the issue nor investigated the matter. In fact, Na'mat says, the publication of the list has triggered even less interest in official circles than in the media. Na'mat continues:

"The reality is that some Arab governments perhaps do not object that politicians and media people benefit from Saddam's bribes either because they are also involved or see no harm in bribes since it is a normal practice by the Arab regimes in varying degrees. Perhaps the political agenda of the deposed Iraqi regime was [no different] than the agendas of these governments. It mattered not to those who were bribed and those who shut their eyes that the money they received from the deposed regime to sing its praise were taken away from the Iraqi people which was destroyed by Saddam's wars and his stupid policies.⁴⁸

Ahmad Al-Rabi', a columnist in the London daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, points out that much of the Arab press, with the exception of the Iraqi, Jordanian, and Lebanese press, has not dared to publish the lists because they included powerful political figures. The Iraqi and Kuwaiti press, in particular, have reason to do so because they have been making the point that Saddam's defenders were not driven by nationalist or Islamic principles, but were paid off.⁴⁹

An op-ed by **Mazen Hammad** in the *Qatari daily Al-Watan* under the title "Publish the Names, May Allah Have Mercy on You!" wrote:

"The scandal is growing, and its threads, hour after hour, are encircling the necks of many who allege pan-Arabism and nationalism as well as those traders of opportunities. While it is too early to point an accusing finger at anyone in particular, those who have 'received' from the Saddam regime, in both Arab and non-Arab countries, for aggrandizing and defending him, count in the hundreds, if not more.

"The scandal is growing because among the names are heads of political parties, parliamentarians and the children of heads of states and governments.

"The scandal is growing because it is no secret that hundreds of apartments, Mercedes automobiles, cash and various grants were distributed by Saddam's aides to ministers, under secretaries, journalists, writers and artists. ... It is also important that no one be excluded [from punishment] if his name appeared on the list regardless of the amount of his influence and the level of his position...

"[The scandal] is a flagrant example of the duality of the life of the Arab politician: he lectures nationalism during the day and nurses oil at night."⁵⁰

'Once Again, the Citizens Pay'

Writing in the *Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa*, columnist **Shaker Al-Nabulsi** says: "At the outset, it appears that the list ... is valid and the evidence is that some of those whose names were mentioned have not denied it." Al-Nabulsi's column focuses on Jordanian Islamist **Leith Shbeilat**, one of the biggest beneficiaries of Saddam's oil vouchers and one of the most vocal supporters of the Saddam regime in its heyday. Al-Nabulsi expresses his astonishment at the relationship between an Islamist who advocates an Islamic state run according to Shari'a law and the secular regime of Saddam which despised the clerics and killed and tortured many of them.⁵¹

Jubran Tweiny, the editor of the Lebanese daily *Al-Nahar*, wrote: "Once again, the country [Lebanon] and the citizens pay for the involvement of some officials in financial scandals and money laundering and oil vouchers, the payment of bribes ... without the authorities trying to put an end to them.

"It is incumbent on the state to respond clearly and forcefully to the sources of the news and prove the innocence of all those who were accused of receiving money from Saddam or smuggled money from the former Iraqi regime against commission."⁵²

In the *Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa*, in an article titled "The Barrels of the Bath," **Daoud Al-Basri** writes that the voucher scandal was not so much about the millions of barrels of oil given to "the militants and their

international partners" as "a scandal for the international and Arab conscience and the environment of silence and deceit which accompanied all the stages of bribing..." He continued: "We will not forget the bribing of those who forged contemporary Iraqi history and those who made Saddam the anticipated Messiah of the Ba'ath."⁵³ *Al-Sharyq Al-Awsat* columnist Samir Attallah wrote in "The Mother of [All] Vouchers: "[What is really repulsive] is the language of the total purchase [of supporters] or total hatred... [the regime] needed people who hate what it hated and offended what it offended... What interests me about the vouchers and the Oil for Food [program] ... are the waitings of the former president displaying pictures of children dying from hunger and disease ... and the million and one stories about the poverty and neediness that transformed Iraq from a rich country to a country celebrating the birthday of a president who basks in his presidential palaces amidst poverty, silence, oppression, and the processions of the dead."⁵⁴

Pro-Saddam Al-Quds Al-Arabi: The List is Only Alleged; Kill the Messenger

In the pro-Saddam London daily *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, the paper's Baghdad correspondent writes about "the alleged oil list:"

"The publication of the list by the newspaper *Al-Mada* ... did not draw much attention in Iraq because Iraqis were already familiar with this fact. Many Iraqis and particularly those involved in the oil trade business... were aware that the regime was selling quantities of its oil to oil companies and individuals with which it was associated or had good relations to circumvent the UN sanctions which controlled Iraq for 13 years. The policy of the old regime was to support anyone who stood by it or was trying to export goods to Iraq outside the sanctions."⁵⁵

In another report from its correspondent in Amman, Jordan, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* tried to divert attention towards the purported source of the list (according to him, this source was Iraqi Governing Council member and Iraqi National Congress head Ahmad Chalabi) and to smear him:

"The lighting of fire recently under the vouchers by the central figures of the Iraqi National Congress against Jordanian intellectuals and journalists is nothing new for the Jordanian government, or for the intellectuals themselves whom the new rulers of Iraq are trying to 'hit'."⁵⁶

Al-Jazeera: Faisal Al-Qassim's Hidden Pro-Saddam Agenda

Faisal al Qassim, host of the popular *Opposite Direction* program on Qatari *Al-Jazeera satellite television*, chose to attack, on his program devoted to the vouchers affair, not the beneficiaries but their critics. He said: "Do these bribed, swindlers and the traders of homelands have the right to discuss honesty? Aren't the records of many of them blotted with bribes, swindling and fraud? How many millions did the previous Iraqi opposition receive from the Central Intelligence Agency?"

"Can those who sold Iraq wholesale to the occupier open the files of corruption and the purchase of consciences...? It is true that the deposed regime wasted millions to buy friends and supporters, but haven't the newcomers handed Iraq oil in its entirety to the American occupier?"⁵⁷ On February 17, 2004, the London Arabic-language daily *Al-Hayat* published Iraqi intelligence documents released by the Iraqi daily *Al-Mu'tamar*, the organ of the Iraqi National Congress, linking Faisal Al-Qassim to Iraqi intelligence.⁵⁸

'They Must Be Published Morally'

Dr. Abd Al-Ghani Mahmud, head of the international law department at Egypt's Al-Azhar University, provided a fitting epilogue to this affair. Dr. Mahmud told the Egyptian weekly *Roz Al-Youssef*:

"Those who have the instruments to influence their peoples - intellectuals, politicians, political parties or institutions - have become in some of these countries propaganda mouthpieces for a corrupt dictatorial regime which has dragged the whole region into oblivion. This problem calls for a firm stand. Those who collected money from this regime, which destroyed its people with chemical weapons while enjoying a life of luxury in palaces during the sanctions, are partners in wrongdoing the [Iraqi] people through their silence about the Search previous MEMRI publications at our website: www.memri.org

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1 See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 160, January 29, 2004, The Beneficiaries of Saddam's Oil Vouchers: The List of 270,
<http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA16004>.

- 2 Al-Zaman (Baghdad), January 26, 2004.
- 3 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 26, 2004.
- 4 Al-Mashreq (Baghdad), January 30, 2004.
- 5 Al-Siyassah (Kuwait), February 4, 2004.
- 6 Al-Hayat (London), January 31, 2004.
- 7 Al-Mada (Baghdad), February 7, 2004.
- 8 A letter to the Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2004.
- 9 Al-Hayat (London) February 5, 2004.
- 10 Al-Zaman (Baghdad), February 12, 2004.
- 11 Al-Hayat (London), January 30, 2004.
- 12 The Associated Press, January 28, 2004.
- 13 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 1, 2004.
- 14 Calgary Sun (Canada), February 1, 2004.
- 15 Al-Qahira (Egypt), February 3, 2004.
- 16 Al-Ahram Al-Arabi (Egypt), May 24, 2003.
- 17 Jamal Halaby, United Press International, January 28, 2004.
- 18 Al-Zaman (Baghdad), January 28, 2004.
- 19 The New York Post, January 28, 2004.
- 20 The Daily Telegraph (London), January 28, 2004.
- 21 Intelligence Online, #435 of August 29, 2002.
- 22 The Daily Telegraph (London), January 28, 2004.
- 23 BBC, January 29, 2004.
- 24 Laksamana.Net (The Politics and Economics Portal), February 2, 2004.
- 25 ABC News, January 29, 2004.
- 26 Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), January 28, 2004.
- 27 Al-Siyassah (Kuwait), February 4, 2004.
- 28 Al-Anwar (Lebanon), February 6, 2004.
- 29 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 26, 2004.
- 30 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 26, 2004.
- 31 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 26, 2004.
- 32 United Press International, January 28, 2004.
- 33 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 7, 2004.
- 34 Al-Qassim Al-Musharak (Baghdad), February 11, 2004.
- 35 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 10, 2004.
- 36 Al-Nahar (Lebanon), February 10, 2004.
- 37 Al-Siyassah (Kuwait), February 4, 2004.
- 38 Al-Hayat (London), January 30, 2004.
- 39 Al-Zaman (Baghdad), February 11, 2004.
- 40 Al-Sharq (Qatar), January 29, 2004.
- 41 The email is dated February 2, 2004 and is in MEMRI's records.
- 42 Sunday Times (Zambia), January 30, 2004.
- 43 ABC News, January 29, 2004.
- 44 Al-Siyassah (Kuwait), February 4, 2004.
- 45 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 26, 2004.
- 46 Al-Mada (Iraq), January 25, 2004.
- 47 ABC World News Tonight, January 29, 2004.
- 48 <http://state.msn.com/id/2071502>
- 49 Al-Hayat (London), January 29, 2004.
- 50 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 31, 2004.
- 51 Al-Watan (Qatar), February 2, 2004.
- 52 Al-Siyassah (Kuwait), February 4, 2004.
- 53 Al-Nahar (Lebanon), January 29, 2004.

⁵⁴ *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), February 6, 2004.

⁵⁵ *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (London), January 28, 2004.

⁵⁶ *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (London), January 28, 2004.

⁵⁷ *Al-Jazeera* (Qatar), February 3, 2004.

⁵⁸ *Al-Hayat* (London), February 17, 2004. The liberal Web site www.elaph.com published photocopies of the originals, February 15, 2004.

⁵⁹ *Roz Al-Youssef* (Egypt), January 31-February 6, 2004.